Knowledge, Capabilities and Human Capital Formation in Economic Growth by Paul A David (with the assistance of John Gabriel Goddard Lopez)
 
Knowledge, Capabilities and 
Human Capital Formation in 
Economic Growth
Paul A David
with the assistance of 
John Gabriel Goddard Lopez




WP 01/13  Knowledge, Capabilities and Human Capital Formation in Economic Growth i
 
 NZ TREASURY 
WORKING PAPER 
SERIES 01/13 
Knowledge, Capabilities and Human Capital Formation in 
Economic Growth 
A Research Report to for the New Zealand Treasury 
   
MONTH/ YEAR  June/2001 
First draft: May14 August 2000 
Second draft: 27 December 2000 
This version: 10 April 2001 
   
AUTHOR  Prof Paul A David 
All Souls College, Oxford & Stanford University 
All Souls College, Oxford OX1 4AL, U.K. 









  John Gabriel Goddard Lopez 
Hertford College, Oxford 
 
 
NZ TREASURY  New Zealand Treasury, PO Box 3724, Wellington 6008, 
NEW ZEALAND 







A CKNOWLEDGEMENTS  The present version of the text reflects the views of the principal 
author, who gratefully acknowledges the able assistance of Gabriel 
Goddard, and the helpful comments received on previous versions 
from an anonymous academic reviewer and from Ron Crawford 
and members of the staff of the New Zealand Treasury. 
 
DISCLAIMER  The views expressed are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the New Zealand Treasury. 
  
WP 01/13  Knowledge, Capabilities and Human Capital Formation in Economic Growth ii
 
Knowledge, Capabilities and  
Human Capital Formation in  
Economic Growth 
Abstract 
This monograph, which has been prepared as a Research Report to the New Zealand (NZ) 
Treasury, undertakes three main tasks: (1) describing the various forms of tangible and 
intangible human capital, their relationship to “capabilities” affecting human well-being, and 
the channels through which they may contribute to economic growth; (2) reviewing the major 
theoretical and empirical findings on the microeconomic determinants, and macroeconomic 
growth effects of investment in human capital; (3) reviewing salient general implications for 
policies affecting human capital, and indicating measures specifically germane to the situation 
of the NZ economy. For these purposes, the concept of human capital is defined 
comprehensively, so that it embraces capacities for interpreting flows of sensory data and 
structured information required for goal-directed individual actions and inter-personal 
transactions, and for providing various physical labour service-inputs in ordinary production 
processes. More conventionally, it subsumes the creative faculties for generating new 
scientific and technological knowledge, the cognitive basis of entrepreneurship, and the 
competences for managing market and non-market production as well as household 
consumption activities. The report is organised in three main Parts that address the three 
major objectives, taking each in its turn. A detailed Table of Contents and an Executive 
Summary precede the text, which is followed by extensive bibliographic references. 
A unifying conceptual framework is developed to (a) identify the micro-level processes 
involved in human capital formation; (b) implicitly aggregate the resulting qualities and 
capabilities of individuals belonging to successive population cohorts; (c) trace the 
interrelated influences that the forms of human capital have upon macroeconomic 
performance. The review of empirical evidence at the macroeconomic level features a 
discussion of the deficiencies of data and methods in many of the international cross-section 
studies, and contrasts recent econometric findings on the role of education in economic 
growth among the developed economies with the conclusions derived through more detailed 
analyses of their historical experiences. Significant policy implications do emerge from the 
modern macroeconomic growth literature, but these are very broad in nature and not 
particularly germane to the situation of small, open economies that may lack a substantial 
industrial base or the extensive human and institutional infrastructure required to generate the 
knowledge-base needed for their peoples’ well-being and their firms’ competitive success in 
international markets. Nor does the received literature adequately treat the implications of  
WP 01/13  Knowledge, Capabilities and Human Capital Formation in Economic Growth iii
 
such economies’ potential to rapidly alter their respective human resource endowments 
through differential population migration.  
Consideration of human capital policies geared more closely to the specific challenges and 
opportunities facing New Zealand’s economy leads to the formulation of a number of novel 
proposals. These would reform tax treatment of education and training investments by 
residents and immigrants alike; subsidise new voluntary institutions developing on-the-job 
training programs under industry sponsorship; undertake public information infrastructure 
investments in order to reduce the costs of effective access to global knowledge bases in 
science and technology. Proposals also are considered for integrated government 
programmes to accelerate the closing of persistent socio-economic disparities within NZ 
society, such as those between Maori and non-Maori.  
 
JEL CLASSIFICATION  H24, I28, J24, N30, O15, O38 
KEYWORDS  human capital, capabilities, knowledge, education, on-the-job 
training, R&D, productivity, macroeconomic growth theory, 
investment taxation and subsidiesC67 (input output models), L16 
(macroeconomic industrial structure)  
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Executive Summary 
Objectives, Scope and Organisation of the Report 
Three main tasks are undertaken in this report: 
1  identifying the various forms of human capital and the channels through which these 
may contribute to economic growth; 
2  reviewing the recent economic literature for the main theoretical and empirical 
findings it offers regarding the factors affecting formation of human capital, and the 
latter’s effects upon long-run processes of economic development and productivity 
growth; 
3  indicating the salient policy implications concerning human capital that are of 
general relevance, and calling attention to those that pertain more specifically to the 
present situation of the New Zealand (NZ) economy. 
The findings are presented and discussed in three main Parts, which address each of the 
foregoing objectives in turn, and each of which contains three major sub-sections. This 
organisational structure is detailed by the Table of Contents. From the latter it may be 
seen that the headings in this, the Executive Summary, correspond immediately to the 
report’s nine major sub-sections. 
An introductory overview of the report as a whole appears in the text at the beginning of 
Part I, pointing to the limitations as well as the strengths of the particular economic 
approach that has been adopted here.  
Human Capital and Economic Growth: Concepts, Definitions and Taxonomies 
The economist’s notion of “human capital” refers to a particular set of acquired human 
capabilities. These generally are taken to be durable traits, persisting over some 
significant portion of the life of the person who acquires them, and yielding some positive 
effects upon the person’s performance in one or more among a wide variety of socially 
valued activities.  
The concept of human capital is comprehensively defined, and thus embraces:  
a  the capacity for interpreting flows of sensory data and structured information 
required for purposive individual actions and inter-personal transactions among 
economic agents; 
b  the capacity for providing a variety of physical labour service-inputs in ordinary 
production processes; 
c  the cognitive basis of entrepreneurial economic activities;  
d  the key resource utilised for managing market and non-market production, as well 
as household consumption activities; 
e  the creative agency in the generation of new knowledge underlying technological 
and organisational innovations.  
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The subject matter’s complexity and potential importance should be apparent from the 
array of distinct and salient roles that “human capital” plays in economic life. The varieties 
of forms in which human capital may appear are taxonomically organised by Figure 1. 

































Some human capital traits are classed as tangible, because they are directly perceptible 
in physical characteristics of the individual agent – such as stature, strength, physical 
endurance; whereas other elements of human capital are intangible. Cognitive ability, 
procedural capabilities, as well as certain psycho-motor based skills usually are taken to 
be the main categories comprising the individual economic agent’s “intangible” (human) 
capital.  
Current usage of the term “human capital” among economists, however, typically refers to 
those intangible capabilities whose formation or acquisition through study, training and 
experience is costly – either in terms of material resources expended, real income (output 
of material goods and services) that is foregone, or both.  
The quantitative economic importance that human capital thus defined has come to hold 
in modern advanced societies is suggested by a variety of indicators: 
•  Estimates of the real stocks of capital in the US (derived by cumulating constant 
dollar investment expenditures) find that the ratio between the total non-tangible stock 
and the conventional, tangible stock of capital more than doubled between 1929 and 
1990, rising from 0.54 to 1.15. 
•  At both dates intangible human capital (formed by education and training 
investments) represented about three-fourths of the total non-tangible stock; within 
the remaining fourth, the stock of R&D capital in 1990 was only half as large as that 
formed by investments health, safety and human mobility. 
•  Estimates of the share of gross private business product in the U.S. represented by 
the imputed real (private) returns on intangible human capital engaged in market 
production show that it has been roughly constant at 0.25 over the decades since 
1929; and almost on a par with the unchanging (0.27) share attributed to the gross 
returns on tangible business capital.   
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There is increasing recognition of a wide range of “human capabilities” – only some 
among which are acquired through formal education – that affect economic agents’ 
performances other than as workers. Consumption activities, including the enjoyment of 
leisure and recreational pursuits, come under that heading. So does invention, 
entrepreneurship and related innovative economic behaviours. An understanding of the 
circumstances that favour successful application of one’s own capabilities, and, indeed, 
self-awareness of the latter, may also be included in the list of economically important 
human capabilities.  
A recent, highly inclusive measure of the capitalised value of the flows of all market and 
non-market “human” services, is due to Jorgenson and Fraumeni. It places the value of 
the total stock of tangible and intangible human capital at 10 times the size of the 
contemporaneous real stock of educational capital. 
It is appropriate to draw a distinction between “economic growth”, a term now 
conventionally used to refer to increases in real GDP per capita, and the potentially much 
broader concept of “economic welfare”. The former measure delimits the set of currently 
available commodities that are counted as satisfying the population’s material wants to 
just those which (typically) pass through market channels.  
By contrast, “economic welfare” is a notion that has far greater potential scope. Measures 
of economic welfare (MEW) impute values to uses of time in non-market pursuits, such as 
“leisure activities”, childcare, and education beyond compulsory levels. But, the growing 
relative importance of the latter is not correspondingly reflected directly in the growth of 
GDP per capita. 
In addition to being seen as an instrumental contributor to the productive resources of 
society, and therefore discussed under the rubric of “human capital”, the “capabilities” of 
human beings are more direct sources of their satisfactions and sense of well-being. 
Many aspects of the human condition are valued ends in themselves, as well as means of 
achieving material economic abundance. Certain to be included among such “ends” are 
the following:  
•  individuals’ prospects of health and longevity, 
•  the ability to comprehend and communicate with others about the events and forces 
that are affecting one’s life, 
•  access to the cultural and multi-cultural heritages of one’s society, 
•  the capability to express and protect one’s own interests through legal and political 
procedures.  
Several further points are required to flesh out the implications of conceptualising human 
knowledge as a form of capital, and relating it in that way to economic development and 
growth:  
•  Knowledge can be viewed as an intangible economic asset, but this kind of capital is 
even less homogeneous than is the case among tangible capital goods; each and 
every “bit” of knowledge is truly unique. 
•  A distinction can be drawn between the kind of knowledge that is manifested in the 
possessor’s specific capacities, or substantive “task competences”, and the kind that 
is reflected in more generically applicable capabilities referred to as “procedural 
competences”.   
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•  Knowledge that underlies “task competence” and “procedural competence” can in 
many instances be codified and made available as information, but there is also a 
tacit dimension in some types of knowledge that may underlie either task competence 
or procedural competence. Both forms of competence, whether narrowly task specific 
or generically procedural, may thus resist being fully codified, but that too reflects the 
balance between economic benefits and costs.  
•  “Social capital” is a form of knowledge that is more a relational asset than a personal 
attribute possessed by individual actors. Its properties are akin to those of so-called 
“public goods”, enabling social capital to be concurrently shared and to resist private 
appropriation. It may be viewed metaphorically as a species of “glue” holding the 
constituent members of society together, and so permitting them to function more 
productively in the economic sphere. Social capital must be constructed jointly 
through direct human interaction, whereas such is not necessarily the case for other 
forms of human capital. 
A Heuristic Framework: Integrating the Micro- and Macroeconomic Perspectives 
The unifying framework adopted in this report (a) identifies the micro-level processes 
involved in “tangible” and “intangible” human capital formation, respectively; (b) implicitly 
aggregates the resulting qualities and capabilities of individuals belonging to successive 
population cohorts; (c) traces the interrelated influences that the forms of human capital 
have upon macroeconomic performance.  
“Qualitative” aspects of tangible human capital affect the level of potential labour service 
inputs per capita, and in that way they directly affect an economy’s potential level of 
output per head of population, given the level of potential (full employment) output per unit 
of labour service input. Underlying compositional shifts, due to demographic-economic 
interactions affecting the age distribution of the population, may result in changes at the 
aggregate level. 
Substantial changes also occur in the tangible components of average “labour quality”, 
due to forces affecting the physical characteristics of members of the workforce (e.g. 
nutritional status, stature, strength, susceptibility to illness and disability, etc.). Although 
these characteristics are governed proximately by physiological processes, the latter are 
sensitive to environmental conditions and will be affected to a significant degree by past 
and current expenditures of material resources, as well as by the state of knowledge 
about how physical well-being can be protected and enhanced.  
Technological and other developments affecting the codification of knowledge of different 
kinds shape both the formation of intangible human capital, and the latter’s relevance (and 
value) in economic activities. The codifiability of knowledge carries implications for the 
institutionalisation of educational processes, and the costs of communicating knowledge 
among individual economic agents and production organisations of all sorts. It therefore 
impinges upon the costs of transferring knowledge, and upon the access that agents have 
to economically useful information.  
These microeconomic and macroeconomic perspectives on the relationships between 
human capital and economic growth may be integrated within a single schematic view, or 
heuristic framework. Figure 2 (below) depicts these in a simplified form. This schematic 
has a dual “heuristic” value: First, it indicates the connections between the micro-level 
determinants, and the macroeconomic effects of the various dimensions of human capital 
formation. Second, it highlights the positive feed-back loops in the dynamic system that 
connects the micro-level and macro-level outcomes. The latter create the potential for a  
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self-reinforcing process of growth based upon sustained increases in productivity. But, 
self-reinforcing dynamics may result in vicious downward spirals, as well as in virtuous 
upward spirals. 
When human capital formation is viewed either at the micro- or the macroeconomic level, 
it becomes evident that there are structural and institutional features peculiar to the 
markets for information goods, and for the labour services of free workers, which cause 
those markets not to function well in terms of allocative efficiency, and to perform less well 
than the markets for ordinary economic goods. 
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Various specific micro-level conditions that lead to “market failures” affecting human 
capital formation, both tangible and intangible in decentralised system of resource 
allocation, can be identified under the following distinct headings: 
•  verification problems; 
•  monitoring problems; 
•  asymmetric information and agency problems;  
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•  a variety of technical complementarities, which result in “spill-overs” of costs and/or 
benefits among agents; 
•  interdependencies among the preferences of decision-agents, which give rise to un-
priced welfare effects of individual allocation decisions.  
There are really only two broad classes of reasons for the appearance of gaps between 
private and social marginal rates of return on human capital investments. (1) The 
existence of non-pecuniary “externalities”, and the interdependence of individuals’ 
preferences over outcomes, result in some significant portions of the benefits and/or the 
costs of particular investments failing to accrue to the agents responsible for undertaking 
those projects; (2) there are persisting “market imperfections” (including incomplete and 
missing markets) that prevent relative prices from properly signalling relative private 
marginal costs and private marginal productivities.  
Such conditions are likely to result in persisting differentials between the social and the 
private rates of return on investments in human capital. There is thus no automatic 
mechanism guaranteeing that the dynamic allocation of human resources in a competitive 
market economy will be socially optimal.  
In addition to adversely affecting the society’s overall levels of human capital, the peculiar 
susceptibility to such “market failures” implies that the composition of the resulting human 
capital stock is also likely to be sub-optimal; in some instances the social rate of return on 
a given form of human capital investment may fall considerably below the private rate, 
even though the opposite state of affairs is more typical.  
The Microeconomics of Human Capital Formation 
Considering the choices that individual agents face over their life-cycle provides a useful 
framework for reviewing the microeconomic literature about human capital formation. The 
critical life-cycle decisions are: primary and secondary education, higher education and/or 
vocational training, on-the-job training, mid-career training and retraining, and retirement. 
Due to the complementarities that exist among those forms of investment, and the 
sequential nature of these choice-points, economic circumstances prevailing at the early 
stages of a person’s life continue (indirectly) to exercise leverage over the investment 
decisions that will be made at much later stages in the life-cycle. 
Decisions about primary and secondary schooling rarely are left to the children, and 
consequently it is necessary to consider the influences impinging on the choices made by 
parents and other agents in the educational process. Parental education and income are 
important determinants of the physical, cognitive and social skills with which the children 
are endowed. 
Parents’ choices are, however, limited by: 
•  their information about the options available and the consequences of these; 
•  the control they can exert over the children’s input into the educational process;  
•  governmental regulations; and,  
•  other influences on early education that are outside the sphere of the family 
background, such as the ethnic environment or religion.  
The stage of higher education and/or vocational training is closest to the main 
microeconomic perspective established in human capital theory: educational choices will  
WP 01/13  Knowledge, Capabilities and Human Capital Formation in Economic Growth 7
 
involve inter-temporal trade-offs between the consequences of finding a job in the labour 
market now, or investing time and money in additional schooling, in the expectation of 
gaining higher income opportunities later on.  
Under a decentralised competitive market regime, several different sources of “market 
failure” will constrain and distort individuals’ choices with regard to investing in human 
capital:  
•  capital market imperfections limit the ability to finance many kinds of human capital;  
•  the economic benefits from education or training may not be fully appropriable by the 
agent involved in making the decision or bearing significant parts of the costs;  
•  the long gestation periods involved mean that decisions will be taken under conditions 
of fundamental uncertainty rather than calculable risk;  
•  where human abilities are not readily observable ex ante, hiring and related decisions 
by employers are made on the basis of observable but inaccurate “indicators”, 
including educational “credentials” that thereby may acquire private “signalling” value.  
On-the-job training (combining production, learning-by-doing, and mentoring by co-
workers) is important for two distinct reasons: 
•  It is a prime source of specific skills that cannot normally be obtained through formal 
education or vocational training courses, but firms may have little incentive to pay for 
the training because: (a) workers cannot be legally constrained from quitting, and (b) 
there may be conflicts between the worker and the firm about the type of training 
desired. If workers do not have the resources to invest in training, and there are 
borrowing constraints, the result is under-provision of specific skills.  
•  Since a large part of what people know is “tacit”, acquired experimentally, and 
transferred by demonstration, there is a need for workers and firms to use on-the-job 
training as a mechanism of knowledge transfer in which the knowledge holders 
actively participate. 
•  Specificity of certain skills has consequences beyond the under-supply of training: it 
can also constrain the financing that is made available to entrepreneurs. 
The formation of work-based skills that are job-specific but not strictly firm-specific is a 
potentially important source of labour market externalities, the existence of which has a 
direct bearing on public policy design. To be able to establish empirically whether or not 
job-specific human capital accumulation (through learning by doing and formal on-the-job 
training) was an important feature in particular occupations and industrial sectors, 
obviously, would be useful. Unfortunately, despite much sophisticated econometric effort 
to identify various, distinct forms of experience-based “learning” from available panel data, 
empirically grounded general conclusions about the creation and value of transferable 
skills formed through OJT have proved frustratingly elusive.  
That workers must finance training is not per se a market failure, but under-provision of 
skills can arise when workers do not have the resources to invest in training and there are 
borrowing constraints. There are serious issues of adverse selection and moral hazard 
that accentuate the credit constraints upon workers in the absence of third-party loan 
guarantees, and, indeed, in the absence of state backed lending for such purposes. 
In an environment of technological change some skills become obsolete, which raises the 
matter of midlife training and retraining. A problem with retraining is that older workers 
have less time to recoup the investment in the form of enhanced productivity; as a  
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consequence, workers above a certain age will not have adequate incentives to learn new 
skills, nor will firms wish to finance the training they require.  
The anticipation of rapid changes in industrial practices and technologies encourages: (a) 
workers to seek early education and training that allow them to be more flexible, and (b) 
firms to adopt new industrial practices that can be grouped under the heading of “just-in-
time learning”. Where technological change is both rapid and disruptive, the induced 
demand for broader general training among the young may conflict with governmental 
educational policies, especially because the latter often respond to pressures from 
employers calling for workers with highly specific new skills. 
The systemic vision of the sequence of educational choices points to the importance of 
corrective government intervention in early stages of the life-cycle. Because schooling is a 
foundation for successfully undertaking later investments in education and training, 
including various kinds of on-the-job training, failures affecting the formation of 
“educational capital” at the lower, primary and secondary stages will raise the costs or 
reduce the effectiveness of providing university education.  
Human capital’s role in retirement generally is neglected by the microeconomics literature. 
Yet, people’s intangible capital needs do change when they enter retirement. In view of 
the demographic trends towards ageing of the population and the growing relative 
importance of the time and resources that retired individuals are allocating in pursuits 
other than market work, “education for recreation and retirement” is a subject that would 
seem to merit more serious attention. 
Human Capital and the Macroeconomics of Growth: Theoretical Investigations 
The neoclassical theory of growth developed by Solow and Swan centred 
macroeconomists’ attention throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s on tangible (physical) 
capital formation as the driver of economic growth. However, the theory showed that, 
because of decreasing marginal returns in substituting physical capital for labour, the 
accumulation of capital would not indefinitely support a steady rate of growth in labour 
productivity. 
From this perspective it became clear that technological change, not capital formation, 
held the key to sustained growth in average labour productivity. Growth accounting 
studies of the U.S. and other advanced nations in the 20
th century confirmed that total 
factor productivity (generally attributed to technological progress), and not the rate of 
accumulation of tangible capital per unit of labour (i.e., “capital-intensity”) was the 
proximate source of rising labour productivity.  
The recent literature on “endogenous economic growth” emerged primarily as an attempt 
to encompass the sources of technological progress and hence of sustained productivity 
growth  within the general equilibrium framework of neoclassical growth theory. This 
literature has evolved to provide several distinct explanations of the process of economic 
growth, each of which carried particular empirical and policy implications: 
•  Romer’s so-called “AK model” generates sustained growth by assuming that 
technological change is the unintended result of specialising firms’ investments. 
Creation of capacity to produce more and more specialised intermediate products is 
assumed to work like Adam Smith’s division of labour principle, but at the aggregate 
level.  
WP 01/13  Knowledge, Capabilities and Human Capital Formation in Economic Growth 9
 
•  The resulting externalities yield increasing returns to cumulative investment, and thus 
the production of goods can avoid the decreasing returns to rising capital-intensity that 
the neoclassical model posited.  
•  These externalities imply that the competitive equilibrium growth path does not 
coincide with that which could be achieved in an optimally planned economy. 
The latter conclusion was reached by virtually all the theoretical analyses based upon 
successive formulations that belong to the family of “endogenous growth models”. It 
carries the implication that growth performance might be improved by public policy action.  
Subsequent endogenous growth models have fleshed out the process of technological 
change through the explicit introduction of human capital and/or knowledge: 
•  Lucas (1988) considers human capital to be another input in the production function, 
not fundamentally different from physical capital, but only formed by workers through 
certain activities (principally education or on-the-job training). By assuming constant 
returns to human capital formation – on the argument that workers’ knowledge “spills 
over” – the model can achieve a positive steady-state rate of growth rate in labour 
productivity.  
•  A second line of analysis shifts attention away from treating human capital as a direct 
input to the production of goods; instead, it focuses upon modelling other important 
activities pursued by skilled labour, especially innovation. Technological change 
resulting from R&D investment that creates a greater variety of goods, or improves the 
quality of existing is the main form of innovation recognised by the endogenous growth 
literature following Romer (1986, 1990). 
This latter line of analysis brought out the significant point that when human capital is 
modelled as a factor affecting innovation, the long-run rate of productivity growth is 
positively affected by the human capital stock’s level; whereas, in the Lucas (1988) model, 
the rate at which human capital is being accumulated, relative to the existing stock, was 
seen as the critical determinant of productivity growth.  
More recent theoretical contributions (e.g. by Acemoglu 1996, 1998) direct attention to the 
existence of complementarities and reciprocal feedbacks in the dynamic interaction 
between technological change, conventional tangible investment, and the formation of 
productive capabilities embodied in members of the workforce. This highlights the 
importance of the formation of co-ordinated expectations that would support a “balanced” 
portfolio of tangible and intangible capital formation projects yielding high productivity 
growth outcomes, rather than leaving the economy on a low productivity growth path.  
A final point concerns the debate about convergence of countries to common levels of per 
capita GDP. The basic neoclassical model held that economies with similar structural 
conditions would converge to a common level of output per capita. Most endogenous 
growth models hold out no prospect of automatic convergence: if a country starts at a 
lower capital and output per capita, it will not grow at a faster pace than a richer country, 
and differences will persist over time.  
This non-convergence result, however, is sensitive to the supposition of the analysis that 
the economy is strictly closed, i.e., that in addition to there being no factor-equalising 
international commodity trade, there is (a) no inter-country “spill-over” in the methods of 
producing human capital and (b) no migration of workers. Both of these assumptions can 
be readily challenged; when the models explicitly allow for international diffusion of 
innovations, they tend to predict catch-up by poor countries in the long run.  
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Empirical Findings on Human Capital and Macroeconomic Growth  
In the early 1990’s pioneering econometric studies (based on international panel data for 
a widely diverse array of countries during the post-1960 era) provided empirical support 
for the conclusion that human capital formation was among the factors that significantly 
affected the aggregate level rate of economic growth. 
•  They found that success in the process of catching up internationally in terms of per 
capita GDP (measured in purchasing power parity equivalents) was positively related 
to the overall social rate of human capital formation. 
•  Furthermore, the poor countries that were tending to catch up with the higher income 
economies were restricted to those that were maintaining levels of investment in 
formal education which were high in relation to their respective GDP levels. 
More recent econometric studies have yielded three robust empirical findings: 
•  There is only weak empirical support for the hypothesis that changes in the human 
capital stock affect growth rates.  
•  There is strong statistical support for the hypothesis that the relative level of the stock 
of human capital (in relation to the labour force or aggregate output) has a positive 
effect on growth rates. 
•  The magnitude of the “level effect” of the human capital stock is itself far from uniform 
across the distribution of economies; the impact on growth rates does not vary linearly 
with the relative size of the stock but, instead, becomes proportionately smaller among 
the economies where the average educational attainment is already high.  
The broad interpretation of these findings in the context of recent growth models is that 
raising the general level of educational attainment interacts positively with other forces -- 
among them the accumulation of complementary physical capital and the application of 
new technologies. Higher human capital intensity thus permits countries to accelerate 
their productivity growth rate and narrow the relative size of the per capita real income 
gaps separating them from the leading economies.  
But, in the near term, at least, the potentials for such convergence are not unqualified. 
They appear to be bounded by conditions that limit economic integration through trade 
and capital movements, as well as by cultural and institutional dissimilarities – including 
differences in political and legal institutions. Such heterogeneities are suspected of 
impeding easy and effective international transfers of technological and commercial 
capabilities.  
Cross-country economic convergence, in the form of the relative dispersion of productivity 
and per capita real income levels, has occurred within “clusters” of countries, both 
historically and in more recent times. The operation of “convergence clubs” had 
particularly pronounced effects in narrowing the dispersion within the upper income tier of 
the OECD countries during the third quarter of the 20th century; indeed, this pulled up 
members from the lower tail so rapidly that some among the former leaders were 
displaced from their positions in the upper tail (e.g., the NZ economy among them).  
The rough rank ordering of national economies by levels of GDP per capita and average 
labour productivity exhibits considerable inertia over the span of decades. Maintaining a 
high average level of educational attainments, and correspondingly high rates of 
investment in other forms of human capital (e.g. health, internal spatial and occupational  
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mobility), would appear to serve as a stabilising force – although not a guarantee – 
against continuing secular decline in a country’s relative per capita income position.  
Most of the theoretical literature on economic growth focuses on the role that investment 
in formal education plays in modern economies. In a broad sense that emphasis is 
justified by the empirical evidence pertaining to aggregate economic growth performance 
in recent decades. Notice should be taken, however, of the disparities that do emerge 
among studies that undertake quantitative assessment of the impacts of human capital 
formation, by means of econometric and growth accounting studies which are based upon 
international cross-section data. Several recent studies based upon measures of 
schooling years per person of working age for the OECD and G-7 economies have 
obtained results that appear to cast doubt upon the impact of human capital formation 
upon labour productivity. Closer examination of this work reveals that some of their 
surprising findings result from inadequacies of the proxy variables that have been 
employed in lieu of proper measures of the stock of human capital. 
Considerable caution therefore is warranted before framing concrete policy 
recommendations simply on the basis of the findings from international cross-section 
studies exercises of this kind, if only because of the many subtle international differences 
in the workings of educational institutions that appear outwardly to resemble one another. 
By considering the historical growth records of some among the presently advanced 
economies (even those extending back into the epoch of their proto-industrial 
development), however, economic historians have obtained a more informative picture of 
human capital’s changing role in long-term growth. 
A noteworthy, and perhaps surprising conclusion from historical studies of Europe and the 
U.S. is that intangible human capital formation contributed comparatively little if anything 
to labour productivity growth before the latter part of the 19th century. This shows that the 
strong correlations between human capital and growth found by some modern cross-
section and panel-data studies are a phenomenon particular to comparatively modern 
experience, not a regularity about the process of economic growth that can be expected to 
hold in any place and period. 
Historical studies (by Abramovitz and David, 1973, 1996, 2000) suggest reasons for the 
rising role played by intangible human capital formation. These reasons are found in the 




•  In the 19th century increasing labour productivity can be attributed to a high and rising 
capital intensity (measured by the tangible capital per man-hour worked), a trend that 
was reinforced by the prevailing tangible capital-using bias of technological progress in 
the 19th century.  
•  The main source of labour productivity and real output per capita growth in the 20th 
century was rising total factor productivity. A crucial aspect of U.S. growth experience 
in that epoch was the changing bias of technological innovation away from tangible 
capital-deepening, and the emergence from 1929 onwards of a strong bias towards 
intangible (human) capital-deepening. 
•  Biased technological progress has been the long-term force underlying a demand-
induced reallocation of savings and the consequent secular relative rise of intangible 
human capital (vis-à-vis both tangible capital, and real output) during the 20th century. 
•  The facilitating evolution of both public and privately funded educational institutions, 
and company financed programmes of on-the-job training, can be seen as having  
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been induced directly and indirectly by changes on the demand side of the labour 
market.  
The foregoing conclusions from the historical experience of economic growth contrast 
sharply with the assumptions made by growth theory. Neoclassical growth models and the 
pioneering contributions to the literature on endogenous growth (e.g. Romer 1986, 1990) 
specify that technological change always is “neutral”; they therefore fail to view “biased” 
technological innovation as a major force creating pressures for readjustments in the 
relative supply of skills and other human capabilities. 
In reality, however, such pressures exist; in the absence of adequate supply-side 
responses, they are likely to manifest themselves in rapidly widening pay differentials or 
increased rates of occupational obsolescence and structural unemployment. A far more 
desirable outcome, of course, would be the co-ordinated, anticipatory provision of the 
human capital investments that are required in order to translate new technological 
opportunities into rising productivity and higher levels of material well-being. 
Implications for Public Policies Affecting Human Capital Formation 
Generic policy implications, from microeconomics analysis and growth theory: 
Microeconomic studies conclude that numerous structural conditions – especially those 
peculiar to economic transactions involving knowledge, and the services of free persons -- 
are likely to drive persisting wedges between the private and social rates of return to 
investing in human capital. These “wedges” signal the existence of mal-allocation, and 
carry the implication that some corrective public intervention may be warranted.  
This is likely to be the case in either of two broad sets of circumstances:  
•  where technological complementarities give rise to non-pecuniary “externalities”, 
and/or the interdependence of individuals’ preferences over outcomes results in some 
significant portions of the benefits and/or the costs of particular investments failing to 
accrue to the agents responsible for undertaking those projects; 
•  where there are persisting “market imperfections” (including incomplete and missing 
markets) that prevent relative prices from properly signalling relative private marginal 
costs and private marginal productivities. 
However, a strict economic justification for governmental (or charitable institution) 
interventions directed to raising human capital investment in particular categories is more 
demanding than the identification of such situations. Public subsidies are called for only 
where the respective marginal social rates of return on such investments – whether 
directed to human capital investment among particular population groups, or for specific 
categories of training – exceed both the corresponding private marginal rates, and the 
marginal social opportunity cost of the public tax revenues that would be absorbed by the 
indicated subsidy programmes. Application of this test, as a practical matter, is not so 
easy. 
Nevertheless, the supposition is widely shared among economists that market economies 
exhibit overall systemic tendencies toward under-investment in human capital, due to the 
incomplete private appropriation of their contribution to the (external) benefits of having a 
labour force (and a polity) that is more highly educated and possesses a greater degree 
and variety of skill. This does not preclude the possibility that in some situations the 
behaviours of individual when left to themselves will result in a level of educational 
investment that turns out to be sub-optimal from their own, private standpoint, as well as  
WP 01/13  Knowledge, Capabilities and Human Capital Formation in Economic Growth 13
 
from a societal perspective. Such is too frequently the situation of young labour market 
entrants, whose work habits and educational preparation reflect the limitations of previous 
interests and judgements on their parents’ part. 
The condition of overall under-investment also is quite compatible with there being socially 
excessive expenditures of private and public resources for formal schooling, i.e., levels of 
investment that drive the social marginal rate of return below the marginal private rate. 
Such a situation sometimes is alleged to be the case in regard to university-level 
educational credentials that are sought (whether by students or their parents) primarily as 
“signals of quality” for prospective employers. The source of the putative inefficiency lies 
in the absence of some alternative institutional mechanism that would perform the socially 
productive, signal-supplying function of educational credentials – with equal credibility but 
at lower unit cost.  
A systems analysis of the sequence of educational choices points to the importance of 
targeting policy measures to address tendencies to under-investment during the earlier 
stages of the life-cycle. Schooling provides intangible capital that is a foundation of the 
capabilities for successfully undertaking later investments in education and training, 
including various kinds of on-the-job training. Market failures, or public institutional 
failures, that result in under-provision of “educational capital” at the primary level, 
therefore will raise the costs or reduce the effectiveness of subsequent investments in 
secondary schooling, tertiary vocational and university education, and in on-the-job 
training. 
Corrective interventions by government therefore must be formulated on a case-specific 
basis, once the nature and seriousness of the existing misallocation has been established. 
Most corrective policy actions, however, will impose some social costs of their own. These 
also must be taken into account in judging whether they should be recommended as 
“second best” solutions, or only as the “n-th best” means of addressing the identified 
sources of “market failure”. 
On the question of the means whereby governments may intervene to alter the allocation 
of private investment in human capital, the literature on the economics of public finance in 
market regimes points almost exclusively to subsidies and taxes as the instruments of 
choice for effecting such corrections. A review of the generic implications of applying 
optimal tax and subsidy principles to the treatment of investments in intangible forms of 
human capital, however, suggests that existing regimes of taxation tend to be biased in 
varying degrees against investment in intangible human capital. Thus it is possible to 
arrive at some general principles for reforms aimed at correcting “government fiscal 
failures”, and these deserve priority of consideration over proposals to introduce specific 
tax or subsidy measures that would, in any case, need to be tailored to suit the relevant 
institutional and legal context.  
Perhaps the major insight for economic policy design that emerges from the literature on 
macroeconomic growth models is that in an economy of any reasonable degree of 
complexity, especially in one where there is decentralised decision-making and 
competition in many sectors, crucial positive “spill-over effects” are created by technical 
complementarities and pecuniary externalities of exchange transactions. For these to be 
coordinated at the microeconomic level in a manner that reinforces growth, it is important 
that they become mutually aligned through widely shared expectations regarding the 
positive externalities that will result from investments in a variety of durable productive 
assets. Such expectational coordination is crucial where the payoff from “investment 
projects” depends on successfully matching the characteristics of newly developing  
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technologies, and physical capital that embodies them, with the capabilities of the 
available labour force, and the projects themselves have long gestation periods.  
By working in partnership with the private sector, public agencies may therefore promote 
growth by facilitating better dynamic co-ordination. This involves increasing the flow of 
reliable information to shape mutually reinforcing expectations that, in turn will affect 
private investment decisions. Of course, because financing the necessary human capital 
components cannot effectively be left to either the household or the business sectors, 
anticipations of governmental action in the latter sphere assumes critical significance. In 
this context, what is required to shape expectations is the timely publicising of the state’s 
credible commitments to undertake long-term programmes providing subsidies and/or tax 
credits for basic education and training investments, as well as assistance with the 
financing of continuing education and re-training.  
From a narrow resource allocation viewpoint, it is obviously important that subsidies in this 
area should have a two-part structure: in addition to promoting general education in the 
population, they should aim to elicit further human capital formation that is aligned 
specifically with indicated broad trajectories of technological development, business 
reorganisation, and structural reorientation related to international trade specialisation. 
The latter, of course, ought to be identified on the grounds of being those holding the 
greatest promise for the economy’s future. 
The situation of the New Zealand economy, however, presents something of an anomaly 
in the context of modern generalisations about economic development and 
macroeconomic growth, and the roles played by human capital therein. Certainly there is 
little in the macroeconomic growth theory literature that has an immediate bearing upon 
the circumstances of a small, open economy. Implicitly most growth model assume that 
the economy is large and diversified, possessing an industrial base and abundant natural 
resources, as well as being about to support the fixed costs of an extensive human and 
institutional infrastructure that enables it to be largely self-sufficient in the R&D and human 
capital formation activities. All of the influential macroeconomic growth models describe 
the technological situation of a “global” economy, one that is closed even in regard to 
knowledge flows, and so must invest in R&D activities in order to generate a basis for 
continuing innovation.  
Yet, such is not the situation in which New Zealand – along with many another high 
income country –finds itself. A number of implications for the design of policies relating to 
human capital formation (inter alia) can be seen to flow directly from that particular 
disjunction. 
Policy Proposals Geared to New Zealand’s Special Economic Circumstances: 
Although having experienced retarded productivity growth in the past two decades, New 
Zealand remains a high-income country with a fully developed array of research, 
education and training institutions. Its overall capacity for expanding the provision of 
educational services at the tertiary level is not a constraint. Putting aside measures that 
may be required to correct the supply of specialised training, which in any case might be 
accomplished by subsidised training overseas, public policies directed to raising the 
average level of human capital in the population can be focused in the first instance upon 
the demand side.   
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Reforming the tax treatment of households’ human capital investments 
Here changes in existing fiscal measures (taxes and subsidies) are the appropriate 
instruments with which to start. Considerations of the basic issues involved in determining 
the proper tax-subsidy treatment of human capital investments can usefully be limited to 
just those concerned with the degree to which private investment incentives may be 
distorted (to the detriment of individual well-being) in ways that can be remedied by direct 
subsidies, or corrected by alterations in the tax regime. 
It should be noticed that changing the after-tax rates of return on different categories of 
assets will generally be easier for the fiscal authorities in an economy that is open to 
international flows of capital and labour, as well as to trade in goods and services. This is 
the case because the levels of domestic wages and interest rates tends to be pegged to 
those in the international economy. Alterations in the relative quantities of different assets 
(i.e., human intangible capital vis-à-vis tangible inanimate capital), therefore, will not tend 
to offset the first-order effects of tax rate changes on the structure of after-tax rates of 
return. This increases the potential potency of the fiscal measures as a policy instrument 
in New Zealand’s circumstances.  
Several modifications of the income-tax system could serve to augment New Zealand’s 
human intangible capital resources, without requiring the potentially more disruptive and 
administratively more costly replacement of income taxation with a consumption tax 
regime. Application of optimal and second-best tax principles suggests that the principal 
goal of a partial fiscal reform should be the elimination of the differential tax treatment of 
human capital investments vis-à-vis other forms of investment by households. A 
secondary, reinforcing objective is to mitigate the disincentive effects of progressive 
taxation of the interest component of the wage-income streams deriving from private 
investments in intangible human capital. 
The first of these objectives would be met by making all certified direct costs of education 
and training fully deductible from taxable wage income; whereas, the second objective 
can be reached (without altering the progressivity of existing tax schedules), by the device 
of shifting to a later point in the life-cycle the date at which such deductions from taxable 
income can be exercised by private individuals on whose behalf the direct educational 
expenditures were made. 
A new scheme of personal income tax reform that would accomplish both purposes 
(proposed by David 2001) seems well suited to countries with New Zealand’s 
characteristics. Its essential features are these:  
•  allow full deductibility for education and training outlays, while restricting the ability of 
the student/trainee and the household that bore those costs to exercise their 
deduction claim until some stipulated time period had passed; 
•  record the nominal value of the educational investment in the current income tax 
return filed by the student/trainee, and credit the corresponding deduction to a non-
transferrable government guaranteed account established in that person’s name 
(identified by a taxpayer number);  
•  when the initial period of inaccessibility had passed, the account would be available to 
be liquidated in its entirely, at date chosen by the named holder, and exchanged for a 
consecutive annual deductions from taxable income over a following span of years; 
•  for as long as it remained unbroached, the surrender value of this account would grow 
at the nominal rate of interest on government debt, or alternatively, a fixed real rate of  
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interest could be stipulated and credits entered in the account could be indexed to the 
domestic consumer price index. 
The novel asset thereby created is an untaxed, interest-bearing educational (expense) 
deduction account – the UIBEDA (or, phonetically, “we-bedda”). Under quite plausible 
assumptions about the time distribution of education-associated earnings differentials, and 
the progressivity of the schedule of tax rates, it would be feasible for the NZ Treasury to 
use such a scheme to act as a financial intermediary in the market for human capital 
investments in a way that satisfied an intertemporal balanced budget constraint. 
It would be possible for the Treasury to recoup more than enough in extra tax revenues 
(deriving from the induced additional human capital investments by the resident working 
population) to make up for the taxes sacrificed by allowing those individuals to exercise 
their deduction claims. This result can be shown with plausible parameters for the 
scheme, under which individual account holders would have a strong incentive to defer 
surrendering their UIBEDA until they reached a point in their life cycle when their earnings 
were high and they faced correspondingly higher marginal tax rates. The extra tax 
revenues would then become available for other subsidies.  
Further extensions of the proposed reform would apply it also to allow deductibility of the 
interest costs of government guaranteed loans and scheduled allowances of foregone 
earnings during periods devoted to education and/or enrolment in certified programmes of 
on-the-job training. Having such a scheme in place could be beneficial in assisting a shift 
from universal direct provision of educational services by the state to a mixed programme 
of student loans and means-tested support for students from low-income households. 
The coupling of educational indebtedness arising from such loans with possession of an 
UIBEDA, might also reduce the resistance among lower income families to having their 
children borrow from commercial lenders for human capital formation purposes, under the 
terms of a government guaranteed loan scheme. The effect of the switch in financing 
would be to release public funds from use for tuition and student maintenance grants in 
support of general education at the tertiary level, making it available for more selective 
forms of educational subsidies. 
Tax credits and subsidies for cooperative business investments in job-specific training  
Providing subsidies for human capital investments that are undertaken jointly by 
employers and workers does offer the benefit of more immediately realised productivity 
impacts, compared to the longer term effects of lifting the general quality of the workforce 
through schooling investments directed to the young. At the same time, OJT investments 
are less amenable to standardised modes of training, far more heterogeneous in the 
content of what is to be learned, and less amenable to external monitoring. It is in the 
interest of employers, as a rule, to make such investments in the most effective form 
possible if they internalise the benefits – whether they are spending their own money or 
funds provided by public agencies. Thus there is a case for avoiding government micro-
managing, or even certification of the forms of training that will be subsidised. 
Nevertheless, survey data as well as casual observation indicates the existence of wide 
and unjustified inter-firm and inter-establishment variations in training practices. This 
suggest that there is significant under-investment in information about best practice 
training methods, and that private incentives to share knowledge about the details of 
successful training methods remain inadequate. Hence, proactive provisions for 
information exchanges ought to be made a condition of receipt of public subsidies.  
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One way in which this latter objective could be realised is by allowing employers to form 
cooperative training associations whose activities would receive matching public funding 
according to a pre-determined formula. In effect, such organisations would be “clubs” 
engaged in the voluntary production of a public good, namely the augmented supply of 
workers suitably trained for their branch of industry. Because their efforts yielded public 
goods whose benefits could be shared by “non-club” firms (and their workers), direct 
subsidisation of private investments through tax credits for incremental training 
expenditures, would be appropriate. 
Firms’ contributions to these organisations’ outlays should be treated as fully expensed, in 
keeping with general principles of taxing consumption rather than investments. 
Furthermore, the work of the training association could be reinforced by automatically 
allowing full deductibility of the foregone earnings costs incurred by the trainees enrolled 
in these “approved” training institutions. That, of course, would be more immediately 
feasible were the scheme to be implemented in conjunction with a tax incentive along the 
lines of the proposed UIBEDA scheme.  
Romer’s (1993) advocacy of “self-organised industry investment boards” that would 
sponsor both R&D and specialised training programmes, is similar to the foregoing 
proposal in spirit. A problematic feature common to both proposals, however, is the need 
for close monitoring by competition authorities of the internal decision procedures and the 
actual investments undertaken by these organisation. Lacking such oversight provisions, it 
would be quite possible for these associations to become vehicles for employers’ cartels.   
Selective migration policies for increasing the national human capital endowment 
The NZ economy’s small size in relation to the flows of qualified workers that could be 
imported from abroad within comparatively short intervals carries an analogous and 
equally important policy implication. Measures to induce immigration by people that bring 
special knowledge and skills acquired elsewhere are likely to be more effective than 
domestic human capital formation in quickly shifting this kind of economy between growth 
paths. 
Creating special incentives for selective immigration may be a rather complicated problem 
in policy design, as there are many different instruments to be considered. Furthermore, 
the recruitment of highly educated foreign workers and their substitution for those 
domestically trained may have the perverse effect of weakening the latter group’s 
incentives to invest in acquiring further qualifications for employment in the same areas of 
occupational specialisation. Nevertheless, there are some special dynamic conditions 
under which policies to enhance both foreign and domestic sources of labour supply can 
be complementary, one serving for the short run and the other for the longer run.  
The provisions of the UIBEDA scheme also lend themselves quite naturally to its use as 
an instrument for encouraging selective immigration of workers who have received 
advanced education and training investments in other parts of the world. The mechanism 
of selection available to the government in this case is the determination of the list of 
eligible institutions, and the date of receipt of specified degrees and competence 
certifications that will be accepted as qualifying them to set up a UIBEDA account when 
they first enter employment in New Zealand. 
As a practical matter it would be necessary to require submission of evidence to establish 
the direct expenditures incurred overseas in connection with obtaining those (approved) 
educational credentials. An alternative administratively more straightforward arrangement 
would permit immigrants to apply to re-finance education and training debts that they had  
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accumulated prior to their arrival, and to submit evidence of the repayment of these new, 
domestically financed debts in order to obtain deduction credits in the UIBEDA scheme. In 
any event, mainly for reasons of administrative convenience, but also to limit the potential 
for abuse of such provisions, no deduction credits whatsoever would be awarded for 
immigrants’ previous indirect educational investments in the form of foregone earnings.  
Targeting human capital formation policies against persisting socio-economic disparities 
New Zealand’s long history of near universal mass education starting at the primary level 
in the mid-19
th century, and then moving rapidly on to secondary schooling in the first 
quarter of the 20
th century, formed a base for the subsequent high average level of 
educational attainment in the majority of the population. Over the long run the socio-
economic, health and educational status of the indigenous, Maori population has 
improved, both in absolute terms and relative to that of non-Maori. Nevertheless, recent 
data document the persistence of substantial disparities between indicators of material 
well-being for these two population groups, disparities that also appear in measures of 
educational attainment and professional qualifications.  
Dynamic models containing multiple equilibria in human capital formation rates (e.g., 
Redding, 1996, and Acemoglu, 1996) suggest how an easily identified ethnic or racial 
segment of the population could become disadvantaged, even in the absence of over 
ethnic and racial discrimination in the labour market. The existence of strong positive 
feedbacks that reinforce a culture of poverty, creating vicious cycles that run from lower 
rates of secondary school completion and poor levels of health care to compromised 
employment experience, to reduced expected benefits from additional training 
investments, and weak family and peer-group support for individual efforts to seize 
opportunities that are likely to yield upward mobility.  
To the degree that such a cycle can be said to characterise the situation of New Zealand 
Maori and Pacific Islanders, it is unlikely that the existing pattern of socio-economic 
disparities will disappear “naturally”, or that piece-meal governmental interventions will be 
able to replace those vicious circles with virtuous spirals leading a large proportion of 
those disadvantaged populations out of relative poverty.  
One may contemplate an integrated programme of support designed to substantially raise 
average levels of human capital (the tangible as well as the intangible components) 
throughout these relatively disadvantaged minority groups. But, its resource costs and 
coordination requirements imply that such an approach would represent a major political 
as well as an economic commitment. Expanding the coverage of such an approach, so 
that it addressed the needs of economically and educationally disadvantaged families and 
youths throughout the NZ population, might raise its political attractiveness on grounds of 
equity alone. Nevertheless, the added administrative complexities of determining 
eligibilities for such targeted subsidies, and the potential drawbacks of establishing 
general programmes of entitlements to resource transfers, should not be underestimated.  
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Part I:  Objectives, Concepts and the General 
Framework 
I.1  Overview of the Report: Purposes, Scope, 
Organisation and Approach 
This report undertakes the following three main tasks: 
1  identifying the principal channels through which human capital affects economic 
activity and so may contribute to economic growth; 
2  reviewing the present state of the theoretical and empirical understanding relevant 
to the formation of human capital, and its linkages with long-run processes of 
economic development and productivity growth; 
3  indicating salient policy implications in regard to human capital that are generic in 
their applicability, and some that are more specifically relevant to the situation of the 
New Zealand (NZ) economy.  
The three-fold purpose is directly mirrored in the report’s three-part organisational 
structure. Part I develops a general “heuristic framework” within which the complex 
subject of the role of human capital in economic growth can be grasped by non-
specialists, and the interrelationships among its various aspects may be discussed 
intelligibly. This requires some preliminary attention (in section I.2) to terminology in order 
to clarify the scope and meaning of the concepts “human capital”, “economic welfare”, and 
“economic growth” that have been adopted here. Brief attention is given also to the ways 
in which these are related to several other concepts which are associated with the less 
precisely defined but more inclusive terms: human “capabilities”, “welfare” and “well-
being”, and “social capital”. A simple taxonomy of human capital is then set out which is 
useful in identifying its several and distinct connections with economic activities, including 
the production and distribution of knowledge as well as that of tangible goods and 
services.  
Within the taxonomic and heuristic frameworks presented in the later sections of this Part 
(I.3), human capital is seen not only to take a variety of forms, but to be able to 
“contribute” in a number of ways to raising the average level, and altering the distribution 
of economic welfare within a society. One may appreciate both the complexity and 
potential importance of the subject from the following enumeration of the distinct and 
salient roles that human capital plays in economic life as:  
a  the functional repository of knowledge, i.e., the capacity for interpreting flows of 
sensory data and structured information required for purposive individual actions 
and inter-personal transactions among economic agents; 
b  the capacity for providing a variety of physical labour service-inputs in ordinary 
production processes; 
c  the cognitive basis of entrepreneurial economic activities;   
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d  the key resource utilised for managing market and non-market production, as well 
household consumption activities; 
e  the creative agency in the generation of new knowledge underlying technological 
and organisational innovations. 
Beyond defining terms and concepts, and providing an overview of the principal 
relationships among the specific topics that are to be examined in greater detail, the 
discussion in this Part contains amplifying comments about the handling of several 
essentially taxonomic points affecting the report’s organisational structure. In addition, it 
has been thought appropriate in these preliminary discussions to interject some qualifying 
remarks in regard to the emphasis upon “wealth-creation” and economic growth-
promoting approaches to the subject of human capital. This approach has featured in the 
mainstream economic literature, and hence is reflected in these pages. Nevertheless, 
there are other quite, different, and equally legitimate ethical perspectives that would 
introduce a range of related and complicating cultural, social and political considerations. 
These typically are suppressed, or touched upon only implicitly by economic analyses of 
the issues surrounding “human capital”. But their existence and relevance should not be 
forgotten, especially when considering the particular nature of the policy implications 
towards which one tends to be most readily led by the dominant approaches that have 
guided economists’ research in this area.  
Part II presents a literature-based review of economists’ current theoretical and empirical 
understandings regarding human capital, taking up each body of findings in turn. The 
discussion in this Part follows the heuristic framework described by Part I. It begins at the 
microeconomic level, with an examination (in section II.1) of the market and non-market 
influences that shape individuals’ human capital formation behaviours over the course of 
the life-cycle. Thence it moves upwards to the resulting distribution of human capital 
“endowments” that emerges at the aggregate population level. The analysis carried out at 
the macroeconomic level is concerned primarily with the ways in which human capital and 
the accumulation of assets of that kind affect productivity performance, and hence may 
alter both the average level of real income and its distribution within the economy as a 
whole. From the dynamic outcomes at the aggregate level of this idealised system, the 
consequences of past human capital formation can be followed back down to the 
microeconomic level. There they will shape subsequent decisions made by households 
and firms in regard to work, production, consumption, savings, and the various forms of 
tangible and intangible investment.  
To gain insights into the general equilibrium features of this dynamical, “circular flow” 
process, section II.2 examines the recent macroeconomics literature that has been 
concerned with “endogenous growth”. The material reviewed under that heading is 
devoted specifically to the formulation and analysis of theoretical models, and the 
empirical testing of related hypotheses about the channels through which aggregate 
productivity growth performance will be affected by both the state of the society’s “stocks” 
of intangible human assets, and the rates at which the latter are accumulating. Some 
conclusions from economic historians’ studies of the changing nature of human capital 
formation and its relationship to the mechanisms of long-run growth in a number of today’s 
high-income societies also figure in the survey of empirical findings presented by section 
II.2. 
These studies have been selected to illuminate aspects of the story that typically have to 
be left out of the mathematical modellers’ abstract, caricature-like sketches of the process 
of growth. A second purpose served by inclusion of explicitly historical treatments of the  
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subject is that of imparting a greater degree of concreteness to the proposition that the 
experience of economic growth only can be understood in terms of the mutual interactions 
and feed-back loops that form among and number of key dynamic processes – including 
those involved in the accumulation of intangible human capital – even though, for 
purposes of analysis, economists work hard to formulate models in which these are more 
easily disentangled. Historical accounts are especially useful in conveying a more realistic 
appreciation for such interactions, as well as for the complex character and significance of 
specific institutional details, and the intricacies of sequencing and timing that often matter 
greatly to the determination of particular economic outcomes.  
Perhaps the most notable distinctive feature of the approach adopted here will be found in 
just that point of emphasis; in the explicit effort to eschew presenting the multiple 
dimensions and effects of a society’s stock of human capital purely sequentially, in 
isolation from one another. Instead, the discussion seeks to present them within context, 
by suggesting a comprehensive “systems analysis” of inter-twined processes that sustain 
endogenous economic growth and human capital formation by continually transforming 
the characteristics of each process.  
This approach also is meant to counteract a misleading impression that has been fostered 
in part by the large economic literature applying statistical “growth accounting” methods. 
Such methods have been informative, without question. But, they have incidentally tended 
to convey the erroneous view that the impacts of the several “factors contributing to 
growth” can be cleanly separated and treated as independent of one another not merely 
for heuristic purposes of analysis, but equally when it comes time to evaluate the array of 
policies options that are available for the promotion of faster economic growth. On the 
contrary, the appropriate orientation is conveyed by the generalisation that in economic 
matters “everything depends upon everything else, in at least two ways”. The design of 
effective policies involving human capital is no exception to this rule, and so requires 
recognition of the pervasive economic interactions among the various modes of capital 
accumulation and the other sources of growth in aggregate output per capita.  
A number of robust implications for policy emerge immediately from the recent literature 
dealing with human capital theory and empirics, and these are quite naturally given notice 
throughout the review in Part II. Part III, however, contains a more systematic discussion 
of the significance that those generic conclusions carry for the formulation of growth-
enhancing government policies, including policies that would appear suitable to the 
general situation presented by New Zealand’s economy. In this regard it could be viewed 
as fortuitous that so much of the recent research on human capital and economic growth 
has not been directed to the special problems of development in poor countries. Instead, 
the bulk of the literature implicitly has addressed the range of cultural institutional, political 
and technological contexts that, broadly speaking, are more directly germane to New 
Zealand’s general situation among the developed, high-income member states of the 
OECD. 
On the other hand, it is evident that a rather unique constellation of challenges for 
contemporary policy-makers is posed by the small size and the highly open nature of the 
NZ economy, by the importance that primary production still holds, and the limited extent 
of the country’s industrial base. One should add to those special considerations the 
historically formed circumstances that are reflected in the disparate economic conditions 
that distinguish representatives of the indigenous Maori population from their counterparts 
among the European settlers and their descendants. Unfortunately, neither this particular 
set of structural circumstances, nor the complications arising from the flows of human 
capital entailed by international immigration and emigration, have been treated by the  
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major theoretical contributions found in the macroeconomic growth literature, including 
those that deal with the role(s) of human capital. 
Therefore, to avoid raising expectations which would remain unfulfilled by Part III, it must 
be made clear from the outset that it is beyond the scope of this report to propose 
concrete programmes of NZ governmental action. Yet, that does not mean that there is 
little left to be said in Part III. On the contrary, the conclusions that may be drawn from the 
material reviewed do form a persuasively robust argument for concluding that unassisted 
competitive markets do not make a good job of producing and allocating human capital. 
Consequently, there is an important place for governmental commitments to programmes 
of public subsidy for education and training, as is true more generally in respect to 
knowledge-forming activities. This is a broad policy implication which extends to embrace 
support for programmes devoted to designing and implementing new instruments and 
institutions that would permit greater selectivity and control in the promotion of educational 
investments, as well as a variety of complementary forms of intangible human capital.  
The last-mentioned point is quite important, inasmuch as the conclusions emerging from 
the relevant literature constitute a strong case for public sector interventions to promote 
closer dynamic co-ordination between investments in human capital, technological 
innovations and other, tangible capital formation projects that are being carried out in the 
private sector. Furthermore, because the adoption of the systems analysis approach here 
serves to highlight the diverse forms of interactions and feed-back effects that affect 
micro-level human capital formation decisions, it indicates that there may be a 
correspondingly wide array of public policy instruments whose deployment in support of 
such policies deserves careful consideration.  
I.2  Human Capital and Economic Growth: Concepts, 
Definitions, and Taxonomies 
To address the question “How does human capital contribute to economic growth?” it is 
necessary to distinguish general notions concerning the “capabilities” of human beings 
from economic agents and their relationship to the concept of “human capital”. Then we 
must define clearly what is to be understood in this context by “economic growth”, and 
how our interpretation of the term bears upon the identification of the human capabilities 
that contribute to the processes that we associate with “growth”. 
The introductory material in the remainder of this Part has been left unencumbered by 
detailed citations to the extensive literature on the many topics that must be touched 
upon, some portions of which feature variants of the definitions and taxonomic distinctions 
that are be adopted here. Readers seeking further discussion of these matters are 
referred to the bibliographic references supplied for Part I. Unlike the selected references 
corresponding to the text citations in Parts II and III, the background bibliography for each 
of the remaining sections of this Part is arranged under specific topical headings. 
Forms of Human Capital, and Human “Capabilities”  
We begin by accepting the working definition of “human capital” that seems widely used in 
standard microeconomics parlance: human capital refers to the collection of acquired 
individual abilities that are substantially durable, persisting over some significant portion of 
the life of the possessor. Furthermore, the personal attributes referred to under this rubric 
are restricted to positive “abilities” and “capabilities”. In other words, their nature is such  
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as would normally yield some stream of benefits, by enhancing the possessor’s 
performance in one or more socially valued activities.  
A difference can be recognised between tangible and intangible forms of human capital, 
although in practice this must rest on what is meant by “tangibility” and therefore is 
somewhat arbitrary, inasmuch as the latter depends as much upon the fineness of the 
observer’s “touch” as it does upon the inherent nature of the attribute that is being 
considered. The taxonomic scheme presented in Figure 1 takes a reasonably 
commonsensical approach to this matter.  

































Under the heading “tangible” are arrayed a number of macro-level “physiological” 
attributes: stature, strength, stamina, as well as eyesight, hearing, and so forth. The 
individual’s general health status and susceptibility to debilitating illness also appear here, 
along with “longevity – an more complex attribute referring to conditional expectations of 
the duration of the remaining life-span. It is apparent that these are generally relevant to 
the individual’s performance of a wide range of activities in addition to those recognised 
as falling into the category of “work”, with its connotations of physical labour.  
The same holds for the “intangible” human attributes that appear on the right-hand side of 
Figure 1. Three main groups are distinguished there: (a) psycho-motor based skills, (b) 
cognitive capabilities, and (c) procedural capabilities. The lattermost among them is 
further elaborated, thereby distinguishing four kinds of procedural capabilities: (i) the 
attributes of creativity and “innovativeness” are separated from (ii) more routinised 
qualities such as problem-solving abilities, complex task management, and leadership; (iii) 
“flexibility”, in the sense not only of being able to perform multi-task activities readily, but 
also to absorb re-training easily, distinguishes another set of procedural abilities”. Lastly 
there are what Figure 1 labels (iv) “social” capabilities”: a set of specific personal qualities 
such as diligence, loyalty, cooperativeness and the capacity for discerning trust in other 
individuals. These are held to play a particularly important role in forming and maintaining 
extended networks of cooperative social interactions and coalitional activities; it will be 
seen that individual relational assets of this kind, when regarded from the societal 
perspective, are requisites for the formation of “social capital”.   
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The critical role of human knowledge in each of the intangible capabilities is emphasised 
in Figure 1 by the labels that distinguish among various forms of knowledge: “know-what” 
and “know-why” and “know where” are especially prominent within the sphere of cognitive 
capability, whereas “know-how” figures in the procedural sphere. “Know-who” has been 
associated particularly with the subset of social capabilities, although it is obviously also a 
cognitive matter. Perhaps the main virtue of taking notice of all the foregoing taxonomic 
distinctions is that it underscores the extremely heterogeneous  character of human 
capital. Even more evident than the heterogeneity that appears among the tangible 
attributes is the implication of the centrality of knowledge in the capabilities that form the 
intangible dimension of human capital.  
Although both the tangible and the intangible forms are subsumed by the term “human 
capital” in the taxonomic scheme of Figure 1, conventional economic parlance tends to 
omit a qualifying adjective from discussions of intangible aspects, lumping the tangible 
attributed under the term “labour”. In the following text, however, this practice will be 
followed except in contexts where it is important to avoid the resulting ambiguity. In this 
connection, it is significant that economists take the term human capital to refer 
particularly to those capacities that have been formed purposively through processes that 
entail costs of some sort, either pecuniary or non-pecuniary in nature. As the concept 
usually is defined, human capital formation’s costs include both direct expenditures for 
material goods and services consumed in the process, and the value that should be 
imputed to the time and effort that the acquiring individuals must devote to the investment 
process, thereby foregoing other possible satisfaction-yielding activities. 
An important element of individual volition, indeed, of choice, thus, is implicit in the notion 
of human capital – at least as that concept has been developed in modern economic 
analysis. This gives rise to some subtleties when one must consider the effect upon 
human capital formation of raising the compulsory school-leaving age. From the vantage 
point of the situation ex ante it would appear that more intangible capital would be formed 
by extending the duration of the educational processes, and to the extent that there are 
greater direct resource costs entailed, that conclusion accords with the common view. But 
as the additional time spent in school by the students is no longer voluntary, the change in 
the societies’ (legal) norm means that the foregone income (say from employment) costs 
to  the individual student will not have increased. Were one to reconsider the same 
question from the macro-perspective of the social decision, however, the matter could 
look rather different. The extension of compulsory school undoubtedly does impose costs 
of production foregone for the society, and these might well be added to the direct 
resource expenditures that are entailed by the change. 
As has been noted, a distinction among intangible capabilities that is recognised in the 
taxonomy in connection with Figure 1 separates substantive “task competence” from 
“procedural competence”. This may be thought of as the difference between knowing the 
answer to a question, and knowing how to arrive at an answer to the question, indeed, to 
a large class of questions. The point worth noticing here is that the processes of acquiring 
these different competences, or skills, also are likely to be differentiated. “Learning” 
particular routines, or skills, is not likely to be the same thing as “learning to learn” – a 
concept that Stiglitz (1987) developed in its relationship to endogenous technological 
change. The nub of the issue is the suggestion that whereas certain forms of endogenous 
learning tended to be “localised” and yield knowledge of the sort whose applicability 
remained very specific to contexts in which it had been formed, learning by doing also 
might yield other, more generically applicable knowledge. Meta-learning, or “learning to 
learn” is one such, and could be viewed as acquired in formal educational experience, yet 
transferable to a wider class of learning situations. Such considerations carry the  
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implication that there is little merit to policy recommendations that call for more funding for 
“education and training” without specifying the nature of the training effort that needs to be 
expanded, and the modes through which it can and should be supplied and financed. 
Capabilities for Discovery and Invention, Entrepreneurship and 
Innovation 
Human capital has an obvious bearing upon the production of new knowledge in business 
practices, as well as of knowledge bearing upon the nature of the material world -- both 
the world of nature and that of human artefacts. Here one must recognise that there are 
important positive externalities, as well as potentially destructive effects resulting from 
“knowledge spill-overs” of a purely cognitive sort. But more recently there has been 
greater recognition of the point that “human capabilities” -- some of them acquired in the 
formal process of human capital formation, and others affected by that mode of training -- 
also have a bearing upon the frequency and ubiquity of innovative economic behaviour, 
and on the supply of entrepreneurship. 
The latter terms must be clearly defined, if one is to make analytical progress: are they 
capabilities, or particular metrics of performance success? Does one want to think of 
innovation activity as a contributor to growth even when such activities often generate 
business failures? For policy purposes it seems important to make this distinction, and to 
recognise that the economic context of human action may have as much, if not more to do 
with the outcomes as it has to do with the attributes of the actors. Thus, one might include 
among the important human capabilities the understanding of the circumstances that 
favour successful application of one’s own capabilities, and, indeed, self-awareness of the 
latter. Human capital investments that result in the augmentation of creative and 
innovative capabilities and entrepreneurial capacities, like those which add to the 
cognitive knowledge base, are likely to yield economic returns that benefit others and so 
will not be fully “appropriated” or “internalised” by those undertaking the investment. There 
may be an implication here that competitive markets will not automatically generate the 
sort of economic incentives to elicit socially desirable levels of those capabilities in the 
population. But inasmuch as innovation and entrepreneurship can be economically and 
socially disruptive, one cannot conclude that there would always be a deficiency in the 
supply of such abilities.  
When it comes to implementing the concept of human capital quantitatively, for example 
in microeconomic analyses explaining the evolution of the earnings of individuals in 
market work, or in macroeconomic growth accounting exercises, economists often delimit 
the range of the processes that are taken to be the constituent elements of “human capital 
formation”. Thus, among the conventionally accepted “sources” of human capital one 
frequently finds only the following: participation in formal education beyond socially 
mandated minimum levels, in organised training programs offered by employers, and 
“work experience” or “on-the-job training” during the early phases of an individual’s 
working life. 
For other quantitative purposes, usually those pitched at a highly aggregated level, an 
attempt is made to capture a broader conceptualisation of human capital by adding items 
of expenditures for health care, and geographical as well as occupational mobility. In 
general, however, this is not carried to the point of subsuming all the resources devoted to 
the bearing and rearing of children under the heading of human capital formation. It will be 
seen that although economists have shown much ingenuity in constructing aggregate 
measures of “human wealth”, the results invariably rest upon some heroic assumptions for 
which proper empirical warrant remains lacking.   
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 A variety of quantitative indicators reflect the economic importance that human capital 
(defined in a less than fully comprehensive manner) has come to hold in modern 
advanced societies. Abramovitz and David (1999, 2000b), extending Kendrick’s (1996) 
estimates of the real stocks of capital in the US back to 1900-1910, find that the ratio 
between the total non-tangible stock and the conventional, tangible stock of capital more 
than trebled between the opening and closing decades of the 20
th century; and between 
1929 and 1990, this ratio more than doubled, rising from 0.54 to 1.15. On each of the 
latter dates intangible human capital (formed by education and training investments) 
represented about three-fourths of the total non-tangible stock; within the remaining 
fourth, the stock of R&D capital in 1990 was only half as large as that formed by 
investments in health, safety and human mobility (see Abramovitz and David, 1996). 
Estimates of the share of U.S. gross private business product represented by the imputed 
real (private) returns on intangible human capital engaged in market production show that 
it has held steady at roughly 0.25 over the decades since 1929, and therefore has 
remained almost on a par with the unchanging (0.27) share attributed to the gross returns 
on tangible business capital. By contrast, at the beginning of the 20
th century the 
corresponding shares of intangible human- and tangible business capital had stood at 
0.10 and 0.44, respectively (Abramovitz and David 1999: Table 2.II). Considering the 
secular increases observed in the ratio between intangible human capital and tangible 
business capital, the initial rise and subsequent stability of the ratio between their 
respective shares is consistent with Abramovitz and David’s (1973, 1996) view of 20
th 
century economic growth as having been shaped by technological and organisation 
innovations that had a strong bias towards physical capital saving and intangible capital-
deepening. But it must be noted that the actual macroeconomic magnitudes referred to by 
that hypothesis are, at best, only roughly approximated by the available empirical 
estimates.  
Many economic realities complicate accurate quantitative implementation of the notion of 
an aggregate stock of intangible human capital; even at the microeconomic level they 
create differences between a private measure of “human wealth” and a social measure of 
an individual worker’s intangible human capital. Although the latter might be supposed to 
correspond to the present value of the differential “quality-adjusted" flows of labour 
services that the worker can provide in production activities relevant to the economy in 
question, people rarely work in isolation from others. The acquired “capabilities and 
qualities” of individual workers affect their interactions with co-workers, and so are likely to 
have non-pecuniary “externality effects” – directly affecting the productive performance, 
and the job satisfactions and dissatisfactions of other employees. The simple matter of 
linguistic compatibilities (including the ability to interpret “standard” symbolic 
representations, such as that for “hazardous materials”) should suffice to make this 
observation transparent. There is nothing in the workings of actual labour markets that 
guarantees correspondence between the wage rate or salary paid to an individual worker 
and the full value of the incremental benefit they provide to the employing organisation: 
some may collect rents, whereas others are being “exploited”. 
Human Capital in a Broadened Framework of Growth Accounting 
Jorgenson and Fraumeni present a system of real income and wealth accounts for the 
U.S. that (a) defines human capital wealth in terms of lifetime labour incomes, and (b) 
includes imputed values of non-market activities. A further innovation is (c) the 
assumption that the productivity of labour in those non-market uses of time (e.g., 
recreation, household production) increased pari passus with the rise in the “shadow  
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price” of labour time indicated by real wage rates in market work. Implicitly, this postulates 
that the “market productivity” effects of changes in the educational attainment (as well as 
the age and gender composition) of the labour force are paralleled in the sphere of 
household production and leisure-time activities. This approach to measuring the “sources 
of growth” therefore departs from the standard growth accounting framework of Denison, 
and also from the augmented growth-theoretic accounting framework of Abramovitz and 
David, and Mankiw, Romer and Weil. 
The resulting estimates employing this measurement approach show that the estimated 
real stock of human capital is more than an order of magnitude larger than that found by 
cumulating real educational investment flow estimates to form (“perpetual inventory” type) 
measures of the educational capital stock. On this basis Jorgenson and Fraumeni 
conclude that investments in human and non-human capital together account for virtually 
all of the U.S. economy’s output growth in the post-WWII era. Even if the assumptions 
underlying these calculations are considered to be rather extreme, the results serve 
nonetheless to underscore the following important point: by leaving out of the picture the 
growing proportion of time that modern populations are engaged in non-market pursuits, 
we undoubtedly understate the quantitative importance of the contributions that 
educational investment makes to raising average economic welfare, more 
comprehensively considered. 
One particular aspect of human knowledge bears in an important, but nonetheless 
limiting, way upon the economic conceptualisation of intangible human capital. Knowledge 
is not homogeneous, despite the conventions followed in formal mathematical modelling, 
which represent knowledge embodied in human agents as an undifferentiated stock 
formed by expenditures on education and training activities. Quite apart from the 
difficulties of dealing analytically with the heterogeneity and the public goods properties of 
“knowledge”, and therefore of treating it as something that could be meaningfully 
aggregated and thereby reduced to a scalar measure, we have to acknowledge that some 
forms of knowledge can be transmitted and preserved more readily or at lower unit cost 
than others. 
Economic Growth, Measures of Economic Welfare and Well-Being 
Although the term “economic growth” is employed widely and casually in the popular and 
business press, it carries at least two distinguishable connotations. As those meanings 
have somewhat different bearings upon the connections between the concept of human 
capital and that of economic growth”, it seems important to be more precise than is usual 
before proceeding further to discuss the relationship between the two.  
The first sense of the term refers to the growth of an economy’s productive capacity, in 
either absolute terms or, more usually, in relationship to that of the population; the second 
sense refers to the growth of per capita real income. The latter is potentially distinct from 
the former meaning because it is given a special interpretation as the pecuniary measure 
(or counterpart) of the expected level of “welfare”, or satisfactions, that is available to a 
“representative” (i.e., randomly drawn) member of the population in the form of the flow of 
currently produced material goods and services.  
There are some quite special conditions, having to do with the existence of complete and 
perfect competitive markets, under which quantitative measures of “economic growth” 
corresponding to each of these two conceptualisations could be held to coincide, so that it 
would be strictly correct to speak of “economic growth” and the “growth of economic 
welfare” as though they were one and the same. As a practical matter, however, those  
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conditions never obtain, and the two meanings should be distinguished. Furthermore, the 
label “economic growth” has come by common convention to be affixed to the increase 
shown by either of two particular statistical indicators of national (or regional) aggregate 
productive capacity: per capita “gross national product” (GNP) or “gross domestic product” 
(GDP) – the second of them being currently the more popular because it corresponds 
more immediately with the productive resources that are being deployed within the 
geographical territory of the country in question.  
The widely used income and product accounting concepts, however, are restricted in 
scope by arbitrary conventions that tend to detract from their appeal as measures  of 
economic welfare. Both the GNP and the GDP ignore flows of goods and services that are 
produced and distributed largely outside market channels, in most instances simply for the 
reason that to include those would require price and quantity transactions data that 
generally are not available. But that quite practical consideration masks the more general 
and deeper issue of where, especially for purposes of quantification, to set the boundary 
between “economic welfare” and “human welfare” more generally conceived. This 
question is one that bears quite directly on the nature of the connections that are 
recognised between human capital (viewed qua “capabilities”) and economic growth 
(viewed qua increased average welfare).  
“Measured economic welfare” (MEW), being more comprehensive in scope than, say 
GDP, would also include the imputed value of the time individuals spent engaging in 
unpaid pursuits, whether or not those involve some components that were market-
supplied. Among the prominent items under this heading are leisure and recreational 
activities, domestic chores such as cooking, cleaning, and clothes-laundering, childcare, 
and the necessary time engaged in education and training at levels above those which the 
society has made compulsory. (It is true that in GDP and GNP accounting conventions 
some imputations are made for non-market services, notably that provided by the stock of 
owner-occupied housing, but economic studies of productivity growth then omit those, by 
working with real GDBP (gross domestic business product) measures.) In contrast with 
MEW, the narrower-scope measures that most modern discussions of “economic growth” 
continue to refer to, whether explicitly or implicitly, totally exclude a very substantial part of 
the real resource costs entailed in forming human capital by means of investments in 
formal education beyond the secondary school level, and on-the-job training of various 
kinds.  
Aside from several unofficial efforts following the pioneering work of Nordhaus and Tobin 
in the early 1970s to implement the MEW concept quantitatively for the US case, a wide 
range of alternative indicators of average “well-being” have been considered, some of 
which are conceptually narrower than per capital real GDP; per capita real private 
consumption expenditures is one such. Other indicators go outside the scope of the 
income and product accounts entirely, by introducing indexes of health status, and life 
expectancy. Still other measures of “human welfare” levels characterising a society at 
different points in time, or comparing societies, would follow the philosopher John Rawls, 
by focusing exclusive attention upon the condition of the poorest or otherwise most 
“disadvantaged” segments of the population(s) in question.  
These remarks concerning alternative ways of gauging improvements in human welfare 
might be regarded as unnecessary in the immediate context. But that view would be 
unwarranted; certainly the brief attention given to them here seems well-justified by the 
seriousness of the policy matters that are at issue. The “impacts upon economic welfare” 
that flow from a given set of exogenous developments which impinge on the rate of 
human capital formation will depend not only upon the structure of the economy, but upon  
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the way that “economic welfare” is defined and measured. But further discussion of the 
policy implications of having settled upon the current association of “economic growth” 
with increases in real GDP per capita, in preference to some other among the alternative 
indicator of improvements in economic welfare, will be deferred for fuller consideration in 
Part III.  
“Human Capabilities” and the Welfare Nexus 
Yet it seems important at this point to take notice of the distinction that Economics Nobel 
Laureate, Amartya Sen, recently has drawn between human “capital” and “capabilities”. 
The two terms may be used more or less interchangeably, but there is also an implication 
for economic policy that is underscored by distinguishing between them. In many contexts 
the two conceptualisations may have perfectly complementary implications, but in others 
they might point in rather different directions. Receiving education, for example, may be 
valued as a direct source of consumption satisfactions, or as a form of investment that 
generates a future flow of enhanced  satisfactions – from the consumption of other 
material goods and service, and possibly from the enjoyments derived in work itself. 
Alternatively, education may be regarded as the process of creating a productive asset 
that can have pecuniary and non-pecuniary externality effects upon other members of 
society, as well as enhancing the productive capacities of the educated person. There are 
no immediately apparent conflicts among these views of the educational process, save for 
the difference in the time-distribution of the benefits. 
On the other hand, the “human capabilities approach” may be seen as carrying quite 
different implications in regard to specific economic policy questions -- such as how 
general or vocationally targeted state subsidies for education should be made. This would 
become very relevant for a society that was committed to promoting welfare-enhancing 
“human capabilities” of a generic sort, such as “creativity”, “problem-solving”, the ability to 
learn and to lead (all of which appear under the rubric of “procedural abilities” in the 
taxonomic scheme set out by Figure 1, in Section I.2). The notion of “human capital”, by 
contrast, lends itself to being interpreted much more readily in terms of specific cognitive 
capabilities and psycho-motor skills that are useful in certain contexts of production and 
distribution. A widening “portfolio” of such intangible human assets may be accumulated, 
but the elements are not so “malleable”; they can grow in effectiveness through practice, 
or become economically obsolete and degraded by lack of practical application. Such 
satisfactions as their possession may convey to the individual often will be conditional on 
he or she having access to other, equally specialised productive assets with which those 
skills are used. In that sense, the job-specific, plant-specific and firm-specific skills that 
labour economists recognise and distinguish from general human capital, are not 
completely vested in the worker. As a direct source of human satisfactions, possession of 
this sort of human capital is more precarious for the persons involved. 
The thrust of the foregoing observations can be restated by framing the issue somewhat 
differently. One might be concerned with the economics of human capital formation 
because of the immediate significance that investments of that kind would have for 
people’s well-being. Aspects of the human condition such as health and longevity, the 
ability to comprehend events and forces that are affecting one’s life, and to communicate 
that understanding to others, access to the cultural heritage of one’s community, the 
capability to represent one’s views and personal interests, and to protect these through 
legal and political procedures – each of those human “capabilities” may be regarded 
intrinsically to be a human desideratum. It might well be the case that a complete 
economic analysis would need to take into account the indirect effects that were  
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channelled via the impact that expanding those capabilities would have upon levels of 
material abundance in the society. Nonetheless, there is an entirely coherent purpose to 
undertaking economic analysis in order to establish whether and in what ways the 
concomitants of economic growth promoted, or failed to augment these “capabilities” in 
the population. 
Therefore, when considering alternative policy measures for the support for human capital 
formation”, it does matter whether faster “economic growth” is sought primarily because it 
is supposed to be conducive to the enlargement of valued “human capabilities”, or 
whether it is taken to be the most expedient means of materially enriching the lives of a 
particular segment within the society, or whether it is desired for altogether different 
purposes, such as the augmentation of national geo-political power. Furthermore, 
inasmuch as a narrow qualitative measure of economic growth such as GDP per head 
reflects not only increases in the productivity of work, but the labour effort expended per 
capita, the nature of the measurement of “labour effort” would directly affect the answer to 
the question about human capital’s contribution, as well as impinging on the issue of how 
productivity growth was related to human capital formation. 
The preceding remarks might be summed up as calling for us to keep in mind the 
distinction between “human capital” considered as a productive asset that will yield a 
stream of input services in material production processes, and “human capabilities” which 
affect the way human agents design, organise and manage economic activities, and also 
derive welfare and satisfactions of their material needs in a world of finite material 
resources. In the first case, human capital is a passive ingredient in production; in the 
second, human capital is the active, creative element that transforms economic life. 
Social Capital 
Should the heading “human capital” also subsume the now fashionable concept of “social 
capital”? “Social capital” involves knowledge about particular relational systems among 
human agents, and about the ways to utilise those relations to mobilise co-operative, 
collective action among certain members of the larger society. Whatever the satisfactions 
the participation in such group activities may yield for the individuals concerned, “social 
capital” is seen as possessing its value as an economic asset because the webs of social 
interactions that this knowledge supports have the effect of creating trust, placing bounds 
upon “moral hazards” in economic contracting, and so reducing “transactions costs”. Such 
knowledge must reside in the minds of those who participate in such relationships, and 
therefore could qualify for inclusion among the attributes possessed by individual agents 
in the society. It then might simply be regarded as a form of intangible “human capital”, 
which is how it is presented by the taxonomic scheme in Figure 1 of Section I.1, instead of 
being treated as a distinct and additional analytical entity – which seems to be the way it 
has entered the literature of development economics. 
Of course, because it must be acknowledged that social capital necessarily is relational in 
nature, such knowledge has to be shared with others before it can serve as a basis for 
action. Yet that is a feature of many other kinds of “socially shared knowledge”, which are 
ordinarily accepted as being part and parcel of intangible human capital acquired through 
participation in educational processes. Such cognitive capabilities as a mastery of 
“reference standards” (the metric system, the atomic weights of elements in the periodic 
table, tables showing the rules for the conjugation of regular verbs, and lexicons 
containing the conjugations of irregular words), can be acquired as part of a formal 
educational curriculum. But an important aspect of the instructional process is to impart 
knowledge that these are “rules” that permit communication and cooperation with others  
WP 01/13  Knowledge, Capabilities and Human Capital Formation in Economic Growth 31
 
who subscribed to them. More generally, in the category of “relational information goods” 
we include “compatibility and inter-operability standards” that specify the designs for 
complementary components of open technical systems. By analogy, in the case of human 
social systems, one may view textual codes, graphical symbols and behavioural protocols 
for the conduct of transactions with other individuals, as learned “standards” whose 
stability permits the formation of systems of “exchange”, economic and otherwise. 
In other words, “social capital” is a form of “glue” that holds the constituent members of 
society together and permits them to function more productively in the economic sphere, 
as well as in other inter-personal transactions where trust is beneficial. But, as has been 
suggested by the sociologist James Coleman, who pioneered the concept, and the 
political scientists Helliwell and Putnam, whose empirical studies have explored the range 
of its importance, this “stuff” has to be formed through human experience; it should not be 
viewed as arising spontaneously, or existing somewhere beyond the realm of the 
attributes that the members of society acquire by participating in activities that entail 
tangible as well as intangible resource costs. To be sure, like other learned capabilities, 
social capital may be developed in interactive processes of socialisation that do not entail 
significant opportunity costs for the individual. But, equally, there may be substantial 
foregone “earnings” in pursuing activities that create a basis for trust, and develop the 
disposition to cooperate with the others – whether they are members of a social club, or a 
business management organisation, or a production team. 
I.3  Integrating the Micro- and Macro-Perspectives: A 
“Heuristic” Framework  
Two main lines of analysis of the human capital-economic growth nexus can be identified 
as extending from the narrower among the welfare interpretations assigned to the concept 
of “economic growth”. Both of these embrace the instrumentalist view of a nation’s 
population as part of its set of “productive resources”, indeed as the most crucial part. 
The first branch of the analysis deals with what will be called the “tangible” aspects of 
human capital, whereas the second focuses upon “intangible” human capital. The 
simplicity of the taxonomic distinction should not obscure the fact that there are complex 
interdependencies between the processes that govern the formation and deployment of 
the two sorts of human capital. One goal of the review undertaken in Part II will be to 
elucidate these, and show their bearing on policy measures that aim to promote growth by 
encouraging investment in this general sphere.  
WP 01/13  Knowledge, Capabilities and Human Capital Formation in Economic Growth 32
 








Parental and sibling socialisation
Formal education (basic)


























Tangible Human Capital Formation 
In addition to the purely demographic forces that determine the age distribution of the 
population and that of the workforce (given the prevailing age-specific rates of labour force 
participation), various dimensions of the workforce members’ physical condition also 
should be seen as contributing to the society’s capacity to generate a higher level of real 
output per member of the population. When one considers the make-up of the list of such 
conditions, ranging from nutritional status, stature, strength, susceptibility to illness and 
disability, it is evident that these impact per capita output levels proximately by affecting 
the potential flow of physical labour services that will be available from the population. 
Quite obviously, “qualitative” aspects of “tangible human capital” must affect the level of 
potential labour service inputs per capita, and via that channel they will impinge directly on 
the society’s potential level of output per head, given the prevailing level of (full 
employment) potential output per unit of labour service input. At the same time, however, 
when more labour service inputs per capita result from greater average work effort, the 
welfare meaning of the contribution to higher per capita output of goods and services is 
usually regarded as ambiguous; reductions in involuntary leisure are viewed as likely to be  
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more welfare enhancing than the sacrifice of leisure in exchange for material goods. Yet, 
by that logic it could be maintained that if greater labour effort followed from improvements 
in the nutritional and health status of the workforce, the welfare significance of a 
consequent rise in real output per capita would not be so problematic, inasmuch as those 
“human capital” developments would constitute an enhancement of people’s capacities to 
engage more fully in both leisure and work activities.  
It is also the case that the physical characteristics of the workforce, including the 
distribution of its members’ ages, strength, ability to learn and remember how to perform 
complex tasks, will affect the ways in which their labour service potential can be utilised. 
For example, a workforce characterised by a high rate of absenteeism or inattention due 
to poor health, is likely to result in complementary fixed production facilities being 
rendered idle, or under-utilised. That, in turn, may well result in a cost-minimising choice 
of less capital-intensive methods of production, and reduced levels of average output per 
unit of labour input.  
Each of the human physical characteristics just identified is governed by physiological 
processes that are conditioned in some significant degree by environmental conditions 
that respond to prior and current expenditures of material resources that affect people’s 
nutritional and health status. Pursuing this line of analysis in a systematic, growth 
accounting framework would lead to the consideration that the tangible part of human 
capital, that is to say, “labour” is simply another “produced resource input”. The 
microeconomic conditions governing its production therefore require explicit analysis, and 
it therefore would be misleading to implicitly ignore this by treating the tangible human 
capital stock as a “free” and exogenous factor of production, contributing to the output of 
the economic system. There are material costs, and opportunity costs in the time spent by 
parents in the bearing of children and their rearing to an economically productive age. 
Beyond that, maintaining the health status and longevity of members of a society’s 
workforce (especially against natural and socially created physical insults arising from the 
organisation of work and the use of particular technological modes of production) entails 
the continuing diversion of resources into some minimum level of forward-looking 
(investment) expenditures. These claims on current production would have to be met 
either by foregoing the current satisfaction of consumption wants, or must come at the 
expense of other kinds of capital formation. 
Therefore, we can say that the solutions to the resource allocation problems affecting 
maternal and infant care, as well as child care, public health provision, preventive private 
health care programs, and so forth, all have a direct bearing upon the process of 
economic growth from the durable (labour) resource input side. It follows that they should 
be analysed in just the same way as one would approach the resource allocation 
decisions that govern the accumulation of stocks of tangible non-human assets. Indeed, 
studies of economic growth in systems that permit humans to be held as chattel slaves, 
have undertaken such analyses; whatever may be said about the moral character of such 
economic arrangements, they are further complicated by the peculiar institutions of 
“ownership”, which remove many important allocation decisions affecting tangible human 
capital from the control of the human beings who are immediately involved. Some parallel 
complications are present, nevertheless, even in modern societies that forbid reducing 
people to the condition of chattel slaves. They appear in the form of institutional 
regulations and contractual restrictions that allow agencies distinct from the persons in 
whom “intangible” human capital has been purposely formed (through formal education, 
and training) significant measures of control over the economic exploitation of these 
acquainted capabilities.   
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Intangible Human Capital Formation: “Types” and “Forms” of 
Knowledge 
A line of analysis parallel to that relevant in the case of tangible capital formation (of both 
the human and non-human forms) would begin with an examination of the roles that 
purposely formed intangible capabilities of human agents play in economic production and 
exchange. Most recent research pursuing the “knowledge economy” and “knowledge 
society” themes concurs in the view that the systematic accumulation of human 
knowledge recently has been gaining in importance among the drivers of economic 
growth and rising human well-being. It correspondingly calls attention to the ubiquity of 
modes of “learning” that yield gains in economically relevant knowledge of various kinds. 
Substantive knowledge about the workings of the natural and social world is identified 
under the label “know what”, whereas a variety of procedural capabilities, artificing skills, 
and problem-solving capacities are grouped under the heading “know-how”. Still another 
category of knowledge, identified as “knowing who and where” can be recognised as a 
significant ancillary asset, complementing the other forms. Knowing where to find 
substantive “facts”, and the identity of individuals who possess particular productive 
assets, or the power to take certain actions, is obviously an important capability that 
influences the effectiveness of the human actors in any production system.  
But, it is not immediately apparent what economic significance such distinctions have, 
except that they remind us of the point that human (knowledge) capital can be formed 
through a wide array of experiential processes, and that the cognitive content of such 
“capital” is far from static. By contrast, if one views intangible human capital formation as 
the acquisition of “knowledge”, and understand the latter to be the basis of an individual’s 
capacities for interpreting “information” and translating it into the performance of symbolic 
or other actions, then the different forms in which humans acquire and hold such 
“knowledge” may be seen to carry some important economic implications. 
In this regard, the distinction that is becoming more and more prominently recognised in 
the economics and management literature is that between knowledge which is “codified” 
and that which is described as “tacit”, in the sense of remaining “silent”, or not articulated 
– although not necessarily incapable of being articulated, as Cowan, David and Foray 
recently have reminded economists. This is because the degree of codifiability, and of 
actual codification, affects both the feasibilities and the costs of knowledge acquisition, 
and through that the economic rates of return on various specific kinds of intangible 
human capital formation. Similarly, those characteristics of the knowledge involved have 
implications for the conditions and costs of communicating knowledge among individual 
economic agents and human organisations. It therefore impinges upon the processes of 
knowledge transfer, and the access that others may have to economically relevant 
knowledge, whether for direct application in material production and exchange or for use 
in generating new knowledge and information. 
Forming Research Capabilities and the Knowledge-Base for 
Innovation  
The forms of human knowledge, in turn, may affect the ability of private agents and 
organisations to extract economic rents from the possession of knowledge, or of defined 
rights to exploit information for commercial ends while restraining others from doing so – 
through intellectual property ownership and legally enforceable contracts. The bearing of 
the forms of knowledge accumulation upon the organisation and conduct of research in 
science and technology, and the impact of science and technology policies and 
institutions upon the balance between activities that rely primarily upon codified rather  
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than tacit knowledge, form a sub-topic that is immediately germane both to innovation and 
diffusion. Such matters warrant closer consideration, even though they may not be 
thought to be central to the subject of human capital economics because they are situated 
at the intersection between the latter and the microeconomics of innovation processes. 
It is true that science and technology policy tends to be approached – at least within the 
currently prevailing conventions of mainstream economics – under the heading of 
“conditions affecting the formation of “intangible non-human capital”. Nevertheless, that is 
a potentially misleading vestige of an older mode of thinking, one that blurred the 
distinction between knowledge and information, and assumed that all economically 
relevant knowledge that was the result of costly research or discovery was fully codified. 
Knowledge reduced to information might be manipulated and processed algorithmically to 
generate new “knowledge” of that kind; and similarly could be stored, retrieved and 
distributed without being embodied in human minds. 
Being reproducible and transmissible and subject to joint use – all at negligible marginal 
costs – knowledge of that kind could yield no economic rents to cover the fixed costs of its 
production. Intellectual property protection, as a device for promoting investment in 
research and development of knowledge (in codified forms), was thus placed at the centre 
of science and technology policies aimed at affecting the pace and direction of economic 
growth. But in view of the extent to which uncodified knowledge is seen as a crucial 
component of the base upon which innovative economic activities rest, one should expect 
only limited effectiveness from policies that are directed to fostering the production and 
distribution of knowledge exclusively in highly codified forms. In reality both innovation and 
the diffusion of knowledge will be mediated by particular labour market institutions that 
affect the mobility of skilled individuals among employing firms and regions; and also by 
the formal education and training institutions, and by more informal organisations and 
practices which affect the composition of intangible assets embodied in the human agents 
of production that society has at its disposal. 
The nexus between innovation and the human capabilities that may have been developed 
and elaborated through formal education is quite complex, however, and perhaps it is not 
surprising that this subject remains very largely unexplored in the vast literature devoted 
to the economics of (technological) innovation. In modern writings on the role of education 
in economic development and growth there is a strong tendency to conflate the formation 
of vocational skills with the acquisition of knowledge via formal schooling. Relating to this 
tendency is the general disposition to focus theoretic and empirical analysis upon 
implications of complementarities that may exist between specific skill endowments of the 
workforce and particular trajectories of technological development. In itself there seems to 
be nothing very objectionable in that approach, so long as the notion of “skill” is 
understood to have been expanded sufficiently to embrace more general human 
capabilities, including generic problem-solving capability and the capacity to master a 
repertoire of particular skills, and switch among them rapidly with ease. Likewise, one may 
need to keep in mind a broadened concept of “technology”, broadened to include “meta-
technologies” constituted from methods of designing and producing a succession of novel 
and differentiated products, or, distinctly, from collections of the techniques required for 
mass producing and marketing highly standardised goods and services.  
Technology itself is changing in ways that affect the economic significance of different 
kinds of knowledge, and, via that route may call for adaptations in modes of human capital 
formation. For example, the progressive codification of production activities is changing 
the nature of the “skills” required of workers: they are less artificers engaged in repetitive 
tasks than they are the discretion-using controllers of artefacts and production systems  
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designed and constructed by others. This implies that the biases in the “direction” taken 
by technological change, with regard to its factor-saving and factor-using effects, will 
influence short-run rates of remuneration of tangible and intangible human capabilities, 
and, over the longer run will be (endogenously) shaped by the effects of past and 
expected future factor supply conditions. These forces need to be considered when 
designing policies affecting human capital formation, as the latter typically will be 
concerned with investments that have long periods of gestation and create (human) 
assets that are extremely durable.  
Gaps Between the Private and Social Rates of Return on Human 
Capital 
In the neoclassical formulations of the human capital concept, its scope tends to be further 
restricted by efforts to arrive at quantitative measurements of “the human capital stock”, 
especially its intangible component. Two approaches have been pursued which have the 
attractive property that they ought to yield equivalent magnitudes for the value of the 
resulting private asset (stock), under conditions in which the microeconomic allocation of 
investment resources was in equilibrium. One approach is the so-called “wealth” 
approach, which views an individual’s intangible human capital as the (discounted) 
present value of the stream of differential earnings from the sale of the services of workers 
in whom different amounts of human capital investment are “embodied”. Typically, this 
approach associates the expected incremental (private) productivity effects of intangible 
human capital formation with the differences between the life-time full employment 
earnings profiles of workers belonging to different educational and training attainment 
categories (but, ideally, who are otherwise identical). The same approach could in 
principle be applied to compute the “wealth” represented by the incremental private 
earnings that were attributable to the differential health status that was associated with 
discretionary medical care. 
The other approach is to start from the investment side, by finding the present value of the 
expected future stream of private costs – in the form of foregone earnings, and direct 
incremental expenditures (e.g., tuition, fees, equipment, and extra living expenditures) – 
that are required for an individual to complete a specified programme of education beyond 
the mandatory schooling age. On-the-job training, internships, and the like may be treated 
similarly. When reckoning the direct costs of education, the value of publicly provided 
subsidies should be included, for, even if they are not borne by the individual, they 
represent the resources expended for his or her education. In the case of on-the-job 
training, some attribution to costs shared by employers, analogously would be 
appropriate. With a proper choice of the discount rate – which should allow for a premium 
above the yield on safe assets that reflects the differential riskiness of investment in 
human capital – the private “wealth estimate” and the “capital cost” estimate should 
coincide; at least, they would do so were the agents maximising expected wealth and 
were the market for human capital in equilibrium.  
Measuring a society’s aggregate real stock of intangible human capital in either of the 
foregoing fashions is of interest primarily for purposes of “growth accounting”: the 
proportionate growth rate of that stock, multiplied by an estimate of the elasticity of output 
with respect to the services of human capital in production, affords a way of gauging the 
quantitative importance of the “contribution” which human capital formation can be said to 
make to the growth of real GDP. A rather different way of assessing the economic impact 
of investments in intangible human capital is to consider the actual or expected internal 
rate of return on various educational and training “projects”. The internal rate of return is 
the discount rate that will set the sum of the stream of differential net earnings (private  
WP 01/13  Knowledge, Capabilities and Human Capital Formation in Economic Growth 37
 
wage earnings net of education-associated outlays) equal to zero. Under certain technical 
conditions – such as the monotonicity of the net earnings stream – the internal rate of 
return associated with a specified course of education, such as high school graduation, 2-
year college, college completion, etc., will be uniquely defined in each case.  
Rate of return calculations of that sort can be used in evaluating the returns to private 
investments in “educational capital”, and even in assessing the conformity of market 
behaviour to private rationality precepts. Some theory is required for virtually all empirical 
measurements of economic variables, but estimates that purport to measure the social 
stock of intangible human capital cannot legitimately presuppose that private and social 
rates of returns will be equated. Nor can it presume the existence of some mechanism 
that would automatically force marginal social rates of return into equality with marginal 
social costs of human capital formation. Indeed, there are numerous structural conditions 
in the relevant markets that are recognised in the economics literature as being likely to 
drive persisting wedges between the private and social rates of return to investing in 
human beings. The implication is that the amounts of “human capital” created through 
private wealth-maximising market behaviours will not be socially optimal.  
These signals of the existence of resource misallocation are likely to appear in either of 
two broad sets of circumstances: (1) the existence of non-pecuniary “externalities”, and 
the interdependence of individuals’ preferences over outcomes, results in some significant 
portions of the benefits and/or the costs of particular investments failing to accrue to the 
agents responsible for undertaking those projects; (2) there are persisting “market 
imperfections” (including incomplete and missing markets) that prevent relative prices 
from properly signalling relative private marginal costs and private marginal productivities 
– excepting those cases where the imperfections arise from complete market power that 
accompanies the “internalisation” of all relevant costs and benefits.  
Many specific structural characteristics of markets for information goods, and labour 
market and financial market contracting situations, have been identified by the 
microeconomics literature as giving rise to difficulties that lead to serious resource 
allocation inefficiencies in the absence of specifically designed incentive mechanisms, 
customised contractual arrangements or regulatory interventions. In some cases these will 
yield socially sub-optimal – and possibly also privately sub-optimal – levels of human 
capital formation. But in others, the inefficiency may take the form of excessive allocation 
of resources for such purposes. One cannot start from a general a priori position 
regarding the nature of so-called “market failures” in this field, any more than one can start 
from such a position in the case of investments in non-human intangible knowledge 
obtained through R&D.  
Corrective public interventions must therefore be proposed on a case specific basis, once 
the nature and seriousness of the existing mis-allocations are established. But it will have 
to be considered that most corrective instruments – whether they take the form of 
subsidies and taxes, or legal and administrative regulations, or the creation and 
management of special institutions by the public or private sector – will impose some 
costs of their own. This is so even when they are as well-designed as the state of 
knowledge would permit. Furthermore, the risks of costly “institutional failures”, arising 
from poorly formulated rules and intra-organisational reward structures and resource 
pricing conventions, also must be considered where public agencies and governmentally 
sanctioned institutions are to be deployed. All such costs should be taken into account in 
judging whether public policy intervention should be recommended as “second best” 
solutions, or only “n-th best” means of addressing an identified source of “market failure”. 
To be able to move to an ideal world, in which the public and private allocation  
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mechanisms were subject to none of the troublesome conditions detailed by the following 
paragraphs, constitute the first-best solution, of course. But more often than not, this 
remains elusive.  
Verifiability problems are especially rife in the case of the formation of intangible human 
capital. One cannot directly ascertain what is in the “trained” individual’s head. The 
expenditure of resources on such training can be measured and monitored, and so can 
the individual’s performance of certain tasks. But the interactions between inherent 
human abilities and training confounds the “pure training effects” with unobservable 
individual attributes, making it difficult to ascertain the degree to which the investment 
has improved performance. It may be noticed that the literature on labour market 
screening points to the possibility that even without yielding any payoff in terms of 
cognitive ability improvements, investment in and completion of accredited educational 
programs may have a positive social payoff in providing a better bias for selecting 
individuals with greater inherent ability. This implies, however, that for efficiency, the 
screening criteria embedded in the design of such screening/training programs should 
identify the particular abilities that are of interest to those employing the “graduates”.  
Monitoring problems are closely bound up with non-verifiability. Workers may be 
provided by employers, or public agencies, with costly forms of training, but it is costly 
and in some cases impossible to determine whether they are making best use of such 
capabilities as they acquired in that way. Most solutions involve incentive schemes 
based upon performance, rather than effort, as the latter is especially difficult to monitor 
in the case of intangible capabilities. Attribution of performance variations to individuals 
is difficult, however, when their work is carried out in teams and involves 
complementary facilities and materials over which they do not have control. A further 
problem exists with punitive incentive schemes: if bad performance leads to 
downgrading to less well paid occupational positions, this represents an effective write-
off of the training investment. 
Asymmetric information and agency problems beset the whole process of producing 
and selecting individuals who possess “expertise”. How can the inexpert judge the 
quality of experts? Determining the amount of intangible capital possessed by a 
particular individual is therefore frequently achieved only in an approximate, statistical 
way, by examining the formal educational credentials and informal learning 
experiences to which he or she has been exposed. Yet it requires a considerable 
amount of expertise, much of it involving knowledge of the idiosyncrasies of the 
individual’s history, to accurately interpret those acquired signals. In a parallel fashion, 
the problems of incomplete and asymmetrically distributed information, and the 
consequent dependence upon the proper alignment of the interests of principals and 
agents, are encountered on the side of the purchasers of “signals of competence”. The 
mechanism design literature has a good bit to say about the way to achieve such 
alignments of interest, but one feature of that body of microeconomic analysis is that 
the solutions typically will turn out to be very specific to the structure of the problem. 
Externality problems constitute the last, but in some respects the most serious category 
of market deficiencies affecting human capital formation of both tangible and intangible 
kinds. Labour market theorists have sought to deal with the externality problem that 
faces those investing in worker education and on-the-job training by drawing the 
distinction between “general” human capital and “firm’” or “job-specific” human capital. 
The purpose underlying this taxonomy is to suggest that where firms are able to fully 
internalise the benefits of training investments, they will provide the correct level of 
financing for them. Where training is of a “general” nature, making it more immediately  
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transferable to other employment situations and so enabling the possessor to benefit 
from higher wages or more secure earnings elsewhere, then, efficiency considerations 
suggest that the investment costs should be borne by the worker who appropriates the 
benefits; and, in a world of perfect markets, including complete capital markets, they 
would be. 
But, general and specific forms of human capital in reality are not so simply separated; 
much “experience-based learning” in solving problems can be generalised by the learning 
agents, and this creates positive externalities that may be enjoyed subsequently by other 
employers. Efforts to prevent employers from “free-riding” typically restrict the freedom of 
workers to take employment in “related” activities, or to migrate to other regions where 
their experience is more highly valued in the market. These measures, although arrived at 
in voluntary contracts, clearly introduce new sources of misallocation. One has to ask 
whether that outcome would be better or worse than having employers levy implicit 
charges on their workers in exchange for allowing them access to learning opportunities in 
their respective firms, e.g., by setting workers’ wage rates below their marginal value 
productivities.  
All of the foregoing problems arise also in the case of the acquisition of costly forms of 
human capital by the self-employed. By and large, the literature addressed to the supply 
of entrepreneurial abilities has been pre-occupied with problems in the financing of 
innovation in conditions where the human capital “endowments” of would-be 
entrepreneurs are regarded as exogenously fixed. Yet, the capabilities of the self-
employed are no less susceptible to modification by human capital formation than are 
those of employees, and venture capitalists face problems of asymmetric information, 
non-verifiability, monitoring and moral hazard from opportunists’ entrepreneurial behaviour 
– all paralleling those encountered by employers who must contract with skilled workers. 
Making those parallels explicit is useful in that it makes transparent the links between the 
microeconomics of human capital formation and the microeconomics of entrepreneurial 
innovation.  
To be of practical use economic analyses of the foregoing problems must go further than 
simply establishing why and how competitive market allocation mechanisms are unlikely 
to work well even in the developed, institutionally sophisticated market economies. 
Establishing a theoretical presumption of “market failures” is of course important in 
providing a cogent economic rationale for public interventions in the affected markets.  
Yet, in order to guide such interventions, it is essential to be able to describe the nature of 
the allocation inefficiencies that arise in specific institutional and technological settings. 
Analyses that are useful for policy design must establish conclusions about the expected 
directions, and the comparative magnitudes of the various deviations from a socially 
optimal pattern of investment in human capital in the absence of public intervention; but 
also, the pitfalls and perverse results that public agencies would have to avoid in order to 
achieve interventions that qualify for the label “second best” rather than “n-th best”.  
Interim Conclusions 
The integrative framework that is set out in Part I has been constructed by drastically 
simplifying many complex and subtle points of modern economic analysis. Justification for 
it, if one is to be found, must lie principally on the grounds that it serves a dual heuristic 
purpose. Firstly, it indicates the main connections between the micro-level determinants 
and the macroeconomic effects of the various dimensions of human capital formation. 
Second, it highlights the presence of several key positive feed-back loops in the dynamic  
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system that connects the micro-level and macro-level outcomes. Feed-backs of that kind 
are shown to create the potential for a self-reinforcing process of growth based upon 
sustained increases in productivity. 
When human capital formation is viewed either at the micro- or the macroeconomic levels 
it becomes evident there are a number of structural and institutional features peculiar to 
the markets for information goods, and for labour, that are likely to result in persisting 
differentials between the social and the private rates of return on such forms of 
investment. This implies that there is no automatic mechanism guaranteeing that the 
dynamic allocation of human resources in a competitive market economy will be one that 
is socially optimal.  
In addition to affecting the overall levels of human capital, the peculiar susceptibility to 
“failures” of the markets for investments in knowledge, information, and the services of 
free persons implies that the composition of the resulting human capital stock also is likely 
to be sub-optimal under such conditions. In some instances the social rate of return on a 
given form of human capital investment may fall considerably below the private rate, even 
though the opposite state of affairs is more typical.  
The concern this should occasion is heightened, and should be heightened by an 
awareness of the fact that human capital formation decisions have implications which 
involve more than the static efficiency of resource allocation. An economy that is 
characterised by strong positive-feed-backs that generate self-reinforcing dynamic 
interactions between human capital accumulation and productivity-based growth in real 
income per capita may find itself spiralling virtuously upwards, but it also may become 
trapped in a vicious spiral downwards.  
To consider more closely what the recent economics literature has to say in regard to 
those potentials is a central purpose of the material reviewed in Part II.  
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Part II:  Human Capital and Economic Growth: 
A Review of Recent Theoretical and Empirical 
Findings 
II.1 The Microeconomics of Human Capital Formation over 
the Life-Cycle: Markets, Families and Social Institutions 
To provide a coherent picture of the microeconomics of human capital formation it is 
helpful to proceed within a simple framework that:  
a  recognises the various agents involved in this process (families, adult workers, 
employing firms, public agencies providing education services, teachers, and 
specialised trainers); 
b  details the relevant decisions of each agent, particularly with respect to formal 
education and on-the-job-training; and, 
c  makes the connection between the personal characteristics – tangible and intangible 
human capital – resulting from the agents’ decisions and the broader technological 
and institutional environment in which the agents interact.  
For this purpose, a natural and convenient way of dissecting the problem is to consider 
the following critical decisions made in an individual agent’s life-cycle:  
1  primary and secondary education,  
2  higher education and/or vocational training,  
3  on-the-job training,  
4  mid-career training and retraining, and  
5 retirement.   
This approach to the educational process is important in its own right, but it is also an 
essential background with which to assess the strength and credibility of the theoretical 
and empirical literature that looks at the macroeconomic relationships between human 
capital formation and growth, which will be examined later in sections II.2, and II.3, 
respectively. 
Primary and Secondary Education 
The distinctive characteristic of the decisions regarding primary and secondary education 
is that others take them on behalf of the agent. In particular, the family and public 
education institutions both affect the continuance and context of this elemental education, 
and in turn determine the cognitive knowledge, socialisation, “innovativeness”, and other 
elements of the human capital of the agent. Mincer and Polachek (1974, p. 77) remark 
how “a major function of the family as a social institution is the building of human capital of 
children – a lengthy “gestation” process made even longer by growing demands of  
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technology. (...) Optimal investment in human capital of any family member requires 
attention not only to the human and financial capacities in the family, but also to the 
prospective utilisation of the capital which is being accumulated”. Since the decision about 
children’s schooling is rarely left to them, it is necessary to consider the influences 
impinging on the choices made by parents and other agents in the educational process. 
Studies have shown that parents’, and especially the mother’s, schooling is of prime 
importance in the determination of the “tangible human capital” of the child; by which we 
mean the health and longevity, and any other concrete elements of a person’s human 
capital, in contrast to “intangible human capital”, which is the combination of a broad set of 
social capabilities and skills. In economic studies, the channel through which women’s 
education operates is: women with higher education have higher opportunity costs of 
childbearing, therefore they tend to have lower fertility rates, which in turn increases the 
resources available for every child. Surely as important is the better infant care and diet 
that educated mothers give to their infants, improving the nutritional standards and so the 
probability of survival and subsequent health (the literature on this subject is extensive; 
the following are some recent contributions: Ahn, 1995; Blackburn, Bloom, and Neumark, 
1993; Hotz and Miller, 1988; Rosenzweig, 1990; Schultz, 1994; Wolpin, 1984). The 
socialisation process also is important because it can contribute to children’s awareness 
of health, increasing future investments in health and reducing the possibility of damaging 
addictions; this is central to Grossman (1999, p. 77), who argues that “in an ever-changing 
world in which new information constantly becomes available, general interventions that 
encourage future-oriented behaviour may have much larger rates of return in the long run 
than specific interventions designed, for example, to discourage cigarette smoking, 
alcohol abuse, or the use of illegal drugs”. 
With respect to intangible human capital, the economic literature stresses the link between 
parents’ education and the value given to children’s education. The well-known paper by 
Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990) concludes that when human capital is relatively 
abundant, the rates of return on human capital investments are high relative to the gains 
of having more children, whereas when human capital is scarce, the return from human 
capital is low relative to having more children. The authors argue that this mechanism 
accounts for the observation that “societies with limited human capital choose large 
families and invest little in each member; those with abundant human capital do the 
opposite” (p. 35). It has been observed that educated parents also make more informed 
decisions about the quantity and quality of education given to their offspring, thus affecting 
the intangible human capital with which they are endowed. 
Naturally, parental income also is important in determining the physical, cognitive and 
social skills with which the children are endowed: as income increases, the opportunity 
cost of food, medical attention, and education expenditures is reduced, and so parents 
invest more. Moreover, the quality of all these “inputs” increases also (Lee and Barro, 
1997).  
An important caveat regarding these conclusions about the influence of family 
background, which are central to micro-economic models of fertility and education, is that 
they assume that parents’ decisions about children’s schooling are (a) informed about the 
options available and the consequences of these, (b) “altruistic” in the sense that the 
expected economic welfare of the children is “embedded” in the parents’ own sense of 
welfare, and that (c) parents have complete control over the children’s input into the 
educational process. These may be reasonable working assumptions for some social 
groups, but it is questionable whether they hold across all groups in society; and 
especially among the economically disadvantaged in average- to high-income societies.  
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None of the economist’s models treat the notion of a dysfunctional family and its effects 
on children’s performance, although this is central in sociology. 
Other influences on early education lie outside the sphere of the child’s immediate family. 
The ethnic environment can influence these capabilities, resulting in more or less 
productive workers, as discussed by Borjas (1995, p. 388): “[t]his ethnic spillover implies 
that the skills of ethnic children depend not only on parental skills, but also on the mean 
skills of the ethnic group in the parents’ generation”. While this influence works partly 
through the income of the ethnic group, which may affect the quality of education, it 
seems that social issues such as the existence of role models (Cutler and Glaeser, 1997) 
or religion (Tomes, 1985) play a part as well. Tomes (1985) argues that religious 
knowledge is complementary to other kinds of human capital, and so there is pressure to 
make educational investments to increase the “stocks of religious capital” in the process. 
Parents’ choice is also limited by governmental regulations. Attendance at primary and 
secondary schools is compulsory in countries with high incomes, and so there is a 
minimum bound to the intangible human capital that a child receives determined by the 
quality of public schools. Similarly, these countries have laws restricting child labour that 
eliminate the fertility trade-off that still exists in some developing countries, where having 
fewer children involves an opportunity cost in terms of less available labour.  
Higher Education and/or Vocational Training 
This stage in the educational process is the one that most closely conforms with the 
perspective offered by economics in the theory of human capital. At least in regard to 
higher education and vocational training, it is not unreasonable to assume that the agent 
involved is responsible for the investment decision, and there are no legal and institutional 
impediments that compel participation in educational activities rather than entry into the 
labour market. Although some younger children may not wish to continue in school, they 
are not only obliged to remain there until the legal school-leaving age, but, in addition, are 
restrained by law from holding a full-time, paying job before attaining the minimum 
working age. 
The human capital theory of educational choice (following the work of Jacob Mincer) is 
based on the inter-temporal trade-off for individuals between the benefits of finding a job 
in the labour market now, or investing time and money in additional schooling, in the hope 
of getting a higher wage and a larger (possibly more regular) stream of earning in the 
future. It is important to include the opportunity costs in the form of foregone earnings in 
addition to any direct costs of education, such as tuition, because the former actually may 
be a large portion of the perceived costs of higher education. The distribution of people of 
different schooling levels is in equilibrium when the supply and demand for workers at 
each schooling level is equated, and no worker wishes to alter his or her schooling level. 
This condition requires a particular relationship to hold between the expected incremental 
lifetime profile of earnings and schooling (for a succinct summary of the theory and the 
evidence regarding Mincerian earnings functions, see Willis, 1986, and Card, 1999). 
While the (simplest) human capital theory is based on a competitive equilibrium with 
perfect information and no uncertainty, it is widely acknowledged that several forms of 
market imperfection constrain and distort the individual’s choice of education. First, capital 
market imperfections can limit the ability to finance this investment. The result of a 
borrowing constraint is that people do not invest as much as they would like in higher 
education or choose a less-expensive course (for example, a shorter degree or one in an 
institution with lower tuition rates). Clearly, those who can access alternative resources,  
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particularly from their families, will be able to get more education for reasons unrelated to 
personal preferences or productivity, and this suggests a role for government loan 
guarantees to ease the borrowing constraints. 
Cameron and Heckman (1998) present evidence for the US that long-run “family factors” 
correlated with income, and the initial level of educational attainment shortly after the age 
of mandatory schooling, positively affect investment in (further) schooling; these factors 
account for the empirically well-documented correlation between educational attainment 
and the income level of individual’s family of origin, whereas short-term credit constraints 
are not found to be quantitatively important. The latter evidence, of course, is specific to 
the modern circumstances prevailing in the US, where both public programs and private 
banks operating under government loan guarantees provide subsidised student loans. In 
addition, it should be noted that continuation to college and educational indebtedness are 
widely established social norms, and US educational institutions typically facilitate 
temporary interruptions of college careers, readily granting leaves of absence that 
accommodate students who encounter financial constraints.  
Indirect costs of schooling are large vis-à-vis direct costs for basic university education, 
which often is state-provided or heavily subsidised; professional training has typically 
been more costly, but it is also true that foregone earnings of college graduates are 
higher. Estimates for the US in the 1970’s and 1980’s put the combined direct (tuition, 
room and board) costs of a four-year college education at a public institution at a mere 8 
percent of the total post high school graduation human capital investment costs, inclusive 
of foregone earnings costs incurred during college and during OJT by college graduates 
(see Dupor et al, 1996, p. 344). A corresponding notional estimate of the direct cost 
component for a four-year college education at a private college would be under 32 
percent; although the actual tuition charges averages 8 times the size of public 
tuition/fees, they reflect some degree of subsidy from institutional endowments, while the 
foregone earnings during OJT for graduates of private colleges may be rather larger. 
The question of the relative quantitative importance of direct versus foregone earnings 
costs of education is important in a number of connections. Financing is one of these, 
because direct costs need to be financed while at school but foregone earnings do not, so 
that the former “impose a relatively larger burden on credit constrained students” 
(Cameron and Taber, 2000, p. 2). The impact of taxes upon human capital investment is a 
second connection in which this matters, because the foregone earnings are not exposed 
to income and wage taxation (and so may be viewed as “fully expensed”) whereas direct 
outlays by students and their families are not deductible from taxable income. A further 
question, whose significance may turn on the relative importance of direct costs in total 
education and training investments, arises in regard to the government financing of the 
direct costs of education when there is a possibility of subsequent migration. While 
migration may not prevent the repayment of loans, there may well be resistance to 
offering this form of public subsidy if recipients are likely to take their training abroad. 
(Policy implications of this will be discussed further, in Part III, below.) 
A second market failure is that the benefits from education or training may not be fully 
appropriated by the agent who bears the costs. This will be the case, for example, when 
the cognitive skills learned are of use to a small number of firms, who then hold the 
bargaining power with respect to the worker and can offer a wage below the marginal 
productivity of the educational investment. More generally, there may be important 
externalities at the level of the firm of having a work-force with a high average human 
capital, for which the individual workers are compensated unequally or not at all. Thus, 
more educated workers may be able to more effectively co-operate in teamwork, the  
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benefits of which will be disproportionately enjoyed by the team-leaders, or managerial 
staff, or by the owners of the employing firm, because at the margin there are many other 
individuals who possess the necessary qualifications to permit them to replace an existing 
team member.  
Thirdly, the cognitive decisions are taken with ignorance of the future demand situation. 
This is one of the most crucial issues in the planning of education, both for individuals and 
government, since current decisions are to a large extent driven by current payoffs to 
different  levels and types of education but these investments involve a long gestation 
period, and the occupational wage structure can be quite different by the time the people 
conclude the courses of higher education and vocational training and enter the labour 
market. This uncertainty results in the loss of resources devoted to education for cognitive 
skills that are not required or fully used; clearly, this implies a payoff for “broad” 
educational investments in skills that can be used in many occupations. With the notable 
exception of Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998), who study a model of schooling and 
on-the-job training with heterogeneous human capital, the literature offers few fully 
specified models of heterogeneous human capital, and none that attempt to account for 
the feedbacks between wages and the supply of different skills in a context of uncertainty.  
That uncertainty raises the possibility that the public sector should intervene in the 
schooling decision, since government agencies may have better macroeconomic 
information about demand movements of different skills than individuals, who are likely to 
respond only to current wages. The same might be said also of individual educational 
institutions, which periodically have been faulted for failing to adequately respond to 
changing labour market demands. (See, for example, Romer’s 2000 analysis of reasons 
why traditional university curricula remained unresponsive to the emergence of new, 
interdisciplinary skill needs, such as those in “bio-informatics”, that have accompanied the 
industrial application of biogenetic research methods). Of course, the centralised decision-
making process is more likely to lead to “overshooting”, in which the lagged adjustment to 
skill “shortages” (e.g., in engineers or, more recently, computational biology specialists, 
described by Stephan and Black, 1998) leads to these being oversupplied when the 
people enter the labour market. 
A different type of uncertainty can be important also in the demand for education: if ability 
is desired by employers but unobservable to them, then sorting of potential workers may 
be made on the basis of observable educational credentials when firms perceive a 
correlation between ability and education. This is the central idea of the signalling and 
screening hypothesis (see, e.g. Weiss, 1995). There is disagreement as to the “distortion” 
caused by sorting: early studies focused on the over-investment in education caused by 
the private return to education – the direct effect of education on productivity plus the 
value of signalling innate ability – exceeding the social return to education, which only 
takes into account the direct effect; more recently, however, it has been recognised that 
sorting can result in better matches of workers to jobs that increase productivity. A 
dynamic process of increasing demand for education may be envisaged as people seek to 
differentiate themselves. This will be the case if the number of new tasks is growing 
slowly, because it forces people to get education if they aspire to a good salary. 
On-the-job Training 
On-the-job training (combining production, learning-by-doing, and mentoring by co-
workers) is important for productivity because it supplies specific skills that are normally 
not obtained by formal education or vocational training courses – in fact, it has been 
suggested (Mincer, 1997) that post-school human capital investment is the primary factor  
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underlying the observed wage structure. The distinction between general and specific 
skills was first made by Becker (1962): general skills increase the productivity of workers 
with many employers, while specific skills only increase their marginal productivity in the 
current job. The distinction is crucial because firms are willing to share the cost of specific 
investments, as workers can only recoup these in the current job, and therefore have no 
incentive to quit and work in another firm. But employers will not finance general skills, 
since the worker can leave after the investment is made and gain the benefit from the 
general human capital elsewhere; therefore workers must finance general skills (for a 
formal derivation of these results, see Hashimoto, 1981). 
The specificity of a given skill may change as the industrial structure evolves, thus 
affecting the incentives for firms to provide and pay for training; e.g., knowledge of 
computer programming may only have been useful to one firm at the outset of the 
computer industry but it is now valuable across a wide range of firms. “Distortions” in the 
wage structure in imperfect labour markets – in particular, compression of the wage 
distribution resulting from institutions such as minimum wage laws or from matching and 
search frictions – can also affect the specificity of skills: the labour market imperfections 
mean that workers do not get paid their full marginal product when they change jobs, 
making general skills effectively specific (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a, b). Another 
reason why some training for general skills may be provided by firms is if these skills are 
complementary to specific skills.  
If training is used as a screening device to discriminate between workers with 
unobservable characteristics, then firms may have an added incentive to provide 
nominally free general skills training. For screening to be feasible training must be more 
productive and therefore valuable to high ability workers; Autor (2000) develops a formal 
model that shows how “firms may be able to offer a package of wages and up-front 
general skills training that induces self-selection by ability, generating short-run 
monopsony profits”. The importance to the firm of gaining the private information will 
determine the demand for training as a screening device; in this respect, note that the 
increasing number of standards reduces the “signal” from each and can lead to increasing 
monitoring periods. 
Obviously, it would be desirable to be able to establish empirically whether or not job-
specific human capital accumulation (through learning by doing and formal on-the-job 
training) was an important feature in particular occupations and industrial sectors. The 
formation of work-based skills that are not strictly firm-specific is a source of labour market 
externalities, the existence of which has a direct bearing on public policy design. 
Unfortunately, empirically grounded general conclusions about the creation and value of 
transferable skills formed through OJT have proved frustratingly elusive. This is the case 
despite the considerable ingenuity and effort on the part of labour economists that has 
been devoted to econometric attempts to establish whether individual, job-experience 
based “skill acquisition” (rather than selection effects) was the main source of the putative 
“learning effects” that have been observed widely in wage-tenure profiles and labour force 
turnover data. 
It is important to separate the effect of greater on-the-job experience from the effect of 
lengthened tenure upon wages, because wages will not rise with the accumulation of job-
specific human capital unless the workers are able to share some of the benefits that 
employers expect to capture from enhancing their productivity through training 
investments. This is a point recently underscored by Felli and Harris (1996), who also 
notice that even after controlling for worker experience, a positive tenure effect upon wage 
rates is observed quite widely in industry. This pure “tenure effect” can be interpreted as  
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reflecting the wage-structures designed by firms that seek to retain workers to whom they 
have provided firm-specific training. Thus, Topel (1991) views the widespread presence of 
a pure tenure effect as evidence that “accumulation of specific capital is an important 
ingredient of the typical employment relationship”.  
Nevertheless, the latter conclusion is merely an inference, and one that may be quite 
unwarranted. It is quite possible, instead, that such a tenure-graduated wage structure 
could be established simply in order to reduce the firm’s (random) job-turnover rate. 
Because hiring and quits impose fixed costs on the employer, tenure-graduated pay has a 
rationale independent from that of sharing the productivity gains that derive from 
experience-based job-specific learning. Consequently, its appearance need not signal the 
presence of job-specific learning. Indeed, McHugh (1988) concluded that employer 
concerns over rising labour turnover rates lay behind the appearance of positive wage-
experience profiles among US southern textile mill workers, including those in occupations 
that left little or no scope for extended job-specific learning.  
If employers adopt tenure-associated wage increments to protect their returns from firm-
specific investment in human capital, then one would expect to find lower average 
turnover rates in firms where the wage-tenure (and within-firm-experience) profiles were 
steeper. A more demanding test, however, would need to control for the complementarity 
that is thought to obtain quite generally between formal education and subsequent on-the-
job training investments. Turnover rates tend to be lower in occupations dominated by 
college educated workers, and empirical studies for the US find a strong association 
between the recruitment of workers with higher educational attainment levels and steeper 
wage-experience profiles. There are few empirical studies that have been able to make 
the sort of controlled inter-firm comparisons that are required to convincingly infer the 
existence of job-specific learning simply from the observed positive effects of tenure upon 
wages.  
There is a second empirical implication, however, which labour economists have sought to 
exploit in testing for the presence of job- or firm-specific human capital accumulation as a 
source of positive wage-tenure profiles: the workers’ conditional separation also should be 
observed to decline as tenure lengthens. In other words, the presumed “sharing” of the 
returns on learning investments with the workers should be seen to have the effect of 
depressing quit rates among the (putative) specifically-trained workers. Negative duration 
effects on the hazard rates for separations – both quits and layoffs – are observed quite 
generally in US data (e.g., Parsons, 1972, 1978; Topel and Ward, 1992; Farber, 1994). 
But this is far from conclusive evidence: the problem with this test is that it does not 
eliminate the influence of other tenure-related processes affecting job separation rates. 
The empirical hazard rate for quits (voluntary separations) might decline due to the 
presence of unobserved heterogeneities among the workers. 
One form of such heterogeneity might be the initial dispersion in workers’ beliefs about the 
nature of the job, or of the firm, and the goodness of “the match” it represents for each of 
them. Workers with the most grossly optimistic “priors” would be likely to be quickest to 
“learn” by revising their beliefs downward, and so would tend to exit early; they would 
leave behind those whose expectations conformed more closely with the “realistic” job-
quality appraisal – towards which they would converge as their tenure lengthened. 
Another selective attrition process may be envisaged, which would likewise give rise to 
negative duration effects on the hazard rate for separations: suppose that among the 
workers there is a distribution of standards for job matching, and some of these pertain to 
dimensions of the job about which credible information is available only to those actually  
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employed by the firm. Those with the most demanding standards are likely to discover 
that they have a “poor match” and so will exit first, leaving behind those who regard 
themselves to be well-matched in their jobs and are therefore less likely to quit. Such 
workers are “learning”, but they are learning about the job, rather than learning to be more 
productive on the job. 
Although the remaining workers would be “better matched” with their employer, and it is 
conceivable that the average performance of the (surviving) workforce might tend to rise 
with tenure, ex hypothesis the productivities of the individual workers would not have been 
enhanced by the accumulation of tenure in their respective jobs. Lacking some collateral 
observations such as individual productivity indicators, or differential treatment of “better 
matched” and “better skilled” employees by the firm, empirically identifying situations of 
true “on-the-job training” is difficult indeed. 
There are parallel forms of “learning” that could be said to improve the average 
productivity of a given cohort of workers without generating human capital. The existence 
of unobserved heterogeneities in the traits of the workforce leaves scope for selection-
type learning on the part of the firm. Screening by employers on the basis of “signals” 
such as educational attainment will not suffice to remove all the variability in worker ability, 
attitudes and interpersonal capabilities, so, within any cohort of new hires, average 
performance can be improved through selective retention. Such a policy can be 
implemented readily enough without forced separations: it may be sufficient to inform 
workers with “sub-par” traits that they “do not have a future” with the firm, at least not one 
that involves promotion to higher wage positions. The firm in this situation is in a position 
to capture all of the benefits of the “knowledge” it gains about the qualities of retained 
workforce, and so there is no reason to expect average wages to rise with tenure on 
account of the “learning process”. Correspondingly, once one controls for the effects of 
selective promotion to higher-paying (occupational) job-slots within the firm, positive 
wage-experience and wage-tenure profiles would not be observed at either the individual 
or the cohort levels.  
Therefore, it remains hard to come by econometric findings that distinguish conclusively 
between the formation of non-transferable job-specific human capital, on the one hand, 
and investments that, on the other hand, yield a preponderance of either general human 
capital, or occupation- and industry-specific human capital, the benefits of which are not 
fully internalised by the trainees or the training firms, respectively. This difficulty is 
encountered not because policy-relevant conceptual distinctions are difficult to draw, nor 
because such distinctions cannot be operationalised for purposes of quantitative analysis. 
Quite the contrary. The core of the problem is empirical: the data requirements for such 
analysis are very demanding, and applied labour economists have been waiting to be 
provided with very large panel data sets, pertaining to wages, job-titles, hires, quits and 
layoffs for a sample of firms that are following a variety of policies in regard to training 
investments and labour turnover. 
It is likely that they will have to go on waiting. Systematic collection of complex data sets 
of that kind is an expensive, long-term undertaking, and the immediate applicability of the 
material to current labour market issues is exposed to the risk of obsolescence by sudden 
shifts in technological, institutional or international trade conditions. Consequently, resort 
to the use of focused employer and employee surveys would appear to offer a more 
immediately practical empirical basis for informing the design of public policy aimed at 
encouraging private sector investment in job-specific training.   
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Concretely, what one needs to ascertain is information about the extent of the gaps that 
exist in a given range of industries between average practice and what might be viewed 
as “best practice” training policies. The latter can be gauged by inter-firm comparisons as 
to the scale, per worker costs, the nature and modes of training: codified material vs. 
demonstration of tacit skills, training that is conducted off-site vs. on-site, training activities 
that are out-sourced vs. those provided by firm personnel). Such comparisons can identify 
the effects on workers’ performance (average proportional change, and variance within- 
and between-trainee cohorts), and worker retention rates among the trainees.  
Information of that kind is costly, yet not impossible to obtain. Black and Lynch (1996), for 
example, report findings on the business revenue productivity impact of human capital 
investments among medium and large size manufacturing firms in the U.S., based on data 
from the National Employers’ Survey conducted by the National Center on the Educational 
Quality of the Workforce (EQW). This was a telephone survey administered by the U.S. 
Bureau of the Census in August and September 1994; a national sample of 4633 eligible 
private firms employing 20 or more workers was contacted (over-sampling firms with 100 
or more employees), and a 72 percent response rate was obtained. The survey questions 
replicated those on the Annual Survey of Manufacturing in regard to plant characteristics, 
sales, materials and capital during 1993. That data was supplemented with information on 
educational attainment, training and job tenure characteristics of the workforce, the types 
of training programmes in use (computer-, teamwork- and supervisor-training), the 
percentage of formal training provided outside working hours, the use of other managerial 
practices (TQM and “Benchmarking”), and so forth.  
It is unfortunate that the intra-industry variability of these training practices, and their 
correlates does not appear to have been made the subject of systematic investigations. 
Instead, Black and Lynch (1996) sought to use this unique data to estimate a more 
sophisticated set of cross-section production functions – which differed only in a scaling 
parameter among the array of industries included in their survey sample. It might be noted 
that their concentration on establishing productivity effects, although entirely 
understandable, was nevertheless a rather dubious undertaking in view of the failure of 
this study to deal satisfactorily with the number of serious econometric problems. 
Numerous pitfalls await casual statistical analyses in this area, and among them the 
following trio are particularly troublesome: (a) the bias introduced by the endogeneity of 
the inputs and training investments selected for the establishments, (b) the problem of 
uncorrected sample (self-) selection biases, and (c) the potential bias due to correlation 
between establishments’ labour training investment choices and (unobserved) product mix 
differences that affected levels of revenue productivity through relative product price 
differences, rather than through physical productivity differences. The main point to be 
noted here, however, concerns the possibility of gathering pertinent data by survey 
methods. 
In addition, however, it is worth noticing a number of subsidiary points that appear among 
Black and Lynch’s (1996) results, as these reinforce the argument that detailed data are 
well worth pursuing in this connection. First, like replacements in physical capital that 
reduce the average age of the machinery stock, worker training has negative concurrent 
effects on organisational performance due to disruption of work routines. As a 
consequence, positive effects are likely to appear only with some lag. To bear this in mind 
would be especially pertinent when seeking to elicit survey responses from employers and 
supervisors as to the performance effects of OJT, as distinct from out-of-work hours, off-
site training. This is quite consistent with observations regarding the apparent adverse 
productivity effects of organisational and individual learning entailed in taking up  
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successive vintages of personal computer hardware and software during the “PC 
revolution” of the later 1980’s, a point emphasised by David (1991a), among others 
seeking explanations for the so-called “computer-productivity paradox”. 
A second noteworthy finding is that there appear to be significant differences among 
sectors in the impact of different types of training on establishment productivity, although 
the clearest evidence on this point concerns the association between “computer-training” 
and establishments’ revenue productivity levels in the non-manufacturing sector. The 
supposed complementarity of information and computing technologies with worker-skills 
has been a staple in recent discussions of the unexplained rise in wage dispersion in the 
US and UK, and to a lesser extent in other industrial economies (see, e.g., Krueger 1993). 
A third observation suggests the importance of obtaining further detail from interviews on 
the content, timing and implementation of programmes such as employer-provided 
training and TQM (total quality management). Black and Lynch (1996) cite an unpublished 
1993 study by Columbia University researchers, in which it was found that the productivity 
effects of high-performance work systems vary significantly with the actual manner of their 
implementation. This conclusion emerges also from Levy and Murnane’s (1996) study of 
the effect of computerisation of a given business activity (a bank that had expanded into 
financial custodian services) upon the specific kinds of worker skills for which demand 
was increased. Where the workforce is expanding, it is found to be important to redesign 
the firm’s training programmes, and worker recruitment criteria, not simply to meet the 
skills requirements of the new information technology, but to take into account the 
characteristics of the new workers who are being recruited to fill the jobs. (In the case of 
the bank that was expanding and upgrading its information technology, the larger number 
of college graduates being employed called for fewer routine work assignments.)  
The upshot of these considerations is that providing subsidies for human capital 
investments that are undertaken jointly by employers and workers does offer the benefit of 
more immediately realised productivity impacts, compared to the longer-term effects of 
lifting the general quality of the workforce through schooling investments directed to the 
young. In that connection it seems important to bear in mind that the substantive content 
of OJT investments, i.e., the nature of the knowledge imparted to or acquired by trainees, 
is likely to be a matter of interest, and potentially a subject of some conflicts between 
employers and workers. The content of training is no less relevant for decisions as to 
whether, and where this form of human capital investment should be promoted by means 
of public subsidies. The following sub-sections elaborate upon these observations. 
(i)  Further training and financing 
The fact that workers must finance training is not per se a market failure, but under-
provision of skills can arise when workers do not have the resources to invest in training 
and there are borrowing constraints. There are serious issues of adverse selection and 
moral hazard that accentuate the credit constraints of workers. Of course, even if workers 
have liquidity constraints, they may be able to self-finance training that is useful across 
many firms, by accepting a wage cut while training. Elbaum (1989) discusses the benefits 
of the British apprenticeship system to employer financing of skills that are transferable 
between firms, but modern examples of trainees with wages below their marginal 
productivity abound.  
A different problem is that there may be a conflict in the type of training desired by the 
worker and the firm; the firm will generally want the worker to get specific skills while the 
worker will prefer to get general ones for insurance reasons. If there are contracting  
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difficulties because of unobservability or nonverifiability of the type of training (so that the 
worker and firm can observe the training, but a contract specifying the characteristics of 
the training would not be enforced in a court), then there will also be under-provision of 
skills. The economics literature has studied some labour market mechanisms that seem to 
alleviate this problem, focusing particularly on the role of promotion to reward employees 
for certain kinds of training and the possibility that firms can build a reputation for not 
appropriating all the benefits derived from workers’ specific skills. 
The specificity of certain skills has broader consequences than the undersupply of 
training: it can also constrain the financing of entrepreneurs. A bank may not lend to an 
entrepreneur who wishes to start a business, because it (rationally) perceives that the 
entrepreneur will take decisions in the running of the firm that go against the lender’s 
interest. In particular, Goddard (2000) shows that the entrepreneur has an incentive to get 
more general skills than the bank desires when starting the firm, to insure herself against 
the possible bankruptcy of the firm. Not only is financing limited, but the probability of firm 
failure is higher than could be achieved with the appropriate skills.  
(ii)  Training and the nature of specialised knowledge 
The need for on-the-job training to learn specific skills is vital, but there is another, equally 
important, motivation for training workers on-the-job rather than in formal education 
related to the nature of knowledge. The intangible capital of individuals is not only 
composed of explicit and codified methods and procedures – what is referred to as 
codified knowledge; a large part of what people know is “tacit”, acquired experimentally 
and transferred by demonstration. Tacit knowledge is costly to codify for transmission and 
use by individuals (and organisations) who work under conditions that differ markedly from 
those in which the knowledge originated (see David and Foray, 1995; Cowan, David and 
Foray, 2000). It should not be supposed that reliance on knowledge that remains tacit (as 
distinct from “secret”) is a characteristic only of traditional, “low-tech” activities, or artisanal 
trades. Tacit and codified knowledge are complements at the microeconomic level, as 
studies of tacitness in scientific work-groups have observed. As David (1998, p. 8) puts it, 
“it is embodied in the craft-knowledge of the researchers, about such things as the 
procedures for culturing specific cell lines, or building a new kind of laser that has yet to 
become a standard part of laboratory repertoire”.  
Some intangible capital remains un-systematised in a compact and easily transferable 
form simply because its nature resists codification. But the incentive structure and 
technological elements affecting the cost of codification (for example, new electronic 
information systems) determine the level of effort devoted to codification: where big 
payoffs exist, then more knowledge tends to be expressed in forms that make it easier to 
transmit to others. Since formal schooling is based on the transmission of systematised 
information, there is a need for workers and firms to use other mechanisms of knowledge 
transfer in which the knowledge holders actively participate. 
On-the-job training is key in this respect because tacit knowledge cannot readily be 
expressed outside the production context in which it is generated; it is an integral part of 
the work practices of research and production units. (For further discussion on the 
economics of tacit knowledge and codification, see: David and Foray, 1995; Cowan and 
Foray, 1997; Cowan, David, and Foray, 2000.) Of course, on-the-job training is not the 
only way in which people can acquire the tacit knowledge needed for production. “The 
circulation of post-doctoral students among university research laboratories, between 
universities and specialised research institutes, and no less importantly, the movement of 
newly trained researchers from the academy into industrial research organisations, is  
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therefore an important aspect of "technology transfer" -- diffusing the latest techniques of 
science and engineering research” (David, 1998, p. 8). Such transfers, of course, occur 
also in industry, but where firm-specific knowledge is involved efforts usually will be made 
to minimise such “knowledge spill-overs”. 
(iii) Formal  schooling  and further training 
A final point regards the positive relationship between the formal schooling undertaken 
and the equilibrium amount of on-the-job training. Schooling provides intangible capital 
that is an essential preparation to undertake certain kinds of on-the-job training and, more 
generally, facilitates the acquisition of skills. This is even true of a great deal of codified 
knowledge, since “successfully reading the code in this last sense may involve prior 
acquisition of considerable specialised knowledge” (Cowan, David, and Foray, 1998, p. 9). 
Moreover, it provides a signal to firms about the worker’s ability that increases their 
willingness to provide training.  
As a result, people with more schooling tend to invest in more on-the-job training, and 
people with greater ability or better schooling tend to engage in job training more than 
others with the same nominal schooling (see Mincer, 1997, for evidence of this using US 
data). This positive relationship is a mechanism that perpetuates differences in schooling 
in later stages of the life-cycle, leading to permanent differences in perceived and real 
productivity and earnings. Therefore, market failures in the provision of higher education, 
or even earlier, can lead to permanent and increasing stratification of workers.  
Midlife Training and Re-Training 
Training becomes particularly important in situations of rapid technological change, 
because skills become obsolete more rapidly; this is compounded by the fact that the new 
skills required may not be available in the labour market but must be developed within the 
firm. This is emphasised by recent OECD documents (1996, 2000). Helpman and Rangel 
(1999) formalise this argument to show that specific skills from on-the-job training will be 
substituted for more formal education in times of rapid technological change, because the 
intangible capital gained from the latter can be transferred more easily between firms, 
industries, and occupations. There also will be an incentive to get more schooling and 
delay entry into the labour market if experience is technology-specific and people 
anticipate that a new and different technology will appear soon.  
Another consequence of the rapid obsolescence of job skills is the need for continuous 
training. This is emphasised by Pischke (1996) in an analysis of the German experience. 
He argues that “initial vocational qualifications are not enough for workers to remain 
productive when work environments change quickly or when structural change 
necessitates switching jobs or occupations”, and that retraining – through formal firm-
based continuous training or informal mentoring and learning-by-doing – is crucial. More 
generally, it can be argued that the anticipation of rapid changes in industrial practices 
and technologies will induce workers to seek early education and training that allows them 
to be more flexible.  
This induced demand for broader general training among the young (usually through 
formal education) tends to conflict with the educational policy thrust of governments that 
are responding to current, short-run conditions. The accelerated organisational and 
technological changes create the perception that employers require highly specific new 
skills; public authorities come under pressure from business complaints that formal 
education institutions are “failing to deliver what the economy needs”. Although in the  
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short-run general and specific training necessarily will be substitutes, human capital policy 
for a context of rapid technological and commercial innovation must recognise that over 
the longer run their complementarity emerges in the lowered cost of retraining. 
Rapid technological change also should create incentives for firms to adopt new industrial 
practices that can be grouped under the heading of “just-in-time learning”; these seek to 
minimise the further training costs required to yield the right mix of skills at all times. 
Specifically, such practices include the cross-training by co-workers, job rotation, skill-
based pay, formal or informal groups, and suggestion systems that reward contributions to 
improve work processes or products (see Stern, 1996, for a more detailed 
characterisation of these practices). 
The distinction between tacit and codified knowledge is germane to these technological 
transformations, since it has been recognised that the knowledge about new technologies 
is likely to be highly tacit, held only by a small group of individuals engaged in practical 
application of the technology in question. As a consequence, the scope for easy and 
inexpensive transmission of uncodified knowledge beyond the confines of such work 
groups remains quite restricted. The process of codification is lengthy, requiring these 
agents to make their discoveries and inventions manifest in physical artefacts or in 
published papers; this knowledge will then slowly diffuse into learning institutions. While 
codification is under way, practical work-based training and other forms of learning are 
essential for workers to understand and use the new technologies. 
On the other side of the coin, it is found that modern industrial technologies have become 
based increasingly on science-based knowledge, and so are more amenable to 
codification and “embodiment” in highly automated plant and equipment. Industrial 
workers therefore have come to operate as the vital discretionary controllers of (“open 
loop”) processes involving physical, chemical or electrical transformations, whereas 
previously they were important direct instrumentalities in such transformations. The 
training of such workers continues to be undertaken within these industrial facilities, but its 
“craft aspects” are greatly attenuated. Formal instruction imparting highly codified 
knowledge of both the scientific foundations of the engineering principle embodied in the 
technology with which they are to work, and of the computer hardware and software they 
must understand in order to perform their tasks properly plays an increasingly important 
part in the new training routines (see, e.g., Balconi 1998, 2000). 
One evident implication of this trend is that the costs facing firms who must undertake this 
kind of plant-specific, on-the-job training are becoming more sensitive to the availability of 
industrial job applicants who come with not only “basic” literacy and numeracy, but also 
have a reasonably strong quantitative and technical grounding. The continuing penetration 
of codified knowledge into industrial practice is therefore creating a stronger cognitive 
knowledge basis for complementaries between formal educational investments and 
eligibility for employment in “blue-collar” manufacturing, paralleling the connections that 
were formed in an earlier era in regard to “white collar” employment.  
Retirement 
The issue of retirement generally has been neglected by the human capital literature. 
Nevertheless, a strong argument may be made that people also require certain types of 
intangible capital in their old age. People who have retired increasingly need to participate 
in sophisticated markets (e.g. for pensions or medical care), for which they are 
unprepared; clearly financing the training required to learn about these issues is even 
more difficult for this group of the population. Further, it can be observed that the  
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underprovision of human capital of kinds relevant for old age has become even more 
acute: in previous eras young people lived and cared for their older relatives directly, and 
in the process learnt the problems faced by older generations. Today, however, the 
increasing desire for independence by both the younger generation and their elders (when 
they can afford it) translates into residential and often (retirement) community segregation. 
Such trends raise the likelihood of a greater number of people entering the ranks of the 
elderly having had comparatively little experience of the realities of that stage of the life-
cycle. In view of the demographic trends toward ageing of the population in the 
economically advanced countries, and the growing importance of the time and resources 
that individuals devote to activities other than market work, the economics of “education 
for recreation and retirement” is a subject that would seem to merit more serious attention. 
Conclusions 
Different stages in the process of human capital formation can be affected by market 
failures. While these market failures may be independent from one another, it should be 
emphasised that the feedbacks between family socialisation, formal education, and the 
work environment can lead to initial differences in human capital persisting in later stages 
of the life-cycle. The reason is that at each stage of the life-cycle there appear to be 
mechanisms that perpetuate and amplify differences in human capital and contribute to 
stratification. Differences in intangible human capital from the early socialisation process 
and the quality of primary and secondary education modify the desire and the access to 
financing for higher education. The better off can make better use of (government 
financed) education through complementary investments; people with less college 
education tend to get jobs for which experience and learning-by-doing is less relevant, 
thus reducing their future wage increases, and are offered fewer opportunities for skill 
acquisition by firms that use schooling as a proxy for innate ability; et cetera. 
A systemic vision of the sequence of educational choices therefore points to the 
importance of corrective government intervention in early stages of the life-cycle, rather 
than in later periods. Some institutions, such as the prohibition of child labour and 
universal schooling, have been very important in affecting the initial level of capabilities. In 
general, however, it seems that parts of the process which greatly shape future 
possibilities are determined within the family setting of early childhood, where outside 
social agencies have quite limited effective leverage. Thus, seemingly “neutral” policies 
can yield very “biased” outcomes through these cumulative life-cycle effects. 
In the view of the literature discussed, the solution for market failures is straightforward. In 
the case of externalities, there is a presumption that the government can intervene to 
force actors to “internalise” the consequences of their decisions on others. For example, if 
the private returns to a firm of implementing a new technology differ from the social 
returns – because of costs of adapting the educational curricula or other external costs, 
then the government could “tax” firms that adopt this new technology until the optimum 
adoption rate was chosen. If the technological changes are geographically localised 
because of the tacit nature of this new knowledge, this is certainly possible; in this 
respect, governments have an advantage over individual firms, which can do little to 
accommodate technological change.  
But, again, the scope for effective government interventions will be constrained when 
externalities extend across national boundaries – unless very costly policy measures also 
are imposed to isolate the economy from foreign trade and factor movements, and the 
flows of information that emanate from the rest of the world. In particular, a small, open 
economy may not be able to influence the flows of knowledge that affect its educational  
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system and industrial structure. Unlike a firm, the government may be further limited by its 
inability to sign contracts with people to take decisions about their education and training 
to rapidly adjust the supply of skills to the industrial restructuring resulting from the 
introduction of new technologies. 
It is in the light of such real-world constraints on government action that one should read 
the macroeconomic growth literature (surveyed in the next section) for the analytical 
insights it can provide, rather than as a source of practical policy prescriptions.  
II.2  Human Capital and Macroeconomic Growth Theory  
We must now seek to pass from the preceding examination of market and non-market 
processes, which impinge upon intangible human capital formation at the micro-economic 
level, to an assessment of their macro-level impacts. The analytical gateway through 
which this passage can most readily be effected is provided by the theory of economic 
growth. Formal growth models present a simplified version of general equilibrium analysis 
in which changes in the quantities of outputs and inputs in the aggregate economy, and 
the associated relative prices, are seen to be determined simultaneously under conditions 
that maintain full utilisation of the economy’s growing productive potential.  
Explicit treatments of the role of human capital within formal economic growth theory are 
of comparatively recent origins, dating from the seminal papers of Romer (1986) and 
Lucas (1988) in the so-called “endogenous growth theory” literature. Before that, the 
prevailing neoclassical theory of growth developed by Solow (1956, 1957) and Swan 
(1956) had centred macroeconomists’ attention throughout the 1960’s and into the 1970’s 
on tangible (physical) capital accumulation as the driver of economic growth. (For a full 
description of this theory see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, or Aghion and Howitt, 1998.) 
To appreciate what the recent contributions to growth theory have to say about the role of 
intangible capital formation, it will be helpful first to review the main features of the 
preceding generation of models.  
Growth with Tangible Capital Accumulation: The Neoclassical 
Background 
The basic neoclassical modelling approach envisages the growth of output per capita (and 
per worker) as dependent on the process of (tangible) “capital-deepening”. Average 
labour productivity levels are depicted as dependent solely on workers’ access to co-
operating inputs of physical capital services, and not on the level or distribution of 
education, experience, or other characteristics. The economy saves part of its current 
production and invests it in additional capital goods. In the simpler, one-sector formulation 
of these models it is assumed that the output can be used equally well for consumption or 
for investment in non-human physical assets, whereas the “two-sector” neoclassical 
models recognised distinct consumption- and investment-goods and determined their 
relative price endogenously, along with the quantities of each. The supply of labour to the 
market is assumed to depend only on the exogenously determined population size, and 
so labour input growth cannot arise from either “quantity” changes (such as alterations in 
the labour force participation rate, the length of the employed work-year, and the intensity 
of physical work efforts), or from alterations in the “quality” of the workers.  
Since the neoclassical model of growth assumes the existence of decreasing returns to 
physical capital, positive growth rates of output cannot be supported indefinitely by 
physical capital accumulation. As the capital stock grows, the marginal productivity of  
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investment is reduced, leading to less capacity expansion; in the limit, the capital-output 
ratio is constant and growth in output per worker can only be maintained by the efficiency-
enhancing effects of technological change. The latter source of sustained growth is thus 
exogenous and its productivity raising effects are treated as separable from those of 
capital accumulation. This separability feature is a consequence of the specification that 
technological change is “neutral”, in the sense that it does not alter the relative marginal 
productivities of the factors of production, when the proportions in which labour and capital 
used remains unchanged (standard growth models assume what is referred to as “Harrod 
neutrality, ” or technological progress which is purely labour-augmenting: given an 
unchanged capital-output ratio, such technological changes will not disturb the marginal 
productivity of capital inputs). The existence of this kind of technological change, and its 
effects in raising labour productivity, are therefore compatible with the maintenance of a 
“steady state” equilibrium path, along which the capital stock and output will be growing “in 
balance” with each other, i.e., maintaining a constant capital-output ratio, and a constant 
real rate of return on capital. When the model includes population growth, there is a 
positive steady-state rate of growth of aggregate real output which equals the population 
growth rate plus the exogenous technological change.  
Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965), building on Ramsey (1928), extended the Solow-
Swan model to allow for an endogenous savings rate by incorporating an intertemporal 
consumption decision. Competitive firms rent capital and hire labour to produce and sell 
output, and a fixed number of infinitely lived households supply labour, hold capital, 
consume and save. The optimal savings rate from this model depends on the capital stock 
per worker, adjusting as the economy develops. In the Solow-Swan model the fixed 
savings rate implied that the economy could “oversave”, but this is no longer possible 
when the savings rate is endogenous. Note that the representative household assumption 
precludes discrepancies between private and social discount rates. Hence, in these 
models, there can be no intertemporal misallocation. 
Aside from the issue of savings, both these models of exogenous technological change 
predict that a country with a capital-output ratio below that of the steady state will invest in 
physical capital until it reaches the optimal ratio; if the country has an excessive capital-
output ratio then it will disinvest until the right level is reached. The speed of convergence 
to the steady state capital-output ratio will be greater the further away the economy is from 
this balanced growth path. Moreover, if the countries have identical preferences (time 
discounting and risk aversion), population growth, depreciation (of physical capital), 
exogenous technological change, and initial technological levels, then they will end up in 
the  same steady state. This result is called conditional convergence since the 
convergence requires that the economies share the same structural conditions – versus 
absolute convergence, which implies that poorer countries will always grow faster than 
richer ones. If the conditions differ, then it is possible for different countries to have 
different rates of growth of output in the steady state. 
The two most important contributions of the Solow-Swan model are that it can (1) quantify 
the effects of different factors on economic growth, and (2) distinguish between growth 
effects, when changes in the parameters alter the productivity growth rates along the 
steady state paths, and productivity level effects. In the case of the latter, changes in the 
rate of growth of labour inputs, or in the savings supply function and the rate of 
depreciation of the tangible capital stock, can raise or lower the level of the capital-output 
ratio and labour-productivity on the balanced growth path. But the slope of the steady-
state path will not be affected thereby.   
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This result has been seen as an unsatisfactory feature of the theory, inasmuch as it 
presents the long-run source of sustained labour productivity improvement (and hence 
growth in per capita real GDP) as dependent entirely upon exogenous technological 
change. The model therefore offers little guidance for public policies designed to promote 
faster, sustainable growth. A related criticism of the neoclassical theory is that it 
completely abstracts from any market failures resulting from externalities, asymmetric 
information or problems of monopolistic competition, and therefore presents a picture in 
which the competitive equilibrium coincides with the social optimum, leaving neither scope 
nor guidance for governmental policies.  
While addressing these deficits in the neoclassical theory of growth has been an important 
contribution of the more recent literature, some other, more generic shortcomings remain 
largely unaddressed. It is important to note some of the more serious among these 
persisting legacies from the “old growth theory”, before going on to examine the “new 
growth theory” in which the role of human capital has come to be discussed. Perhaps 
most prominent among the caveats to be mentioned in this connection is the fact that the 
exclusive supply-side orientation of virtually all the model-building work in this area has 
led to a narrow focus on the characteristics of “balanced” (or steady-state) growth paths. 
Although the notion of steady state growth is a very useful analytical construct, in 
permitting the study of “comparative equilibrium dynamics”, the growth theory literature is 
not empirically well-grounded in representing the experience of long run growth as a 
“steady-state equilibrium” process. Nor has it provided an adequate characterisation of the 
observed behaviour of the economy when it is away from its steady-state path; indeed, 
the maintained hypothesis of “real business cycle theory” is that the economy never gets 
pushed far from its supply-determined equilibrium path. 
The two prongs of the foregoing criticism should be understood to be quite different in 
their implications. The first point accepts that the long-term historical record of 
macroeconomic performance in the US and other advanced economies can legitimately 
be read as a reflection primarily of supply-side developments that gave rise to the trends 
in potential (full-employment) real output and productivity. But within that framework, 
economic historians have shown that careful reading of the evidence rejects the view of 
growth as movement along an unaltered steady-state path, in favour of interpreting it as a 
sequence of extended transitions, or “traverses”, between steady-state growth paths (see, 
e.g., Abramovitz and David 1973, 1999; David 1977, 2000). 
The second point of criticism focuses on the question of whether it is legitimate to 
separate the trend from the cycle for purposes of analysis and explanation (see, e.g., 
Duesenberry 1958, for an alternative approach). The neglect of the economy’s 
disequilibrium dynamics – which is entailed in thus abstracting from shorter-run 
macroeconomic responses to exogenous demand shocks, and endogenous fluctuations in 
the involuntary employment rate and the rate of utilisation of fixed plant and equipment 
associated with the business cycle, cast doubts upon an important presupposition 
common among those engaged in modelling economic growth. 
Specifically, it calls into question the validity of the claim that the steady-state growth path 
solution(s) found for these models are locally as well as globally stable; that convergence 
to all such paths will be sufficiently rapid to provide a reasonable description of actual 
dynamic behaviour (see Fisher, 1983). In other words, if one cannot offer a good account 
of the economy’s movements when a disequilibriating “shock” takes it away from a 
steady-state growth path – there may be no sound basis for assuming that the ensuing 
disequilibrium dynamics takes the form of simple convergence back towards the pre- 
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existing growth path, or in a smooth traverse to a newly defined steady-state 
configuration. 
A message of caution to take from the preceding remarks is that, like the models cast in 
the neoclassical mould, the recent wave of endogenous growth models tell us about the 
contrasting (dynamic) equilibrium configurations that are implied by different constellations 
of their underlying structural relationships and parameters. Comparisons among those 
equilibrium states, however, in most cases can tell us very little about the actual time path 
of reactions that would ensue from particular policy interventions that altered one or 
another parameter of the macroeconomic system.  
Endogenous Growth Theory 
The current literature on endogenous economic growth emerged primarily as an attempt 
to encompass the sources of technological progress, and hence of sustained productivity 
growth  within the general equilibrium framework of neoclassical growth theory. As the 
focus of this critical review is restricted to the recent economic literature, our treatment of 
economic growth theory is essentially co-extensive with the body of work on formal, or 
mathematically formulated growth models. It is therefore appropriate to draw initial 
attention to the existence of earlier contributions to the modelling of endogenous 
technological progress based upon the accumulation of learning and wealth-related 
investment in education. 
In particular, the mathematical growth models developed by Haavelmo (1954, pp. 24-44) 
recognised the endogeneity of the growth of knowledge and its role in modern economic 
growth: output growth depended on “the accumulation of knowledge” and the state of 
knowledge was represented as an index of “education and know-how” that cumulated the 
“educational effects” of physical capital investments that matched the savings supply 
along the full employment growth path. This “learning by doing” specification anticipated 
Arrow’s (1962) model of growth with endogenous technological change. Haavelmo also 
sought to represent the growth of the population, and hence the labour force, as 
endogenous, by specifying a negative relationship between the birth rate and an index of 
“the level of education” for the population that was dependent upon per capita real wealth. 
Alas, Haavelmo (1954) worked out his models using specifications of the aggregate 
production function that proved less mathematically tractable, and yielded less intuitively 
appealing results than those provided by the models of Solow (1956)-Swan (1957) 
formulation. The latter, elegantly simplified formulation rapidly established itself as the 
dominant paradigm in the theoretic growth literature. 
(i)  Increasing returns due to externalities of specialised tangible 
investment: The “AK model” 
The principal initiator of the new fashion in growth theory, Romer’s (1986) “AK model”, 
generates sustained growth by assuming that technological change is the unintended 
result of the firms’ investment decisions. Firms decide their investment without considering 
the positive effect that the additions in the capital stock will have on the productivity of all 
the other firms in the economy. The result of this externality is that the production of goods 
can avoid the decreasing returns to physical capital that prevent steady rates of labour 
productivity growth in the Solow-Swan and Ramsey models when there is no 
technological change. Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995) argue that another interpretation of the existence of constant returns in the AK 
model is that capital may be viewed broadly to include physical and human components.  
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When the production function has constant returns to capital, the model implies a constant 
growth rate, but when the externality is so large as to produce increasing returns, growth 
becomes explosive. Solow (1994) criticises the AK model for its knife-edge character, 
which makes the model unrobust: any infinitesimal deviation away from constant returns 
to physical capital either eliminates sustained growth or makes it explosive. A different 
and perhaps more fundamental criticism of the AK model is that it assumes technological 
change to be an accident of other productive enterprises, rather than an economically 
valuable activity decided on by rational agents.  
The AK model implies that there is no convergence among economies: if a country starts 
at a lower capital and output per capita, it will not grow at a faster pace than a richer 
country, and differences will persist over time. (We may note that an analogous result is 
found by Lucas, 1988, where differences in the initial educational level of the labour force 
are shown to persist, as will be seen.) The existence of the externality, however, implies 
that the competitive equilibrium of the AK model does not coincide with that which could 
be achieved in an optimal socially planned economy, thereby introducing a role for 
government policies designed to enable poorer economies to close the gap with those 
that were initially at higher per capital output levels.  
(ii)  Increasing returns due to externalities of investments in intangible 
assets 
The endogenous growth models that followed Romer (1986) fleshed out the process of 
technological change through the explicit introduction of human capital and/or knowledge. 
The literature can be separated into two separate strands, depending on the role played 
by human capital in promoting economic development. The first, pioneered by Lucas 
(1988), considers human capital to be another input in the production function, not 
fundamentally different from physical capital, although it can only be accumulated by 
workers through certain activities – principally education or on-the-job training. A second 
line of analysis, originating in the work of Nelson and Phelps (1966), is formalised by 
Romer (1990). It recognises the role of human capital as an input to conventional 
production but doesn’t regard this as its most important function, emphasising instead the 
part it plays in innovation. In this perspective, human capital has the inherent capacity to 
modify itself and the other inputs also, and it is this property that leads to a permanently 
dynamic economy; human capital is the only factor of production capable of creating new 
and improved production processes and goods, in addition to promoting their diffusion 
through the economy. In the following sub-sections, these two different kinds of 
endogenous growth models and their implications are described in greater detail. 
(iii)  Growth with human capital as a factor of production 
Lucas (1988) includes human capital as an additional input in the production of goods, 
while retaining the other features of the neoclassical growth model. In the model, the 
labour force can accumulate human capital, which is then used together with physical 
capital to generate the output of the economy. In one version of the model, human capital 
is acquired through time spent in an (non-productive) educational process, introducing a 
trade-off for workers between employing time to produce output and using it to gain further 
human capital that will increase their marginal productivity when working in subsequent 
periods. In another version of the model, human capital is gained by the workers through 
on-the-job training, and so the time employed working increases their productivity later on. 
The accumulation of human capital involves a sacrifice of current utility in the form of less 
current consumption in the case of education, or a less desirable mix of current 
consumption goods when on-the-job training is considered.  
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In the Solow-Swan and Ramsey models, the equation describing physical capital 
accumulation is sufficient to determine the dynamic evolution of output. To specify the 
growth path when human capital is included, it is necessary to consider an additional 
sector where the growth of human capital takes place. Given that physical capital still has 
diminishing returns, the required assumption for the model to exhibit a positive growth rate 
of output per worker in the steady state is that the “technology” for generating human 
capital has constant returns. This means that the growth of human capital is assumed to 
be the same for a given level of effort whatever the level of human capital attained. With 
this assumption, the rate of output growth (per worker) is positive and increasing in the 
productivity of education or on-the-job training in the creation of human capital. 
Note that linearity in the production of education or on-the-job training is a strong 
assumption, not warranted by either theoretical or empirical literature on the 
microeconomics of human capital formation. In fact, human capital theory normally 
specifies that the marginal return from each extra year of education is decreasing, both 
because the skills gained have less impact on the worker’s productivity and because the 
worker has less time left in which to recoup the investment made before retiring. Lucas 
(1988), however, justified his assumption on the argument that (at the societal level) 
constant returns to human capital formation are the consequence of a social feature of the 
human education and training processes, whereby each generation of workers is able to 
inherit part of previous generations’ knowledge. But the way in which this came about was 
not specified.  
Azariadis and Drazen (1990) and Redding (1996) undertake to model the mechanism of 
human capital transmission across generations in the more plausible framework of an 
overlapping generations model (Lucas followed Ramsey in the simplifying assumption that 
households, as well as firms, are infinitely lived). In these models agents inherit the 
human capital accumulated by the previous generation; they then decide how much time 
to devote when young to a training technology that increases labour quality, thereby 
affecting their marginal productivity when older. Since a given generation deciding its own 
human capital investment does not take into account the intertemporal spill-over effect 
upon the human capital endowment of future generations, there is a technological 
externality that can result in constant or increasing returns to human capital at the social 
level. This state of affairs could be ascribed to the impossibility of contracting with the 
future generations, and sometimes is described as an allocational inefficiency due to 
“incompleteness of markets”. The source of this problem affecting human capital 
investment is therefore rather different from the set of conditions previously seen to impair 
the allocative efficiency of markets that do exist.  
With respect to on-the-job training, Lucas argues that while there may be diminishing 
learning by doing on a particular good or production process, the additional productivity is 
also inherited within a “family” of goods. Stokey (1988) and Young (1991) formalise this 
idea in a model of economy- wide learning-by-doing. In their models, there are positive 
spill-overs from any individual firm’s experience in production to the rest of the firms’ 
costs, and from the experience of the firm in the production of any one good to the 
production of other goods. Stokey’s and Young’s models of knowledge spill-overs, 
however, differ from the structure of Lucas (1988); they conceive growth as driven by the 
enhancement of product quality through the introduction of new goods, rather than by 
human capital accumulation. That is, the focus is on “un-embodied” knowledge regarding 
skills and technology, rather than knowledge embodied as human capital via a costly 
educational process. In this regard, the approach of Stokey and Young is more closely 
related to the growth theory literature focused on the connections between human capital 
formation and innovation, which will be examined below.  
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Lucas proposes, much as Romer (1986) did in presenting the AK model, that there may 
also be a contemporaneous externality between workers such that a rise of the average 
skill level in the economy would increase the marginal productivity of all the factors of 
production. The rationale for this externality, which was originally envisioned in the work of 
Arrow, is that agents benefit from others’ human capital but do not take this into account 
when deciding on their allocation of time between production, leisure, and education. 
Incorporating an “external effect” of human capital results in equilibrium growth rates that 
do not coincide with the efficient growth rates, once again indicating scope for welfare 
enhancing public policy measures. In the model with education, this would require a 
subsidy to schooling that offsets the inability of agents to internalise the benefit their own 
investment in human capital will convey to others in their own generation. In the model 
with on-the-job training, the intervention requires “picking winners”, in the sense of 
subsidising the production of those goods where there is a high return to on-the-job 
training. 
Acemoglu (1996) has offered a formal demonstration of how positive spill-over effects 
(pecuniary externalities) created by workers’ educational and training investment 
decisions can give rise to macro-level increasing returns in human capital. His model 
supposes that workers and firms make their investments in human and physical capital, 
respectively, before being randomly matched with one another. The direct consequence of 
random matching is that the expected rate of return on human capital is increasing in the 
expected amount of (complementary) physical capital with which a worker will be 
provided; similarly, the return on physical capital is increasing in the average human 
capital that the firms expect the workers to bring to the job. Hence, an increase in 
education for a group of workers induces the firms to invest more in tangible assets, 
thereby increasing the return to all workers in the economy. Through a similar argument, 
the model is seen also to imply that there are “social increasing returns” in physical 
capital. 
The importance of Acemoglu’s (1996) analysis lies in the attention it calls to the 
interactions between the two forms of investment, and the dependence of this source of 
social increasing returns upon some measure of co-ordination being achieved between 
them. In the model the high level co-ordination equilibrium is attained because, in effect, 
both firms and workers are implicitly assumed to be “risk neutral” and willing to commit to 
irreversible investments on the basis of the expected payoffs from probabilistic job-
matching. By the same token, the analysis has two limitations that are worth noting. First, 
the externality results derive crucially from the presumed difficulties, if not the 
impossibility, of firms and workers contracting with one another ex ante, in advance of 
their investment decisions. In some situations, where the duration of the “training 
investments” is very extended, this may be quite realistic. But even there, where legal 
provisions for “bonding” trainees exist, co-ordinated decisions to train and to employ may 
be arrived at, and so “internalise” the potential investment externalities. The special 
arrangements used by the armed services to furnish themselves with a trained medical 
corps constitute a familiar illustrative case.  
The second limitation is related to the point noticed previously concerning risk-neutrality. If 
random matching results in some workers ending up in the wrong jobs (i.e., in jobs that 
require a different level of skill than the one they have obtained, not to mention different 
skills altogether), they will find they have wasted some of their human capital investment. 
This is so especially when, as the microeconomic evidence cited by Acemoglu (1996) 
indicates, the higher costs of job search once workers are installed in a job lead to 
considerable persistence even when the match with the employing firm is not close. 
Symmetrically, firms would wind up with unsuitable workers who required to be further  
WP 01/13  Knowledge, Capabilities and Human Capital Formation in Economic Growth 62
 
trained before being trusted to use the specialised facilities in which capital had been 
sunk, or possibly with over-qualified workers who were discontented and adversely 
affected the morale and performance of others. 
In other words, there is a worrisome “down side” to probabilistic matching, and the 
consequences of that would surely be considered by rational agents. It is only reasonable 
to suppose that in a dynamic environment both firms and workers would learn from these 
matching mistakes, and would try to devise selection rules to reduce the costs of future 
mismatches. But if the economic losses involved were large, and if such remedies proved 
largely ineffectual in avoiding them, the response to the uncertainties surrounding the 
payoffs surely would militate against the probabilistic investment strategies assumed in 
Acemoglu’s model. In other words, there is also a low-skill, low capital investment co-
ordination equilibrium in this model. That would suggest a significant role for public 
agencies: providing better information that would reduce the degree of uncertainties, and 
so prevent the economy from being pushed into co-ordination on under-investment 
strategies that lead to a low productivity growth path. 
(iv)  Human capital externalities and international convergence 
Lucas’s (1988) analysis predicts that economies which start with a poor endowment of 
physical and human capital will remain poor relative to richer countries; even though the 
growth rates will be the same in all countries when they reach their respective steady 
state paths, on which the fraction of labour time devoted to education is unchanging and 
the marginal products of physical and human capital are also stabilised. This non-
convergence result, of course, is sensitive to the model’s specifications that there is (a) no 
inter-country “spill-over” in the methods of producing human capital and (b) no migration 
of workers. 
Both of these assumptions can be readily challenged. Consider not only the international 
dissemination of codified and uncodified knowledge used for instructional purposes, but 
the diffusion of educational institutions and institutionalised organisational practices – 
such as systems of external examinations, local, regional and national school systems 
with supervisory bureaucracies, school inspectors, etc. In addition, many examples of the 
international spread of pedagogical techniques may be cited; such as the “Montessori 
method” in infant schools, computer-based remote instruction at the university level, the 
“case method” in M.B.A. programmes. But it is another matter as to whether these 
outwardly similar “technologies” of instruction can be used with equal cost effectiveness 
everywhere, even within broadly homogeneous societies, let alone across fundamentally 
different cultural milieus. 
Although spill-overs of “knowledge about conveying knowledge” could be a significant 
promoter of convergence, and therefore ought not to be assumed away, neither should 
they be supposed to operate automatically and costlessly. Indeed, it is likely that such 
knowledge transfers require significant complementary local investments and managerial 
abilities. Differential organisational “absorption capacity” becomes relevant in this context, 
as it is in the case of technology spill-overs. Yet, where formal educational infrastructures 
are concerned, the all but universal dominance of public sector financing and state 
provision of schooling implies that market mechanisms on the supply side will not have 
much leverage; differences in the organisational knowledge-borrowing capacities of 
government bureaucracies may therefore be a more critical source of international 
differences in the educational levels attained by the mass of the population.  
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In a subsequent article, Lucas (1993) presents a growth model with human capital spill-
overs, but the human capital in question is not embodied, and therefore is more closely 
akin to technological knowledge. As might be expected, the possibility of cross-country 
spill-overs substantially alters the convergence conclusions of the previous model of 
“informationally isolated” economies: if each country’s evolution of human capital is driven 
by the world average, then convergence will result. On the other hand, it may be that the 
average human capital stock differs between groups of countries, in which case each 
group would converge to a different steady-state determined by the relevant average 
human capital stock (so-called convergence-club dynamics, studied by Quah, 1997, and 
Durlauf and Quah, 1998). 
(v)  Intangible capital, innovation and growth 
Since the work of Romer (1990), Young (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), the 
endogenous growth literature has stopped modelling human capital as an ordinary input to 
the production of goods and considered the other important activities pursued by skilled 
labour, concentrating especially on innovation and its diffusion through the economy. Two 
separate types of innovation are considered: first, innovation as the creation of a greater 
variety of goods and production processes; and, second, innovation as the improvement 
of existing goods’ quality. Romer (1990) emphasises the creation of new capital goods by 
a fixed, exogenous number of skilled workers; unlike Lucas, where the capital goods are 
unchanged and the human capital is determined within the model. Romer argues that 
workers with human capital can be allocated to the design of new intermediate products 
that are subsequently used in a final product market production or to production itself. The 
new “knowledge” generated is nonrival, partially excludable, and can be accumulated 
without bound on a per capita basis; contrasting with human capital, which is rival and 
excludable, since it is incorporated in the workers, and for which there is an upper bound 
to accumulation determined by the finite lifespan of an individual. 
A consequence of the nonrival, partially excludable nature of knowledge is that there is 
incomplete appropriability of the profits generated by an innovation; while the designs for 
the production of capital goods cannot be used freely to produce output, they can be used 
to develop new designs that erode the other goods’ profits. This in turn implies that 
knowledge cannot be paid its marginal product under perfect competition without negative 
profits for the firm. An important contribution of Romer’s model is to introduce imperfect 
competition in the intermediate goods sector, which then generates a stream of rents to 
the firms when they innovate, partially circumventing this problem.  
Positive long-run growth is sustained in Romer’s model by the accumulation of 
knowledge, thought of as an expansion in product varieties. The necessary assumption 
for permanent growth is for the research sector to have a constant returns technology, 
such that increases in the “knowledge stock” do not reduce the marginal productivity of 
further research. Since knowledge accumulation is responsible for growth, it is the fraction 
of the skilled labour force in the research sector and the productivity of this pool of labour 
that determines the growth rate of output in the economy’s steady state. In addition, since 
the model assumes that the human capital required for research is the same as that for 
the production of output in the final goods sector, the rate of output growth is ultimately 
determined by the size of the skilled labour force in the economy. This result is very 
significant: when skilled labour is considered solely as an input for production, the growth 
of output can only be affected by different rates of human capital accumulation, but when 
human capital is thought of as a factor of innovation, growth is sensitive to the level of the 
human capital stock.  
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In Romer’s analysis, there is suboptimal human capital accumulation and growth resulting 
from, first, an externality arising from the effects of knowledge on future productivity, and, 
second, the effects of monopoly pricing in the intermediate sector, which results in 
suboptimal levels of acquisition of new vintage capital goods. These market failures are 
seen to justify government intervention; as a consequence of the model’s structure, 
government subsidies to the production of human capital can increase growth and welfare 
somewhat, but only a subsidy to knowledge creation can reach the social optimum. 
Similar results were derived by Grossman and Helpman (1991c, Ch. 3) by considering an 
expansion in the number of consumer products, rather than intermediate capital goods.  
Stokey (1991, 1995), Grossman and Helpman (1991a) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) 
model innovation as a process that increases product quality; Aghion and Howitt stressing 
the obsolescence of capital product designs and knowledge generally, which both Lucas 
and Romer ignore. In these models, innovation is generally modelled by embedding a 
patent race into the Romer framework, whereby the firms must spend human capital 
resources in R&D to gain a certain probability of discovering an enhanced quality product. 
This good then yields a stream of monopoly rents to the successful firm until the next 
innovation appears. As in Romer, there is an inefficient outcome because of an 
(intertemporal) spill-over, as each innovation permanently raises the productivity of future 
goods, and the monopolistic appropriability effect. In addition, obsolescence introduces a 
“business stealing” effect, as researchers do not internalise the destruction of rents to the 
current holder of a production patent when deciding on the amount of R&D to invest. 
The stochastic nature of innovation in these models means that output follows a random 
walk with drift such that the average growth rate is increasing in the size of the skilled 
workforce and in the productivity of research. Therefore there is no prediction of 
convergence. Young (1993) and Stokey (1995) generalise the previous literature to show 
that the equilibrium rate of R&D, and therefore the growth of output also, depends on the 
degree of substitutability or complementarity among goods, the nature of competition, and 
the properties of the innovation technology. 
The interaction between the investment, training, and R&D decisions is crucial to these 
recent explanations of endogenous economic growth with human capital. This systemic 
feature of the relation between human capital and R&D is most clearly exhibited in a 
growth model developed by Redding (1996), in which Aghion and Howitt’s (1992) 
assumptions are modified to allow for an explicit choice by workers of the time to devote 
to education, whilst the entrepreneurs decide on how much to invest in quality-enhancing 
R&D. Since these decisions are taken separately, and the workers are then assumed to 
be matched randomly to entrepreneurs, their optimal investment depends on each other’s 
expected investment. In particular, if workers expect entrepreneurs to invest in R&D they 
will invest more in human capital because of the increased marginal productivity of human 
capital that would result. Similarly, entrepreneurs will invest more if they expect workers to 
have acquired human capital. The result of this strategic complementarity is that growth 
depends very much on the expectations of the agents’ investment decisions. Redding 
proves that there may be a high-growth equilibrium for which both make high investments, 
but the possibility of a low-growth equilibrium exists also. Moreover, this raises the issue 
of government intervention to co-ordinate expectations of the agents in the economy, 
perhaps by giving a subsidy to either R&D or to human capital accumulation in order to 
induce the economy towards the high-skills and high-growth equilibrium. 
The diffusion of innovations, be they the result of an expanding product variety or quality 
improvements, is the other essential contribution to growth of human capital considered 
by the endogenous growth literature. Young (1991) studies the diffusion of innovation  
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within an economy, while other authors (Grossman and Helpman, 1991b; Barro and Sala-
i-Martin, 1995, 1997) study the problem in an international context by dividing the world 
into two groups of countries, generically named “leaders” and “followers” depending on 
their relative technological advance. A key assumption in these models is that the follower 
finds imitating the leading economies cheaper than innovating when the technological 
distance is very great, but that the cost of imitation increases as the technological gap is 
shortened; this assumption implies a form of diminishing returns to imitation. As a 
consequence of that condition, the followers prefer to copy than to invent and the 
relatively lower cost of imitation implies that they grow at a faster rate than the more 
advanced countries, for otherwise identical economies. These diffusion models therefore 
predict catch-up by poor countries and convergence of output per capita in the long run.  
Under the assumed conditions of such a model, copying is possible because of the public-
good character of technology and limited property rights. These elements, accentuated by 
imperfect competition, imply that the outcomes are not optimal: the leading economies 
generally have insufficient incentives to innovate and the followers have excessive 
incentives to imitate. The models with diffusion have other interesting implications. First, 
they too (like Lucas, 1993) can generate clusters of countries with different output per 
capita in the steady-state if there is more than one relevant technological leader. Second, 
the models encompass the possibility of “leapfrogging”, whereby the technological 
leadership shifts from one country to another (Brezis, Krugman, and Tsiddon, 1993). 
Leapfrogging will occur when there are major technological changes in the context of 
imperfect knowledge spill-overs across countries – due to national specificity of learning, 
justified perhaps by the imperfect codifiability of technological knowledge. Brezis, 
Krugman, and Tsiddon (1993) argue that more developed countries will have accumulated 
more experience (learning-by-doing) in older technologies, making them less inclined to 
change to new technologies that are initially less productive because they can’t transfer 
their previous production experience. Lagging economies have greater incentives to adopt 
the new production techniques and will overtake the leaders when these prove to be more 
productive than the older ones; the result is that “economic leadership will tend to be the 
source of its own downfall”. More generally, the existence of any sunk costs produces 
inertia in the techniques of production utilised, because the firm or country must compare 
the marginal cost of the old system to the (higher) average cost of the new one. 
Stiglitz (1987) makes a more comprehensive statement about the selection of 
technologies. He suggests other mechanisms can lead to the dominance of one 
technology besides learning-by-doing. There is what he calls “learning-to-learn”, which 
means that experience in learning increases the productivity in learning, just as 
experience in production increases productivity through learning-by-doing; this 
explanation focuses on learning as an activity, similar to producing in that it too requires a 
process of specialisation, but it begs the question of the nature (codified or tacit) and 
whereabouts (e.g., in the “know-how” of organisations) of this capacity to learning. 
Following the analogy a step further, the author asserts that there are some spill-overs 
from learning-to-learn, just as there are from the knowledge about one technology itself; 
but these spill-overs are not complete: there is partial localisation in the learning process, 
so that learning to perform a set of tasks is useful to learn how to perform another, related 
set of tasks. 
Stiglitz’s analysis carries at least two implications for the present discussion. First, unlike 
Brezis, Krugman, and Tsiddon (1993), the lagging economies may not be able to adopt 
the new production techniques and “leapfrog” because they are not only behind in 
production: they also lag in the capacity to absorb and adapt the technologies, especially  
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so if the knowledge about the new techniques is not fully codified or the technology is very 
specific to the context. Therefore economies can become “locked-in” to a technology that 
traps them in a low output growth equilibrium, and thus convergence would not be 
expected. Secondly, firms’ and nations’ “ability to learn, as well as their state of 
knowledge, is critically dependent on past history”. For example, a “labour shortage may 
induce firms to shift to a less-labour intensive technology; but subsequently, when the 
labour shortage is eliminated, the new technology may dominate the one previously used” 
(Stiglitz 1978, p. 134). This viewpoint of economic growth diverges markedly from the 
ahistorical exogenous and endogenous growth models discussed earlier; it also points to 
the importance of dynamic elements in policy consideration rather than just an analysis 
based on static comparative advantage. 
(vi)  Dynamic interactions: human capital investments and technological 
innovation 
Among the more interesting recent developments in the analytical treatment of the 
role of human capital in macroeconomic growth has been the effort to recognise 
the existence of reciprocal influences in the dynamic interaction between 
technological changes and the formation of productive capabilities embodied in 
members of the workforce. The key insight into this is the existence of technical 
complementaries between the two classes of assets, both of which require 
irreversible (costly) resource commitments. On the one side are specific 
technological and organisational practices, intangible knowledge-assets, which 
result from deliberate inventive activities, or arise as a by-product of experience 
gained in actual production operations. On the other side is an array of physical 
production facilities and human capital assets that yield flows of productive 
services, and in which technological and organisational knowledge can be 
embodied. 
As has been recognised in the theory of factor demand (since Hicks, 1932), changes in 
the state of technological knowledge may alter the relative marginal productivity schedules 
of the primary factor inputs (labour and tangible capital). Thus, the derived demand 
implications link the relative rates of accumulation of productive assets to expectations 
about the future marginal productivity relationships, and consequently to the expected 
future structure of relative asset prices. “Non-neutral” trajectories of technological and 
organisational innovation are those that imply an alteration of the expected relative input 
prices, in the absence of any intervening change in assets’ relative availability in the 
economy. Within the class of productive assets there are complements as well as 
substitutes. Concretely, machines may substitute for repetitive, low-skill labour services, 
such as those of a trench-digger, whereas the mechanical back-hoe requires a skilled 
driver to operate it without tearing up water-mains and electricity cables; numerically 
controlled lathes may dispense with some of the skills of the machinist, but nonetheless 
demand the services of operators who are capable of programming and reprogramming 
them on the shop floor. 
On the other side of the picture, however, the theory of induced innovation points to the 
reciprocal influence that expectations about the future value of that knowledge in 
production applications will exert on decisions to invest in creating new technological 
knowledge. It thereby highlights the role played by the future availability and prices of the 
necessary productive inputs in establishing the anticipated, privately appropriable returns 
to those creating new knowledge of that kind (see, e.g., Binswanger and Ruttan, 1978). 
Consequently, the direction of deliberate, profit-motivated R&D investments (i.e., their 
“neutrality” or “biasedness” with regard to relative input usage) will respond to changes in  
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expectations about the relative rates at which the various forms of tangible capital stocks 
and intangible human capital are accumulating, and to whatever alterations may be 
expected to occur in the pattern of (technical) complements and substitutes among the 
array of specific physical capital and labour service inputs. 
A recent paper by Acemoglu (1998) directs attention to the potential complexities in the 
dynamic interactions between those two processes. Because human capital formation 
typically has a rather long gestation period, and the same is true of physical capital in 
many cases, the adjustment of prices in the markets for these productive assets tends to 
occur much more quickly than the quantity adjustments; moreover, induced changes in 
the direction of innovation depend upon the expectations of future relative input prices and 
the anticipated scale of application. Expectations about the extent of the market for a new 
technological innovation, of course, should be reflected in (and hence signalled by) the 
expected future real unit prices of the technologically-specific inputs, i.e., the ratio of the 
inputs’ price to the price of the end products. 
Motivated by the experience of the US economy since the early 1970’s, when the college-
graduates belonging to the baby-boom cohort flooded into the labour market, Acemoglu’s 
model traces a dynamic sequence in which an exogenous (or, equivalently, an 
endogenous but lagged) increase in the availability of workers having particular higher 
level skills/capabilities at first depresses the relative skill-premium; but the expectations 
that this situation will persist then induces “directed” innovations that are biased towards 
making more intensive use of just those skills. The eventual arrival and adoption of these 
innovations (loosely associated with “information technology” in Acemoglu’s discussion) 
then generates a sufficient increase in the derived demand for workers with 
complementary capabilities to reverse the previous trend towards compression of the skill 
premium. Indeed, as there is no further supply increase comparable to the initiating 
(unanticipated) labour supply “shock”, the induced technologically-driven demand for 
skilled workers is sufficient to produce a trend towards greater wage and earnings 
inequalities. 
There is a critical supposition underlying this analysis, although not one that is explicitly 
developed by Acemoglu (1998): expectations that the biased trajectory of (IT) innovation 
will continue for some time into the future are quickly formed and shared by the household 
sector, as well as among the firms. This is so because the household sector’s opinion 
about the desirability of undertaking investments in training for future employment 
involving the supposed technology-related skills must underpin the allocation of private 
and public resources for such purposes. Lacking that, there is nothing in the picture to 
prevent the human capital formation process from being slowed, or halted by initial 
experience of the collapsing skill-premium. Thus, it is not enough that the firms know they 
are making R&D investments premised upon the future availability of the right kind of 
(complementary) capabilities in the workforce. The firms need to know that this is known 
and understood by the agents who must make the necessary forward-looking decisions as 
well, if those premises are to be fulfilled. 
This is essentially the same kind of co-ordination problem that was recognised and made 
central in Acemoglu’s (1996) model of the role of labour-capital complementaries and 
externalities in creating social increasing returns to human capital investment. Remarkably 
enough, that earlier paper is not mentioned or even referenced by Acemoglu (1998), yet 
its main results are quite critical in the present connection. Indeed, the different 
characteristic speeds of adjustment in the markets for the different types of intangible 
knowledge-assets (skills and technologies) only further complicate the fundamental 
difficulties of achieving the appropriate intertemporal co-ordination equilibrium. It is useful,  
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of course, to show that one can formulate a growth model in which there exists an 
equilibrium path characterised by high rates of human capital formation and technological 
progress. Yet it is unwarranted and potentially misleading to completely gloss over the 
disequilibrium dynamics of such a dynamic system, thereby creating the impression that 
the unassisted market always could be depended upon to find that path automatically and 
stay on it.  
This is so particularly in the case of this model, because “the reality” more likely would 
entail periods of skill-shortages, under-utilised production facilities, over-commitment to 
training programmes; alternated with episodes of labour-market congestion, lengthening 
job-search durations, over-qualified workers, and – for a growing portion of the cohort of 
labour-market entrants – rising debt-burden and disillusionment with the institutions of 
further education and professional training. A critical issue that this raises is whether such 
episodes would also seriously interrupt, and even re-direct, the trajectory of technological 
change. In the context of Acemoglu’s (1998) model that would seem to be very much a 
possibility, given that its specification of the innovation process represents the latter as 
lacking any inertial components and therefore sensitive to current changes (expected) 
input prices and quantities. In this connection we may notice the rather different 
conclusions that would be suggested by an alternative, non-neoclassical theory of 
technological change that also allows for “non-neutrality” in the effects of endogenously 
directed innovation (see David, 1975, esp. Ch.1, for further treatment of neoclassical and 
non-neoclassical macro-models of induced innovation).  
The immediately relevant difference between the two theoretical formulations lies in 
recognising that some important part of “directing” comes from the rear – that is, from the 
constraints created by the cumulative nature of technological progress, and not only from 
inventors’ expectations about the state of relative factor prices that will prevail in the 
future. Thus, past choices of technique, and the sunk costs associated with them will exert 
persisting (“hysteresis”) effects upon both the rate and direction of technological 
improvements that are generated along established trajectories of innovation. This is 
especially relevant where technological progress takes the form of a more-or-less 
continuous stream of incremental, highly localised innovations (Antonelli, 1995). 
Such “localisation of technological change” may result from either (a) unplanned 
knowledge generated essentially as a by-product of production activity, including the 
formation of new, plant-specific workforce skills, or (b) knowledge gained in previous 
production as a result of deliberate efforts to enhance the efficiency of existing production 
facilities within the engineering and labour management constraints that those impose, or 
(c) conscious R&D strategies of elaborating and extending established “families” of 
products that exploit a common scientific knowledge base or a specific set of perfected 
production methods. 
Under those conditions, a bias of technological and organisational change towards 
intangible human capital-deepening methods might become established and persist for a 
protracted period, imparting more or less steady, upward pressure on the demand. 
Although lags and the effects of disturbances on the supply side of the labour market – 
due to demographic developments and public policies affecting funding and provision of 
training – might well result in episodes during which the expectations of high private rates 
of return to investments in further education and training will be disappointed. Yet, where 
the underlying technological trajectory has become established and the co-evolution of 
institutions and political commitments supporting the extension of mass education has 
acquired strong momentum (from the sunk costs and individual professional and  
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commercial interests it involves), the emergent dynamic properties can become 
increasingly robust. 
But a rather different state of affairs exists elsewhere, especially for economies that face 
the challenge of initiating a major technological and structural reorientation, calling for 
complementary changes in the capabilities of its labour force. When considering the latter 
context, perhaps the most significant point to note is the one that emerges when 
Acemoglu’s 1996 and 1998 contributions are read in conjunction: it is quite a delicate 
matter for a market system to establish a smoothly virtuous dynamic of positive feedbacks 
that will continue to drive growth at the macroeconomic level. The reason, simply put, is 
that the spill-over effects required must be underpinned at the microeconomic level largely 
by mutually aligned expectations regarding the positive pecuniary externalities that will 
result from investments in a variety of technically complementary durable assets. 
Such will be the case especially where the “investment projects” that are required to 
achieve complementarity between the characteristics of newly developing technologies 
and matching worker capabilities are those which can entail unusually long periods of 
gestation. For a free market economy to arrive spontaneously at an automatically 
sustainable set of such expectations is difficult, and therefore highly unlikely. The good 
news – or, perhaps one should say, the less discouraging news – is that the important 
initiating and guiding function that exists to be filled in such situations is one that lies well 
within the scope of established national government agencies in most countries, save for 
the poorest and smallest. 
II.3  Empirical Findings on Human Capital and 
Macroeconomic Growth  
The Modern Cross-country Evidence 
The literature of endogenous growth theory has stimulated economists’ interest in the 
empirical evidence available from cross-country comparisons, bearing on the main-level 
relationships between human capital formation and the growth rate of real output per 
capita. The growth models that view human capital as a simple input to production predict 
that growth rates will be positively associated with changes in the stock of education, 
whereas models in which human capital has a role in the development of innovations and 
its diffusion throughout the economy imply that it is the stock (rather than the flow) of 
human capital that affects the overall productivity growth rate of the country. 
(i)  Measuring the stock and flow effects of human capital on output growth 
Early studies of the effects of human capital on growth, such as Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 
(1992) or Barro (1991), were based on data sets pertaining to a very diverse array of 
(more than 100) countries during the post-1960 era. They used narrow flow measures of 
human capital such as the school enrolment rates at the primary and secondary levels, 
which were found to be positively associated with per capita growth rates. Barro reported 
that the process of catching up was firmly linked to human capital formation: only those 
poor countries with high levels of human capital formation relative to their GDP tended to 
catch up with the richer countries.  
Later studies by Barro and Lee (1993) criticise the school enrolment measures of human 
capital used for measuring the flow rather than the stock of human capital, and tackle this 
by constructing new indicators based on educational attainment of the population. The  
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new indicators measure the number of years of school attainment, categorising it into 
those with no schooling, some primary, some secondary, and some higher education. 
While the Barro and Lee (1993) indicators can capture a measure of the stock of human 
capital, they can do so only crudely, because they omit the possibility of differing quality of 
this stock. Barro and Lee (1996) extend their previous indicators to consider a proxy of 
quality based on the school inputs using measures such as the public expenditure per 
student, teacher-pupil ratios, estimated real salaries of teachers, and the length of the 
school year.  
Inputs to schooling may be too narrow a measure of human capital quality, and measures 
based on student cognitive performance could be better in accounting for the other non-
school inputs to human capital, such as family influence, and differing ability or motivation. 
Hanushek and Kim (1995) analysed data derived from tests of academic achievement, 
concluding that the quality of the labour force has a consistent and strong influence on 
economic growth, and that, together with the quantity of schooling and initial income, 40% 
of the variation in growth rates can be explained. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Ch.12), 
among many others, have also included life expectancy and infant mortality in the growth 
regressions as a proxy of tangible human capital, complementing the intangible human 
capital measures derived from school inputs or cognitive tests considered; their finding is 
that life expectancy has a strong, positive relation with growth. 
A recent survey by Krueger and Lindahl (1999, 2000) of the findings from these 
econometric studies of cross-country growth equations characterises the more robust 
results. First, changes in the human capital stock do not seem to affect growth rates, as 
would be implied by the model in Lucas (1988) or a macro-extension of the Mincerian 
human capital theory. This contrasts with the robust evidence from the micro literature of 
education on income (recently reviewed by Card, 1999), and leads Krueger and Lindahl to 
suggest that because of measurement errors in the estimated human capital data in many 
studies, the educational variables have essentially no “signal” after conditioning for 
physical capital investment rates. When allowances are made for these measurement 
errors, the change in stock measures of education is positively correlated with economic 
growth (see also Topel, 1999). Secondly, the evidence with respect to the positive effect 
of the level of human capital stock on growth rates is much stronger. But the size of this 
effect varies across countries; and it is not linear as has been generally assumed by the 
endogenous growth model literature. In particular, among countries that have attained a 
high average level of education (e.g., the OECD economies), the initial level of education 
appears to be unrelated to their subsequent growth performance. 
Two other well-established results that emerge from the cross-country studies examined 
by Krueger and Lindahl are: (a) the greater effect of secondary and higher education on 
growth, compared with primary education, and (b) the seemingly insignificant, or even 
negative, effect of female education on the growth of output. With respect to the latter, 
they follow Barro (1999) in suggesting that the insignificant effect of female education may 
be a result of gender discrimination in some countries’ labour markets. The argument is 
that females receive education in these countries but are discouraged from participating in 
the labour market, and thus cannot contribute directly to the growth of output. This may 
explain part of the problem, but it seems that other mechanisms also are at work: in 
countries with high female labour market participation, variations in the extent of female 
education have an insignificantly small positive effect on output growth rates. 
While there is persuasive evidence about the positive relation between initial human 
capital levels and output growth and (weaker) empirical support for the relation between 
changes in human capital and growth, it is not at all clear that this implies a causal  
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relationship running from human capital to growth. Motivated by the fact that schooling 
has increased dramatically in the last 30 years at the same time that the “productivity 
slowdown” became manifest in many of the higher income economies, Bils and Klenow 
(2000) suggest that the causal direction may run from growth to schooling. That 
relationship would be predicted by a Mincerian model in which high anticipated growth 
leads to lower discount rates in the population, and so to higher demands for schooling. 
Of course, both variables might be driven by other factors. From the results of different 
empirical tests, Bils and Klenow conclude that the channel from schooling to growth is too 
weak to explain the strong positive association found by Barro (1991), and Barro and Lee 
(1993), as described above. But, they argue, the “growth to schooling” connection is 
capable of generating a coefficient of the magnitude reported by Barro. An alternative 
explanation is suggested by Glaeser (1994): current schooling need not directly impinge 
on future output growth, but it decreases the cost of future schooling, and it is this indirect 
effect through increasing returns to scale in nation-wide schooling that works to raise long-
run per capital output growth rates. 
In summary, there appears to be no single formal theoretical model of growth that is 
wholly consistent with the empirical results reported from cross-country studies. The 
evidence broadly sides with both the augmented neoclassical models of growth, and 
models of endogenous growth with spill-overs that also predict (conditional) convergence. 
Yet, there are more complex patterns underlying the variation in output growth rates 
across countries that would qualify those broad findings and favour models with multiple 
steady-states (e.g. Azariadis and Drazen, 1990). With respect to the effects of human 
capital on growth, the weight of the cross-country evidence is in favour of a level effect. 
This implies that the stock of human capital reflects many other differentiating factors that 
influence the growth process, and should not be seen as simply another source of service 
inputs to production. The importance of the role of human capital as a critical factor for 
innovation and the diffusion of knowledge thus appears to emerge from this literature as 
deserving closer analysis.  
(ii)  Convergence, catch-up and the role of human capital 
For some economists (e.g., Easterlin, 1981) the answer to the question “Why isn’t the 
whole world developed?” lies mainly in the international disparities in levels of education. 
Does the evidence suggest that human capital formation is the route through which the 
gap between rich and poor nations can be closed? As explained in the review of recent 
growth theory, different models have dissimilar implications regarding the ability of 
relatively poor countries to catch up with richer ones. The neoclassical growth model 
predicts absolute convergence in the per capita real GDP levels among countries with 
similar structural characteristics (referred to as “conditional convergence”). Most 
endogenous growth models, on the other hand, do not predict that countries will end up 
with the same output per capita in the long run; instead, they predict that the long run 
outcome will continue to reflect the initial conditions of the economy. 
An important exception to be noted in this literature, however, is the set of endogenous 
growth models that do predict eventual convergence because they explicitly recognise the 
effects of international spill-overs of knowledge (as in Grossman and Helpman, 1991, and 
Lucas, 1993, for example). Quite clearly, the existence of neoclassical and non-
neoclassical models that yield the same prediction makes it difficult to discriminate 
between these formulations solely on the basis of the empirical evidence regarding 
convergence. Consideration of that evidence nevertheless may prove helpful, in enabling 
us to eliminate still others among the contending array of growth models.  
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The main finding from a wide range of cross-country studies is that absolute or so-called 
“unconditional” convergence is not manifest in the international data pertaining to the post 
World War II era (see Summers and Heston, 1991; World Bank, 1991). But conditional 
convergence is evident. The “conditioning variables” change from study to study, but tend 
to include indicators of: the educational characteristics of the population, government 
consumption, the importance of trade, the rate of population growth, investment ratios, 
and the degree of political instability (see Barro, 1991 and 1996, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1995, and Durlauf and Quah, 1998, for a review). 
These studies point to a low rate of convergence, approximating 2% per year. Although 
that in itself is not an implausible estimate, the slow convergence speeds found in these 
studies does pose a problem, in that they imply that the share of physical capital in total 
income should be around 0.9, whereas national income accounts show that the share is 
closer to 0.4. In turn, this would suggest that labour is being paid more than its marginal 
product, and that physical capital is paid less. To counter this implication (which is 
anomalous within the framework of the neoclassical theory of distribution), an influential 
article by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) proposed that capital should be interpreted 
broadly to include human capital in addition to physical capital. The addition of a proxy of 
the rate of human capital accumulation as a conditioning variable leads to an estimated 
share of physical capital that is not substantially different from that derived from national 
income accounts. In the authors’ view this demonstrated consistency between the 
neoclassical growth model and the international evidence, while incidentally pointing to 
the importance of the role of human capital. 
Cross-country analyses focusing on convergence are subject to a number of general 
critiques (see Durlauf and Quah, 1998, for a detailed survey on the following issues). First, 
such studies assume away any unobservable country-specific heterogeneity. This has 
motivated Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Barro (1996), and still others, to use panel-data 
methods in their econometric work, allowing for country-specific “fixed effects”. Their 
results broadly suggest that the rates of convergence are more varied than the 2% per 
year implied by many of the early cross-country studies. Second, since convergence 
studies do not capture the whole dynamics of the cross-country distribution, a number of 
recent papers (e.g., Durlauf and Johnson, 1995, and Quah, 1997) have studied other 
features besides absolute convergence. The presence or absence of a secular tendency 
towards relative convergence, i.e., a narrowing of the proportional dispersion of per capita 
incomes among countries, is referred to as “σ -convergence”, and it was to the strength of 
this phenomenon among the industrially advanced economies that attention was first 
drawn in the now widely cited paper by Abramovitz (1986) on “Catching Up, Forging 
Ahead, and Falling Behind” (see also Abramovitz and David, 1997). 
Other phenomena have also been studied empirically, including the possibility that the 
countries do not converge to a single steady state path, but belong to sub-groups (also 
called clusters) of countries that share a common growth equation. Recent studies of this 
kind have revealed more complex patterns of convergence and non-convergence co-
existing in the international cross-country data. In particular, they find evidence that 
countries can be divided into groups (determined by initial conditions, such as income and 
literacy), which also differ among themselves concerning the aggregate production 
functions that describe the member-countries’ dynamic behaviours. Convergence occurs 
within such groups, but it may be to a different level of income per capita than other 
groups attain in the long run. This casts doubt on the explanatory power of the 
conclusions of Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) regarding the neoclassical model. But, as 
Romer (1994, p. 11) emphasises, “the convergence controversy captures only part of 
what endogenous growth has been all about. It may encompass a large fraction of the  
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recently published papers, but it nevertheless represents a digression from the main story 
behind endogenous growth theory”.  
A recent paper by Wolff (2000), however, appears to throw doubt upon both the 
neoclassical theorists who argue for the existence of convergence in an “augmented 
growth model” (including human capital among the inputs), and the emphasis given to 
education and knowledge investments by the proponents of endogenous growth theory. 
Examining the entire set of OECD member countries, Wolff confirms that over the period 
stretching from 1950 to 1990 there has been evident convergence in levels of real GDP 
per worker and in various indicators of human capital intensity. A variety of indicators of 
educational investment (both enrolment and attainment rates, derived from different 
sources) point to two important trends that these economies experienced in common. 
First, starting from ubiquitously high levels of primary schooling at the beginning of the 
post-World War II period, the decades following 1950 saw a significant increase in 
average schooling levels at the secondary and tertiary levels throughout the OECD 
economies. Second, the relative dispersion in educational attainment and average 
schooling levels declined substantially over the postwar period, particularly at the 
secondary level. In other words, there has been “σ -convergence” in average educational 
levels as well as in the labour productivity levels among these economies.  
Closer examination of this body of data reaffirms the cautionary injunction that a variety of 
detailed international patterns is indicated when different methods and definitions of the 
education variables are adopted, the broad consonance in their movements 
notwithstanding. It is worth remarking in this connection that the coefficient of variation (a 
measure of relative of dispersion) of the average years of schooling of the total population 
aged 25 and over exhibits a persistent downward drift over the whole interval from 1960 to 
1985, with a long period of stability between 1965 and 1980; by contrast, the same 
dispersion measure for the average years of schooling in the labour force decreased 
substantially between 1965 and 1980, before rising slightly in the early 1980’s.  
Wolff’s (2000) study uses the pooled time-series and cross-section observations for the 24 
OECD countries to test three regression models of the relationship between labor 
productivity growth and human capital. To test what he refers to as “the catch-up model” 
he includes the level of schooling, considering that in the framework suggested by 
Abramovitz (1986), a key dimension of the social capability of the population can be 
viewed as the educational attainment of the workforce; more specifically, Wolff suggests 
that there may be an educational “threshold effect” permitting the successful borrowing of 
advanced technology. Secondly, since human capital theories posit a positive relation 
between the rate of productivity growth and the rate of change of schooling levels, Wolff 
specifies a model of the growth of labour productivity in which the change in schooling 
level (rather than the level of schooling) appears as an explanatory variable. A third model 
includes a variable for the level of schooling and an interaction term of schooling with R&D 
intensity, in order to test the hypothesis that human capital affects growth through its 
interactions with technical change. In all three model specifications, however, Wolff also 
includes among the regressors the level of labour productivity at the beginning of the 
period, the ratio of investment to GDP, and the average ratio of R&D to GNP. 
The econometric results reported by Wolff are striking, in that none of the three 
specifications show any substantial, statistically significant “effect” of formal education on 
productivity growth. In all three regressions the most powerful explanatory variable in 
accounting for differences in labour productivity among OECD countries turns out to be 
the relative level of labour productivity at the beginning of the period: “By itself, the catch-
up variable explains 74 percent of the variation in RGDPW growth over the 1950-1988  
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period” (Wolff, 2000, p. 458). While, as has been noticed, other international regression 
studies – that of Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) aside – also fail to find substantial 
human capital growth effects, Wolff manages a clean sweep in rejecting hypotheses 
involving level effects as well. These results from an important contributor to the literature 
on human capital, skill demands and productivity growth are so surprising that they 
deserve closer examination.  
Wolff (2000) himself feels obliged to offer a number of reasons for the divergence 
between his negative conclusions regarding the role of human capital and the general 
tenor of the literature based upon comparative macroeconomic growth data. 
Concentrating upon the discrepancy with the growth accounting literature’s positive stance 
regarding the contribution made by increases in the average level of schooling of the 
workforce, he points out that although growth accounting studies implement the human 
capital model, they (i) do not allow for a “catch-up” effect, (ii) typically assume that the 
effect of increases in average educational attainment levels can be gauged from 
associated relative earnings differentials, rather than testing the hypothesis, and (iii) do 
not restrict the effect of educational input changes to be uniform across countries, as is 
the case in his regression model.  
While each of the foregoing points are valid, only the first of them also addresses the 
failure of Wolff’s analysis to turn up any “level effects”, as well as finding no quantitatively 
significant “change effects”. This draws attention to the dubious role of the so-called 
“catch-up” term in these regression exercises. Inasmuch as the dependent variable is the 
proportionate change in labour productivity, and its changes from the initial level appears 
as a regressor, errors in the regressor will be correlated with those in the dependent 
variable. This contributes to the apparent explanatory power of the “catch-up” term. 
Wolff’s own discussion of convergence in educational levels within the OECD makes it 
evident that at the start of each sub-period the dispersion in labour productivity levels was 
correlated with the dispersion in the average schooling level of the labour force; that 
although the dispersion was reduced within each period, the rank ordering of the countries 
by those relative educational standings was not markedly altered. Hence, it is not 
apparent why one should include the initial productivity level at all. Indeed, were the 
country’s ability to absorb the technology of the leader country governed by the country’s 
level of human capital, as Wolff hypothesises, then one might take the initial average 
schooling levels (or some other knowledge infrastructure index) as a “catch-up” variable in 
the sense suggested by Abramovitz (1986).  
(iii)  The limitations of the international cross-section evidence 
Beyond conceptual questions of the sort just raised, it is important to call attention to 
some basic limitations of the statistical methodologies that have been employed in 
undertaking cross-country studies aimed at evaluating the impact of human capital upon 
economic growth. To suggest the nature of the problems, and the need for careful scrutiny 
before accepting announced “results” at face value, it is useful to make a close 
examination of several very recent studies that have cast doubt upon the role of human 
capital and educational investment. 
One may start by noting that Wolff’s approach, while making use of panel data, treats 
every country-period observation as independent, rather than allowing for heterogeneity 
among the countries (both in the measurement of variables, and in their relationships) by 
specifying a regression model with “fixed”, country-specific effects. Furthermore, although 
there are potential problems of simultaneity in the regression equations estimated by 
Wolff, these have not been addressed by the use of instrumental variables or other  
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methods. To be specific on this point, rapid growth in productivity (which is taken to be the 
dependent variable) also tends to be accompanied by high retained earnings rates, and 
the latter, in turn, tend to induce both higher conventional investment rates, and higher 
ratios of (internally financed) R&D to GNP. As a result, one would expect the estimated 
elasticities of labour productivity with respect to the human capital variables to be 
downward biased even in the absence of the dubious “catch-up term”. 
Thus, one may conclude that numerous econometric problems vitiate the force of the 
negative findings reported by Wolff (2000). Yet, those problems are not shared by another 
very recent international panel-data based study, by Boskin and Lau (2000), which also 
concludes that human capital inputs have contributed comparatively little to economic 
growth among the industrially advanced countries. This NBER working paper is focused 
exclusively upon the G-7 economies, using a specially constructed annual data set, and 
employs econometrically sophisticated (instrumental variables) analysis in estimating a 
large number of the parameters of a transcendental logarithmic production function model 
for purchasing power parity adjusted constant dollar GDP. The author’s model has three 
inputs – the utilised gross stock of non-residential capital, the employed number of person 
hours, and human capital measured as the number of years of schooling of the working 
age population (obtained by the perpetual inventory method). The “translog” function 
provides a very flexible specification, allowing for generalised input-augmenting 
technological changes at exponential rates that are constant throughout the period 1958-
97 but specific to each input in each country; country-specific variations in initial input 
efficiency levels, and in the degree of economies of scale, also are accommodated by the 
regression model.  
Boskin and Lau (2000) find that among all the proximate sources of real output growth in 
the G-7 economies, save for Canada, the contribution of human capital accumulation 
during the 1958-97 era accounts for between 4 and 6 percent, the latter being the figure in 
the US; the highest proportionate contribution is found for Canada, at 8 percent. In the 
period since 1973, their estimates put human capital’s contribution at only 5 percent. 
These authors also report a rapid rate of human capital augmenting efficiency change 
(technological progress, in their interpretation); indeed, the rate matches their estimated 
rate of physical capital-augmenting technological change. 
The results just described disagree sharply with the picture formed on the basis of the US 
growth accounting study by Abramovitz and David (2000, Tables 1:IA, 1:IVA), which 
estimated that the proportional contribution to the growth of real Gross Private Domestic 
Product (GPDP) from compositional changes raising the average “quality” of labour inputs 
were twice as large, i.e., just under 11 percent in each of the sub-periods 1948-66 and 
1966-89, and 12 percent over the whole period 1929-89. Moreover, Abramovitz and David 
(1973, 1996, 1999) have shown that the US macroeconomic data, as well as much micro-
level evidence points to a conclusion diametrically opposite to Boskin and Lau’s 
inferences regarding the bias of technological and organisational innovation. The 
intangible capital-augmenting changes of the sort envisaged by Boskin and Lau’s reading 
of their econometric results would have the effect of lowering the marginal capital-output 
ratios for tangible and intangible capital alike. Instead, the Abramovitz-David thesis argues 
that during the twentieth century, and particularly from the 1920s onwards, innovation-
driven efficiency change has been biased towards intangible capital deepening, given 
unchanging relative rates of input remuneration. In other words, by tending to raise the 
marginal intangible capital-output ratio, this bias in technological change has worked in 
conjunction with a continuing unskilled labour-augmenting bias (vis-à-vis the rate of 
physical capital augmentation) to encourage a shift of the overall domestic asset portfolio 
away from physical capital and toward intangible capital.   
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Why is it that the sophisticated methodology employed by Boskin and Lau (2000) yields a 
diametrically opposite picture? An explanation is to be found not in the econometric 
techniques, but in the data to which it has been applied; the disparity in conclusions stems 
mainly from the difference between the measures of the human capital input that have 
been used in these two studies. Boskin and Lau’s work relies upon a surrogate human 
capital index, provided by the number of schooling years per person in the workforce, 
whereas the figures cited from Abramovitz and David are based on their calculations 
using an average labour input quality index derived by weighting the service inputs of 
workers in different educational attainment (as well as age and gender) categories by their 
relative wage rates. The latter measure is hardly ideal, but the point here is that the shift of 
the labour force composition towards higher, and more highly remunerated educational 
levels, makes the average labour quality index rise more rapidly than the simple measure 
of average schooling years. 
The implications this carried for Boskin and Lau’s regression estimates will be considered 
shortly, but it is worthwhile digressing briefly to point out the generality and seriousness of 
this particular data problem. It should be understood that whereas the outward institutional 
features of educational systems around the world are highly mimetic, the reality of the 
educational services provided is highly variegated. The “school year” is not an 
internationally standardised unit -- neither of time, nor of real resource inputs, nor of 
educational outcomes; average schooling quality varies widely at both the secondary and 
tertiary school levels (see Behrman and Rosenzweig, 1994). Furthermore, the distribution 
of educational attainments in the working age population and in the employed workforce is 
not identical, or everywhere related in the same way. Yet, for want of better, most of the 
large international cross section studies that introduce human capital stock measures are 
obliged to ignore those differences when using the perpetual inventory approach to 
estimate the average number of years of education completed by members of the working 
age population. (See Barro and Lee, 1993, Kim and Lau, 1993; although Barro and Lee, 
1996, attempt adjustments for the variability of schooling quality.)  
As Temple (1999) has pointed out, the presence of even a comparatively small number of 
“outlier” countries in the international cross-sections may bias the overall regression 
results, particularly when the statistically anomalous observations reflect an underlying 
inhomogeneity in the relationship between the proxy measure and the true variable. A 
specific problem, illustrative of this source of bias, can be observed in the Barro and Lee 
(1993) perpetual inventory estimates of average educational attainment for a small 
number of countries in the Penn World Table dataset whose populations are 
predominantly Moslem: the proxy variable for human capital reflects previous rates of 
school enrolment among a large (female) section of the population that has very low adult 
participation rates in market work. As a result, when the proxy measure of average (years) 
of education per worker is constructed as the ratio of the total stock of human capital to 
the number of gainfully employed persons the estimates for the countries concerned turn 
out to be aberrantly high. In a less dramatic fashion, Boskin and Lau’s (2000) reliance on 
the same kind of average schooling years measure of human capital intensities in the G-7 
exposes their work to estimation biases, as will be seen. 
A more striking disparity in the measured growth of human capital services than the 
contrast already mentioned between the Boskin-Lau and Abramovitz-David findings could 
be seen by referring to a still larger estimate of the contribution from the accumulation of 
intangible human capital that has been presented by the latter pair of authors. This 
emerges when Abramovitz and David (2000, Tables 2:III, 2IV) adopt an accounting 
framework based upon an “augmented Solow model” of growth. In that framework the 
contribution to output growth is calculated from the rate of increase of the real stock of  
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intangible human capital per person hour worked, weighted by the share of earnings that 
represent the gross return on intangible human assets. Because the increase in real 
investment costs per schooling year were rising dramatically, as continuation rates from 
secondary to tertiary educational levels climbed and the foregone earnings component of 
college and university attendance grew with the rise in real wage rates, it is hardly 
surprising that this methodology yields a substantially larger assessment of the impact of 
human capital formation – surpassing even that obtained with the more conventional 
average labour quality index. The proportional contribution to the average growth of 
(augmented) GPDP approaches 19 percent for the period 1966-89, almost four times the 
magnitude indicated by the Boskin and Lau (2000) proxy index-based estimates for the 
US.  
A variety of evidence suggests that in the post-WWII era all the G-7 countries shared 
similar experiences in regard to the rising investment devoted to higher education. 
Consequently, Boskin and Lau’s panel regression estimates must compensate for the 
understated growth rates of their proxy measure of average human capital inputs for these 
countries, and this results in strongly over-stated estimates of the rate at which the human 
capital efficiency index in their production function must have grown. But that is not the 
whole of the story: another part of the explanation for the low impact attributed to 
educational investment by Boskin and Lau’s study also is related to the inadequacies of 
their proxy measures for human capital intensity increases, because these errors in the 
indices do not take a simple, proportionate form across all the G-7 countries. 
Furthermore, in some countries the participation rate of women in the workforce was rising 
more rapidly than in others. On that account alone, Boskin and Lau’s measures of 
average schooling years attained per person of working age behave differently (from 
country to country) than the corresponding figures on a per person hour worked basis. 
Both defects in that proxy variable, and particularly the last mentioned one (which 
recapitulates the problem previously noted in regard to the Barro-Lee methodology for 
obtaining indicators of human capital intensity growth), give rise to an errors–in-variables 
bias in the regression coefficients estimated by Boskin and Lau (2000). The coefficients of 
interest here are those for the elasticity of real output with respect to the human capital 
inputs, and the direction of the econometric bias is downwards, thus contributing further to 
the surprisingly weak role that their study reports for human capital among the sources of 
output growth.  
The foregoing observations on the distorting influence of inadequacies in simple 
measures of intangible human capital formation that are most widely available for use in 
cross-country statistical analyses can be further reinforced, by comparing the findings of 
Boskin and Lau (2000) with those of the recent growth accounting exercise carried out by 
Bassanini, Scarpetta and Visco (2000) for the G-7 countries during the 1980s and 1990s. 
The latter OECD study builds upon the same information for the average number of years 
of education in the working age population, based on data about the highest level of 
education attained and assumptions about the number of years of schooling implied (for 
the various countries) by different levels of educational achievement. But the authors then 
segment the working population into six categories, based upon gender and three 
different educational attainment levels, and apply a standard set of relative wage weights 
to obtain an average labour quality index (which they label the human capital input). As 
would be expected, their findings for the G-7 countries ascribe a rather larger contributory 
role in real output growth to human capital than that found by Boskin and Lau (2000): the 
US fraction implied by the estimate in Bassanini et al (2000, p. 14) approximates 7 
percent, rather than 5 percent. But, as their index of compositional changes is a very 
crude one, these results for the US are still weak in comparison with the role that human  
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capital formation is seen to occupy in the growth accounts prepared by Abramovitz and 
David (1999, 2000).  
Cross-section studies of the sort just reviewed are thus seen to be subject to criticisms on 
a variety of rather esoteric, technical grounds. In many cases they are subject to 
econometric or other methodological failings that undermine their credibility, either 
because of the defects in the data that go in, or due to biases in the results that come out, 
or both. In a heterogeneous collection of societies, many of which do not collect reliable 
statistics for all of the variables of interest to the economist, there are obvious risks in 
employing indirect measures and proxy variables that are satisfactory for many, but not all 
of the countries. Thus, in regard to the issues of present concern, there is ample cause to 
worry that errors of measurement in explanatory variables such as the level, or rate of 
growth of educational capital per worker, may result in regression estimates that 
systematically understate the magnitude of the elasticity of output with respect to human 
capital inputs. 
A more fundamental criticism, however, concerns the interpretation of the cross-section 
results: the positive correlation between education and growth does not entail a direction 
of causality. The issue of causality reveals the fundamental problem faced by this type of 
econometric study, which may be able to demonstrate that there is a process of 
convergence and an empirical relation between education and growth, but cannot identify 
the underlying mechanisms that link education to growth. This limitation is crucial because 
a simplistic reading of the evidence can lead to errors in policy, whereby an increase in 
the supply of skilled workers is thought to lead automatically to growth, without regard to 
the industrial structure or the characteristics of the labour and credit markets. 
To gain an understanding of the underlying mechanisms of growth involving human 
capital formation, it is necessary to look at detailed historical studies. The latter permit one 
to connect the rising educational attainment of a population with other processes of 
change, particularly those affecting technology, but also the organisation of production, 
and the labour market. From there the effects can be traced forwards, to the subsequent 
change in the characteristics of the country’s effective labour supply, and the impacts on 
industrial productivity. Some of the historical evidence about these underlying processes 
in the growth experiences of the developed countries is examined in the following section, 
where it will be seen that the advance and diffusion of technology is the prime mediator in 
the relationship between human capital and growth. The survey concentrates on material 
from the US experience, as well as that of other industrialised countries in Western 
Europe, and Japan. 
Evidence from the Historical Experience of Developed Economies 
Most of the theoretical literature on economic growth focuses for quite understandable 
reasons on the role that investment in formal education plays in modern economies, and, 
in a broad sense has been informed largely by empirical generalisations about aggregate 
economic growth performance that derive from comparatively recent historical experience. 
Nevertheless, there are some insights to be gained by considering human capital’s 
changing role over the longer time span that is afforded to us by the historical growth 
records of some among the presently developed economies. 
(i)  Human capital and economic growth policy in broad historical context 
Indeed, it is useful to begin by taking even the briefest notice of economic historians’ 
recent researches into the era before the Industrial Revolution, as this serves to direct  
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attention to the importance in proto-industrial development of state policies affecting 
aspects of human capital other than formal educational attainments and literacy. Cosimo 
Perrotta (1999), for example, compares the viewpoints and policies regarding poverty and 
employment in 17
th century England with those of contemporary Spain, identifying the 
former as the “first policy of human capital”. The presence of vagrant “sturdy” beggars 
(i.e., the able but unemployed poor) not only was seen in England as a social problem 
requiring governmental action, but contemporary thinking there explicitly acknowledged 
the existence of connections between the conditions of economic development, 
employment and poverty. As a consequence, the policy approach adopted in England 
(including the administrative apparatus established by the “poor laws”) was geared to 
promoting “industriousness” and the acquisition of work-experience among the able-
bodied poor, and so tended to foster economic growth. In Spain, according to Perrotta, a 
“medieval mentality” prevailed and influential commentators did not link the problems of 
vagrancy and begging with questions of employment creation and the economic 
prosperity of the realm; no comparable reorganisation of poor-relief was undertaken in 
Spain throughout the 17
th and 18
th centuries, the era of that nation’s economic decline. 
Humphries (2000), has examined the extensive use in 17
th- and 18
th century England and 
Wales of apprenticeship contracts that rested upon the institutional base created by the 
labour-market policies of the Tudor State during the preceding century. This, she 
suggests, had created an unusually skilled artisanal workforce, which contributed 
significantly to the precocious growth of manufacturing industries in Britain, setting the 
state for mechanisation and the applications of inanimate power sources in the Industrial 
Revolution. For the workforce in this era, therefore, the formation of intangible human 
capital was not a matter of formal schooling; in British society the dominant causal 
connection between expenditures on education and real income ran from the latter to the 
former, and this was reflected by predominance of private (church and charity) 
educational institutions. 
Indeed, as regards the role of governmental funding and provision of primary (and a 
fortiori secondary level) schooling, and in respect to the prevailing rate of literacy in the 
adult population, England and Wales was shockingly laggard. Until the closing decade of 
the 19
th century the “first industrial nation” and “workshop of the world” continued to lag far 
behind other comparatively un-industrialised countries – such as Prussia, the United 
States and New Zealand. (See Lindert, 2000, for comparative historical evidence on the 
political economy of mass education before 1910.) Britain’s remarkably delayed adoption 
of mass public education, even at the primary level, combined with the weaknesses of its 
apprenticeship and technical education system (especially in comparison with that of 
contemporary Germany) after 1870, may well have considerable responsibility for the 
much-discussed inflexibilities and “bad attitudes” attributed to its industrial workforce. 
Economic historians continue to hotly debate whether such was the case, and whether it 
contributed to the country’s well-known difficulties during the 1880-1913 era in making a 
structural transition from the old staple lines of manufactures into the “new industries”. 
Even though the specifics of the foregoing abbreviated discussion appear far removed 
from modern concerns, it should serve to underscore the value of maintaining a broader 
perspective than that commonly allowed even in the currently fashionable endogenous 
economic models. By considering a longer time span and the interactions with cultural, 
institutional and technological development, one can better appreciate the complexities 
and issues of timing that may prove critical in the evolving nexus between human capital 
formation and economic growth.  
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(ii)  Lessons from the long-run growth experience in the US economy 
Recent contributions by Abramovitz and David (1996, 1999) bring out the part played by 
educational capital formation in the contrasting characteristics of the US economy’s 
growth path over the course of the 19
th and 20
th centuries. The quantitative base for their 
analysis is an augmented “growth-theoretic accounting” framework, which is employed to 
separate the “sources of growth” of output between the proportional rates of change in the 
quantity of tangible (or physical) capital, in man-hours of labour, measures of average 
labour input “quality”, and the growth of total factor productivity (TFP). This last is the 
“residual” component, which is equivalent to the weighted sum of the rates of growth of 
average labour input productivity and average capital productivity. Conventionally it is 
attributed to the effect of technological and organisational innovations, but, of course, it 
also includes the net effect of any inputs left out of the accounting altogether, and errors in 
either the input growth rate estimates and the weights. 
Abramovitz and David (1999, Part I) find that during the nineteenth century increasing 
labour productivity was attributable to a high and rising capital intensity (measured by the 
tangible capital per man-hour worked). They also show that over the long period 1835-90 
the economy-wide trend towards “capital-deepening” (i.e., the rising capital-output ratio) 
must have been reinforced by a tangible capital-using bias in technological progress. The 
latter worked against the rising labour productivity, resulting in a very low growth rate of 
TFP. The authors’ conclusion that the accumulation of tangible capital was more important 
than total factor productivity in the American economic growth experience of the 19th 
century is consistent with Broadberry’s (2000) findings in a comparative study about 
productivity in the US, the UK, and Germany. 
One implication derived by Abramovitz and David (1973, 1996, 2000) from these growth 
accounting calculations is that intangible human capital formation contributed little if 
anything to labour productivity growth in the 19
th century: the crude residual is very small, 
and hence improvements in average “labour quality” due to education, etc., could not 
have been substantial. This macro-level inference is supported by micro-level evidence 
from this era, showing the absence of significant labour earnings effects of differential 
educational attainments among the factory workforce.  
There is a striking contrast between that situation and the 20
th century US economy’s 
rising dependence upon improvements in “average labour quality” as a proximate source 
of the growth of labour productivity. Following the methodology pioneered by Denison 
(1974) and subsequently elaborated by Jorgenson, Fraumeni, and Gollop (1987), 
measures of the contribution to real output growth from this source may be obtained by 
classifying the employed labour force according to age (or experience), educational 
attainment and gender, and applying weights based upon relative average wage rates in 
each category – as proxies for the relative marginal value productivities – in order to 
quantify the impact of compositional shifts within the aggregate labour input. An estimate 
of the “contribution” that the latter makes to the growth rate of real output (and real output 
per manhour) is found by multiplying the growth rate of the average quality index by the 
fraction of real output imputed to earnings on intangible human capital. 
Growth accounting and the rising contribution of human capital inputs: 
According to the estimates presented by Abramovitz and David (1999, 2000), in the US 
the 20
th century has witnessed a five-fold expansion in the relative contribution that 
increases in “average labour quality” (due to compositional changes) have been making to 
the growth rate of real output (GPDP) per manhour. Starting from a negligible 5.2 percent 
level in the period 1890-1905, the proportionate contribution to the labour productivity  
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growth rate increased to 9.3 percent in 1905-29, 16.7 percent in 1929-66, and reached 
25.2 percent in 1966-89. Alternative estimates, based upon 1998 data released by the US 
Bureau of Labour Statistics (USDL Release 98-187), similarly put the average level of the 
proportionate contribution over the entire period 1972-96 at 25.1 percent; but they differ 
somewhat, in suggesting that the level was a more modest 16 percent in 1972-88, and 
then rose markedly during the early 1990’s. 
The significance of the contrast between 19
th and 20
th century American experience in 
regard to the significance of intangible human capital accumulation among the sources of 
growth deserves further notice on at least two counts. First, the findings, especially those 
pertaining to the first half of the 19
th century, accord well with the impressions that 
historians of Britain’s Industrial Revolution have reached (albeit on less solid quantitative 
grounds) about the relationship between educational expenditures and rising income 
levels during those early phases of modern economic growth. Secondly, the correlation 
between high levels of human capital per worker and labor productivity growth that can be 
observed in cross-section and panel-data pertaining to the second half of the 20
th century 
evidently is not a “law” valid for all times and places. It is, instead, a phenomenon 
particular to the present historical era. 
One may press the latter point further, by observing that a strategy for development that 
relies heavily on accelerated human capital formation, without reference to the specific, 
prevailing economic, social and technological context, scarcely can be justified universally 
on purely economic instrumental grounds. To be sure, a policy of “investing in people” 
may be deemed generally desirable for humanitarian or other ethical reasons, but that 
rationale should be clearly distinguished from the considerably more restricted contention 
that human capital formation in some circumstances yields attractive social returns 
through its effects in accelerating economic growth. 
In contrast with the sources of growth in the 19th century, the main source of US labour 
productivity and real output per capita growth in the 20th century was rising total factor 
productivity (TFP). This reflected complicated underlying patterns of change. A crucial 
aspect of this underlying process was the changing bias of technological and 
organisational innovation away from marked capital-deepening and (plain) labour-savings, 
and towards intangible (human) capital-deepening. These developments were responsible 
for upward pressure on the marginal efficiency of investment schedules pertaining to the 
accumulation of capital in the forms of education, training, and the knowledge gained 
through organised R&D activities. They thus worked to maintain the real rate of return on 
intangible capital investments in the face of a massive rise in the ratio of intangible capital 
to real output, and a correspondingly dramatic “portfolio shift” that saw intangible human 
capital substituted for tangible non-human wealth. 
According to the estimates available for the 20th century, the ratio of the real intangible 
capital stock to real GDP (appropriately augmented for foregone earnings) was essentially 
constant from 1900 to 1929, and then rose from 2.4 to 3.46 in 1948, and to 5.1 by 1990. 
Most of this reflected the accelerated accumulation of post-high school education and 
training, a trend that became especially pronounced in the US after WWII. In relation to 
the real stock of conventional tangible capital, however, the rise of the real intangible 
capital stock was a much more continuous process throughout the 20th century: the ratio 
climbed from 0.31 c.1905, to .54 by 1929, to .71 in 1948, and had reached 1.15 by 1990. 
At the same time, the share of (augmented) real output imputed to the stock of intangible 
human capital was rising – from 0.09 in 1890-1905, to 0.18 in 1905-27, 0.24 in 1929-66, 
and 0.25 in 1966-89; whereas the corresponding share of conventional tangible capital  
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drifted steadily downwards, falling from 0.44 in 1890-1905 to 0.27 in 1966-89. (See 
Abramovitz and David, 1999, Part 2, Tables 2-I, 2-II.) 
The combined effect of these developments was a marked 20
th century rise in both the 
absolute and relative “contribution” that the increasing level of intangible human capital 
per manhour was making to boost the growth rate of (augmented) real GDP per manhour. 
During the 1890-1905 period this source had been responsible for adding a mere 0.2 
percentage points per annum, or about 19 percent of the realised labour productivity 
growth rate; whereas during the 1929-66 interval the corresponding figures were 1.1 
percentage points, or a 41 percent contribution. The absolute contribution of rising 
intangible capital intensity fell back to 0.7 percentage points per annum in the aftermath of 
the golden era of post-WWII growth, 1966-1989; but, as the pace of labour productivity 
growth itself had slowed, the magnitude of the relative contribution grew even larger, to 59 
percent. (See Abramovitz and David, 1999, Part 2, Tables 2-IV.) It will be noticed that the 
effects on the productivity growth rate just reported are considerable larger than those 
which were indicated by the previously cited calculations of the impact of compositional 
changes in raising average labour input quality. This is the case because the Abramovitz 
and David’s (2000) “augmented growth accounting” calculations using the real stock of 
intangible human capital, in effect, take into consideration the capital formation that goes 
towards improving productivity capabilities within each of the categories of the workforce, 
rather than considering only the effects of shifting the distribution of the workforce among 
the various categories of educational attainment.  
Skill bias in technological and organisational innovation and the demand for human 
capital:  
The thesis that the 20
th century US economy has been shaped in significant ways by the 
emergence of an intangible human capital-deepening bias in the trajectory of 
technological and organisational innovations, suggests that the general phenomenon of 
skill-bias in technological change is not a particularly novel phenomenon. What has 
directed economists’ attention to this subject lately has been the suspicion that the 
introduction of information technologies is largely responsible for the observed widening of 
average education-associated wage differentials, as well as of the residual wage 
dispersion among the ranks of the university educated workforce. 
The more general conclusion that technological change in manufacturing industries during 
the post-WWII era has been skill-biased finds strong support from econometric studies 
using less aggregated US data (Mincer, 1993a, b; Kahn and Lim, 1998), as well as data 
from other developed countries. According to Berman, Bound, and Machin (1998, p. 
1246), “skill-biased technological change was pervasive in the OECD over the past two 
decades, occurring simultaneously in most, if not all, developed countries”. This 
conclusion is advanced on the grounds that it provides an explanation consistent with the 
simultaneous rising wage premiums for skilled workers, and the observed within-industry 
substitution towards skilled workers. Similar inferences support the conclusion that this 
phenomenon had emerged considerably earlier in the century. This may be seen from the 
historical research of Goldin and Katz (1999), who find that skill-biases appeared most 
notably in the technologically novel industries and where factory electrification was under 
way. 
The Abramovitz-David hypothesis that the changing morphology of long-run US growth 
was driven primarily by “biased” technological progress implies that the relative rise of 
intangible capital, especially that embodied in people during the 20th century, was not the 
result of largely exogenous institutional developments and political forces that managed to  
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mobilise state subsidies for mass education. Instead, the latter facilitating, infrastructural 
transformations can be seen as being directly and indirectly induced by changes on the 
demand side of the labour market. 
One important source of support for that view is that the succession of new “general 
purpose technologies” (GPTs) that were introduced in the US (and elsewhere) from the 
late 19
th century onwards required incremental technical improvements (so-called 
secondary innovations); in turn, each set in motion a process of further technical 
elaboration and gradual diffusion that resulted in a broad range of specific product 
innovations and applications in old and new industries alike. The electric dynamo, the 
internal combustion engine, the synthesis of organic chemical compounds, and still 
others, are identified prominently among the GPTs that figured in the transformation of the 
early 20
th century American economy. The new technologies give rise to economies of 
scale and scope at both plant and firm levels, lending impetus to strategies of mass 
production and mass marketing. 
The hypothesis that the introduction and elaboration of new GPTs was important in the 
acceleration of productivity growth during the 20
th century is taken up by David and Wright 
(1999a, b), who examine the evidence for two alternative conceptualisations of the 
process of productivity growth. In the first of these, advanced by Harberger (1998), 
aggregate TFP growth typically reflects highly localised cost-saving developments (within 
a small number of industries in any narrow time-frame); it stems from independent 
technological and organisational innovations that do not generate important knowledge 
spill-overs. Alternatively, the growth process has been seen as the consequence of the 
diffusion of a new “techno-economic regime” affecting many industries and sectors; that 
is, a generic form of technological progress that creates dynamic spill-overs and results in 
economy-wide surges of productivity growth. The latter vision is the one more readily 
assimilated into the aggregate dynamic models found in the recent literature on 
endogenous growth. 
David and Wright argue against the first of these views on the basis of diverse theoretical 
and historical considerations. They point out that the quantitative support Harberger 
(1998) presents is drawn from a period of unusually slow growth in US industrial 
productivity; whereas proximate responsibility for the marked post-World War I 
acceleration of TFP growth in the US manufacturing sector was shared by many different 
branches of production, rather than concentrated in only a few industries. Further, they 
link that productivity surge with the final stage of factory electrification that was under way 
during the 1920s: the diffusion of the “unit drive” system of the dynamo technology alone 
is conservatively estimated to have accounted for roughly half of the 5 percentage point 
rise in the manufacturing sector’s average annual TFP growth rate. Analogous effects 
may be found in previous as well as subsequent historical episodes involving “general 
purpose technologies:” David (1991, 2000b) has argued that this is likely to hold true in 
the case of the microelectronics-based digital computer, which continues to open a broad 
stream of complementary innovations that are penetrating different products and 
processes across a range of both old and new industries. 
Yet, GPT’s require the introduction of complementary organisational changes at the level 
of the plant office and store, in order effectively to exploit the new possibilities of 
production and marketing. This is where the connection with human capital formation 
becomes critical. For complementary organisational changes to be implemented on a 
wide scale necessitates learning by architects and engineers of the new designs for 
industrial facilities, and by managers of new techniques of controlling and directing 
organisations that are more complex. The specifics of such knowledge generally are  
WP 01/13  Knowledge, Capabilities and Human Capital Formation in Economic Growth 84
 
acquired through learning-by-doing; even though mastery of general principles acquired 
through formal professional education may be involved, the process of such technologies’ 
diffusion, therefore, can be gradual and quite protracted. Innovations in industrial practice 
facilitated by the introduction of a GPT are thus to be seen among the (non-neutral) 
processes that have altered the relative demands for tangible and intangible productive 
assets, including labour qualities and skills. The technologically driven shift towards mass 
production organisations taking place in the US during the first half of the 20
th century was 
thoroughly implicated in both the transformation of high school and college education, and 
the quickened pace of productivity advance. 
A rising demand for higher and higher levels of schooling, evident in the recurring 
educational movements – first to mass secondary schooling, and later to mass college 
education – taking place in the US over the course of the first three-quarters of the 20th 
century, undoubtedly drew strong impetus from developments in the country’s labour 
markets. Recruiting practices and pay-scales gave indications that the firms embracing 
new technological trajectories particularly valued worker qualities (such as general 
intelligence, alertness, diligence, flexibility in the sense of versatility as well as receptivity 
to change) that tended to be correlated with higher educational attainments. The signalling 
motive for seeking education implies that the social marginal productivity of schooling in 
terms of raising “labour quality” need not be very large for “education” to be used by firms 
in selecting and sorting workers. Where considerable uncertainty surrounds the degree to 
which individuals possess those desirable attributes, general education attainments will be 
sought by potential workers as a means to secure better paying jobs in firms that “screen” 
on that basis, as well as the ticket of admission to professions that require further, more 
vocationally specific training. 
The trajectory of technological evolution from the late 19th century onwards also has 
stimulated “an increasing demand for scientists and engineers and supporting personnel, 
who could carry on the necessary knowledge-generating and knowledge-applications 
activities”. That provided new incentives for upwardly mobile families and individuals to 
seek and invest in further university training, but it also impelled US university 
administrators to seek to fulfil new needs arising in the various business communities from 
which they sought financial backing – whether directly or through legislative action in the 
case of the state universities. According to Abramovitz and David (1999, p. 38): “The 
prospective demand from industrial employers also stimulated efforts on the part of 
colleges and universities to adapt existing curricula, or establish entirely new areas of 
instruction that would be better attuned to those needs”. 
This claim contrasts sharply with the pioneering models of endogenous growth (Romer, 
1986 and 1990) in which technological change is assumed to be “neutral”, and where it is 
the increased supply of skilled workers (through education, e.g., in Lucas 1988) that 
automatically promotes greater productivity and growth. A second point of contrast is the 
emphasis placed upon the reciprocal links between technological change and human 
capital formation through formal education. In addition to the previously cited 
microeconomic studies of wage behaviour that point to the existence of strong skill-
technology complementarity, a considerable body of empirical evidence below the 
macroeconomic level can be adduced to support the proposition that in the latter half of 
the 20
th century, if not before, the overall bias of technological innovation has been in the 
direction of human capital-deepening; that is to say, it has tended to raise the marginal 
rates of return on investments in formal education and training. 
Thus, using industry-level data for 61 branches of US manufacturing over the 1960-80 
period, Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987) found that the relative demand for educated  
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workers was greater in sectors where newer vintages of capital equipment had been 
installed. Such findings are not confined to the manufacturing sector: in a study of the 
returns to education in US farming based upon 1959 data, Welch (1970) concluded that a 
portion of the returns to further schooling resulted from the greater ability of more 
educated farmers to adapt to new production technologies. Using data from the US 
Population Survey in the period 1959-69, Gill (1969) calculated rates of return to 
education and found that among the highly educated workers these were differentially 
greater in industries where technological change was faster. In the same vein, Wolff 
(1996) found that in US industries in the period 1970-85 the growth of cognitive skill levels 
(defined by the Dictionary of Occupational Titles) among employees was positively 
correlated with indicators of recent technological change, including computer intensity, low 
average ages of equipment, and R&D intensity.  
Although recognised in the historical and applied empirical literature for some while, the 
important implications of the dynamic interplay between induced skill-biased innovation 
and induced biases in human capital formation at the macroeconomic level have only 
recently attracted the attention of theorists. Examples of this may be found in the formal 
analyses of skill-biased innovation (Eicher, 1996, and Galor and Moav, 1998), and the 
macro- model of Acemoglu (1998) that has already been considered at some length (see 
the closing sub-section in section II.2, above). 
(iii) Comparative  historical  experience 
Regional comparisons across European countries have been particularly useful in 
determining the importance of geographical proximity in convergence. They also suffer 
less from the bias of “outliers” in broad samples and allow for a more careful 
measurement of output and other variables than is possible with a broad sample of 
countries. Van Ark (1997) compares the productivity performance of economies in 
Europe’s eastern and south-western periphery with the richer, “core” countries of 
Northwest Europe. He finds evidence of divergence of the first two groups of countries 
with respect to the “core” European economies in terms of manufacturing productivity 
performance, particularly so in the case of the Eastern European countries.  
On close examination of the post-World War II evidence, Van Ark (1997, p. 302) 
concludes that the major factors behind this divergence are: (1) “differences in emphasis 
on ‘extensive’ versus ‘intensive’ growth strategies; (2) the variation in investment in human 
capital; and (3) the openness to trade and foreign investment”. Using the same regional 
approach, Koman and Marin (1997), compare the growth record of Austria and Germany 
from 1960-92. They also find divergence in the time-series evidence that cannot be 
explained wholly by differences in physical and human capital accumulation; instead, they 
explain divergence from differing rates of technical accumulation in the two countries. 
The comparative growth experience of the US vis-à-vis other OECD countries since the 
mid-19th century has been examined by Abramovitz and David (1996; 1999, Part 3) to 
gain further understanding of the elements influencing catch-up and “forging ahead” (i.e., 
the overtaking of a productivity leader by a former laggard). In their reading of the 
evidence, the simple catch-up hypothesis – whereby the relative growth potential of a 
country reflects the size of the productivity differential that separates it from the leader – is 
mediated by two classes of constraints: “technological congruence” and “social capability”.  
Limitations in the laggard’s “technological congruence” stem from differences from the 
resource availabilities, factor supplies, technical capabilities, market scales, and consumer 
demands in the leader’s economy. The more fuzzily defined concept of “social capability”  
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is meant to capture a myriad of factors, including the level of general education and 
technical competence, institutions that affect the financing and operation of industry, and 
political and social characteristics that influence risks and incentives. During the extended 
period between 1880 and 1929, according to Abramovitz and David (1996), the gap 
between the situation of the western European economies and the US in regard to both 
technological congruence and social capabilities militated against the former’s ability to 
catch up, and the relative size of the trans-Atlantic productivity gap continued to widen.  
Broadberry (2000) compares the US growth experience in the 20
th century to that of 
Britain and Germany. He shows that while the productivity records of these countries are 
quite different, the human capital record that emerges from school enrolment is very 
similar for the three countries. In order to understand why Germany has overtaken Britain 
since World War II, and the US “forged ahead” in productivity, Broadberry finds it 
necessary to consider the educational path followed by each country. 
On disaggregating productivity performance to consider vocational training in addition to 
formal education, it becomes apparent that: (i) the US specialised in higher level skills 
(particularly for managerial and research tasks) from formal education that were used in 
capital-scale intensive, hierarchical organisation of mass production, in combination with 
unskilled labour; (ii) Germany followed the opposite path, specialising in intermediate skills 
learnt through vocational training, which were used in a handicraft, “flexible system” of 
production; (iii) Britain tried to accumulate both types of human capital, falling behind the 
US in high-level skills and Germany in intermediate ones. 
If one accepts the author’s suggestion that vocational training is a substitute of tangible 
capital, but general education (through its provision of “social capabilities”) is 
complementary to tangible capital, then the divergent paths in human capital accumulation 
can explain the evolution of the countries’ growth rates. This article therefore reinforces 
the general message that a simplistic view of human capital accumulation cannot yield an 
adequate account of the historical patterns of growth: the industrial path followed – mass 
production or flexible production, oriented to industry or services – determines the need 
for different kinds of human capital, and this in turn depends on the resources and 
conditions of the country. 
Another important lesson underscored by a comparative analysis of historical experiences 
is the value of drawing a clear distinction between the growth and level effects of 
education. This distinction can be perceived clearly in the work by Godo and Hayami 
(1999) comparing the US and Japanese growth performance in the 20th century. The 
authors show how the average schooling in Japan increased rapidly from the moment 
when schooling was made compulsory at the turn of the 20
th century, approaching the US 
average schooling by World War II, without a corresponding increase in per capita growth. 
The celebrated Japanese growth experience occurred in the post-WWII era, and was 
accompanied from the start by a rising capital-labour ratio. The most likely explanation for 
this experience is that a crucial threshold level of education was required in order 
successfully to import foreign (American) technology. 
A generalised formulation of this particular hypothesis would hold physical and human 
capital to be complements, as has been discussed above. Consequently, the increased 
schooling could not contribute to growth without a simultaneous increase in physical 
capital. Reflecting back on the similar suggestion advanced by Wolff (2000), were the 
latter to be the case, it would be important to properly measure the growth of the physical 
stock of capital when conducting econometric time series tests of this particular 
formulation of the role of educational capital in growth. It is unfortunate, therefore, that like  
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so many other studies based upon international data, Wolff’s econometric investigations 
rely upon measures of the national (gross) domestic investment rate in lieu of the growth 
rate of the real tangible capital stock. 
We might then conclude by observing that the eminently plausible idea that investments in 
human capital have an important payoff in economic development through their role in 
facilitating the successful transfer of technologies that are embodied in physical plant and 
equipment, has yet to be adequately tested by econometric methods applied at the 
macroeconomic level. Nevertheless, the hypothesis can be supported by a wealth of 
historical case study evidence from the “late industrialising” economies, much of it having 
been ably drawn together and synthesised in the recent work of Alice Amsden (2001). The 
historical record testify to barriers impeding technology transfer and adaptation, in even 
the most advanced of those countries prior to WWII, as a consequence of poor human 
capital endowments. 
There is positive evidence as well, in the heavy educational investments that 
subsequently became characteristic of the successful Asian industrialising societies. 
Moreover, as Amsden (2001, pp. 238-45, 277-81) emphasises, subsidies to learning and 
education by the highly successful late entrants to the global market for sophisticated 
manufacturing products were targeted, rather than across the board. In Korea, Taiwan 
and China, the path pioneered by Japan was followed in first concentrating their tertiary 
educational investments upon building engineering skills. From that base they moved on 
to repatriate cadres of foreign-trained scientific and technical workers among their 
overseas nationals, and to create new, complementary financial and research institutions 
that would sustain the transition from “intelligent buying” to “strategic making” of new 
technologies.   
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Part III:  Public Policy Implications for New 
Zealand: Enhancing Economic Well-being 
through Human Capital Formation  
This Part provides some guidance for policy formulation in regard to human capital, based 
upon the analytical conclusions and empirical findings discussed in the preceding Parts. It 
begins by considering what might be described as “generic” implications for policy, and 
then takes up the question of whether, and in what respects, the major conclusions that 
can be drawn from the economics literature are applicable to guide policy-making for an 
economy whose particular structural characteristics resemble those of New Zealand. In 
order to address these issues, a preliminary examination of relevant policy objectives is 
required, including a number of more focused policy directions that appear to be 
especially germane in the NZ context, and thus deserving of special attention. Although 
the systematic development of a comprehensive programme containing concrete policy 
recommendations lies beyond the scope of this undertaking, some novel proposals for 
fiscal reforms and supporting institutional experiments are put forward for further 
consideration.  
The organisation of the discussion thus proceeds, straightforwardly, from generic 
concerns towards increasingly specific policy issues:  
•  Section III.1 considers what might be termed the “meta-implications”, that is to say, the 
implications that the general approach adopted in this Report would seem to carry for 
the task of framing “human capital policies”. 
•  Section III.2 summarises and comments upon the principal generic policy implications 
that emerged from the large body of theoretical and empirical material surveyed in 
Part II. 
•  Section III.3 begins by indicating several distinctive structural aspects of the economic 
situation of New Zealand as a small, open economy, and their specific implications for 
policies aimed at altering the country’s human capital endowment. The nature of the 
additional empirical information needed to identify certain policy objectives and 
feasible instruments is briefly indicated in connection with the presentation of specific 
policy suggestions. The latter include: 
a  fiscal (tax and subsidy) reform measures to improve the allocation of domestic 
investment between tangible capital and intangible human capital formation;  
b  fiscal and other tools for implementing a policy of selective encouragement of 
immigration by people who have received education and practical training overseas; 
c  several proposed complementary innovations in institutional infrastructure, directed 
to improving access to scientific and technological knowledge and channelling 
private and public investment towards economically productive, job-specific training 
programmes; 
d  coordinated programmes of public action targeted to counter-act the low levels of 
investment in human capital formation that are associated with persisting socio-
economic disparities and disadvantages that particularly affect Maori members of 
New Zealand’s society.    
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III.1 Meta-Implications:  Orienting the Formulation of 
Human Capital Policies 
What are “Human Capital Policies”? 
To orient thinking about government policies that seek to target human capital formation 
as a means of promoting sustainable economic growth in New Zealand, or indeed, in any 
modern market economy, it is best not to begin with a narrow set of preconceptions about 
which interventions are to be considered under the heading "human capital policies”, and 
which are not. This proposition, as unsettling as it might be, is probably the most robust as 
well as the most general implication to be drawn from the foregoing review.  
Indeed, this advice follows more or less directly from the breadth of the concept of human 
capital investments, and the general equilibrium character of the analytical framework 
adopted in this report. Human capital formation decisions at the microeconomic level are 
influenced by a wide variety of interdependent economic factors, as well as non-
economic, conditioning circumstances, as has been emphasised in Part I, and Part II.1. 
Most of those micro-level decision-factors are potentially subject to being directly altered 
by the application of some state policy instrument or a number of the latter taken in 
combination. Thus, taxes and subsidies, and direct procurement programmes can affect 
the behaviours of households and firms affecting human capital formation and its 
deployment, by altering the constellation of wages, prices and costs; whereas fiscal, 
monetary and exchange-rate policies will have impacts on current incomes and 
employment prospects. Furthermore, policies that impinge in the first instance upon 
tangible, physical capital formation, and upon the rate and direction of technological 
changes – whether through invention or the diffusion of innovations – have potentially 
important feedback effects upon human capital investment decisions.  
Thus, whatever the purposes for which their application is intended, the whole panoply of 
economic policy tools also can produce significant indirect dynamic effects on the growth 
of the country’s human capital resources. Even if the point is an obvious one for 
economists, it is useful to bear in mind that where the initial effects (whether positive or 
negative) of policy initiatives first impact the accumulation and utilisation of classes of 
assets other than human capital, the indirect repercussions are likely to be positively 
correlated where those seemingly unrelated investment targets had a complementary 
relationship to human capital inputs in production activities. Analogously, negative impacts 
on particular types of human capital formation would follow from policy measures that 
stimulated the supply of assets that were substitutes in production activities. Putting this in 
other words, adverse effects upon investment in some particular form of (human) 
intangible capital would be expected to flow from the relative growth of demand in markets 
for goods and services that were related as “gross substitutes” (either in consumption or in 
production) to the human capital investment activities in question.  
To be concrete: consider the economic factors affecting the choice that students entering 
tertiary education might make among different courses (fields of concentration), some of 
which can be expected to extract more rather than less study-time than is the norm 
among college and university attendees. For example, laboratory course requirements for 
students in fields such as chemistry and physics, and mechanical engineering, are 
generally held to be especially time-consuming. Decisions favouring the latter areas of 
study therefore would have to overcome the additional discouraging economic effect that 
was created by a macroeconomic policy which had resulted in high job-vacancy rates and 
high wage offers to young part-time workers. Does the latter policy then qualify for  
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description as a human capital policy biased towards university training in the humanities, 
rather than the sciences? 
Extrapolating from the foregoing illustrative case, would it be justifiable to regard any and 
all government economic policy measures that have perceptible effects upon human 
capital formation as belonging to the set of “human capital policies”? Practical reason 
suggests otherwise: just as it is good advice to avoid the extremes of taxonomic “splitters”, 
so it is equally sensible to resist the efforts of “lumpers” who aim to eliminate all the bases 
upon which distinctions can be erected. With regard to the taxonomic question at hand, 
perhaps the simplest middle way is just to avoid the entangling market connections that 
are articulated in general equilibrium analysis; to entirely abandon efforts to discriminate 
between “human capital policies” and other policies on the basis of their effects. A much 
more workable basis for selectively applying that label can be found by referring, instead, 
to the policies’ proximate intentions. 
One may then answer the question posed at the beginning of this sub-section 
straightforwardly, by identifying generic “human capital policies” as those which are 
introduced with the explicit intention of affecting the levels, diversity and relative 
availability of human capabilities. Further distinctions might be made when such intentions 
are combined with an additional goal: for example, to affect human capabilities not only in 
a welfare-enhancing way, but one that achieves and sustains some specified pace of 
economic growth. The latter is more or less the classification principle that has been 
embraced for the purpose of this discussion. 
The digression taken before arriving at this point will have been useful if it underscored 
the message that clarity of intentions does not relieve policy designers from the 
responsibility of thinking hard about questions of efficacy and ultimate effects. If any good 
practical use is to be made of the implications for policy recommendations that emerge in 
this report, much additional effort will have to be devoted to examining possibilities of 
unintended outcomes. The latter of course may include quite perverse effects arising from 
the complex interactions among the myriad of government regulations, programmes and 
policy initiatives that are found in virtually every modern economy.  
Human Capital and Economic Growth Policies in a Human Welfare 
Context 
The introductory attention devoted (in section I.1) to the quantitative definition of 
“economic growth”, and to the relationship between the latter and alternative ways of 
gauging improvements in economic welfare and human well-being, may have seemed 
unnecessary, and perhaps even tedious on first reading. Yet, those preliminaries are well 
justified by the policy development concerns that motivate this report. They carry the quite 
clear implication that a general caveat should precede any specific efforts to suggest 
directions for human capital policies that derive only from considerations of the human 
capital-economic growth nexus. There are three main points of caution, or at least of 
qualification, to be noticed in this connection. 
First, a society’s endowments of human capital, and the actions on the part of public and 
private agents that alter them, are likely to impinge in quite different ways upon the growth 
of real GDP per capita and each of the available, alternative indicators of economic 
welfare, or of human well-being. To make this observation more concrete, suppose that 
identical levels of public resource expenditures are entailed in setting up either a technical 
apprenticeship programme targeted at secondary school leavers, or a programme of 
automatic post-natal home visitation by paediatric nurses. It is improbable that the pair of  
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items on this menu of public investment projects would exert identical proportionate 
leverage on a welfare index that accorded heaviest weight to the near-term goal of raising 
average incomes among the poor. Were a different (less Rawlsian) indicator of the 
society’s “growth in welfare” – say, an index that assigned very heavy weight to reductions 
in infant mortality and morbidity rates – to be consulted, the relative efficacy standings of 
the two public policy options would be different again, and actually might be reversed. If 
human welfare is to be made the “objective function” for purposes of analysis and policy 
selection, the details of the way in which a notion of welfare is reified and associated with 
measurable magnitudes really do matter greatly. 
The existence of classic index number biases of the sort just illustrated is a matter that is 
easy enough to gloss over when discussing “economic growth” and “human capital” as 
abstract, aggregate variables. It should be borne in mind that such biases nonetheless are 
very much present. Indeed, it is all too likely that they will resurface with a vengeance as 
soon as any concrete policy options are put on the table. Thus, it is seen that inasmuch as 
the selection of a particular criterion function for evaluating alternative policies will matter, 
the set of issues surrounding that (constitutional) choice ought to be made the subject of 
explicit discussion.  
A second equally basic point, corollary to the one just noted, is that normative issues 
obviously are raised by the focus of this study upon the relationship between “human 
capital” and the conventional “economic growth” measure – in preference to one or 
another of the alternative indicators of economic welfare improvements. The background 
motivation here is one that regards human capital as an instrumentality, and proposes to 
evaluate various possible courses of government policy affecting human capital formation 
by considering their likely impacts upon the selected criterion, “economic growth”. 
Of course, it might be objected one need not be overly concerned on that score, because 
the subjective and ethical issues raised by emphasising “economic growth effects” in the 
criterion function for designing human capital policies really are not so stark. The reason 
that could be offered for such a view is simply that the historical records for the world’s 
developed economies show that growth in real GDP per capita has been positively 
correlated over the long run with that of most of the conceivable alternative “welfare 
indicators” – average nutritional status, terminal adult height, the human body-mass index, 
health status, life expectancy, the variety and quality of goods and services available for 
consumption, and so forth. That is a good argument for the long run.  
But, the third point to be noticed is that even within the moderately brief time-spans that 
separate one human generation from the next, the movements among the various welfare 
indicators may be seen from the same historical records to be capable of diverging widely 
from one another. Political decision-makers need to be alert to that fact, and therefore to 
what is implied by accepting the promotion of “economic growth” as the objective in 
framing governmental policy affecting human capital formation. To take one elementary 
example: other things being equal, a programme that would encourage a higher rate of 
continuation from secondary to university and post-graduate levels of education would 
entail a short-run sacrifice of “economic growth” as measured by real GDP per capita. 
That particular (statistical) outcome, however, simply turns upon the convention that the 
foregone production incomes of those who remained longer in school should not be 
counted as “investment” and so included in the gross product reported by the official GDP 
accounts.  
By contrast, in an alternative augmented system of (MEW) accounting, the foregone 
earnings of students engaged in education and training beyond the compulsory level of  
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schooling would form part of (augmented) gross private domestic investment. Now, there 
is no doubt that a proposal to increase the (intangible) human capital investment rate 
involves an actual trade-off – between short-run and long-run consumption. Whether or 
not it is perceived also to be a trade-off between “economic growth now” and “faster 
economic growth in the future”, is a question whose answer will depend upon the 
particular product accounting standards, and the time frame. Too often these remain 
implicit when reference is made to the goal of promoting faster “economic growth”. 
Seasoned political practitioners in representative democracies, however, ought to have an 
appreciation for both the statistical and rhetorical niceties in all of this, if only because they 
appear so instinctively to take to heart the message of John Maynard Keynes’ famous 
aphorism: “in the long run we are all dead”. 
III.2  Generic Economic Policy Pointers from Theoretical 
and Empirical Studies  
Policy Implications from the Microeconomics of Human Capital 
Formation 
Microeconomic studies conclude that numerous structural conditions – especially those 
peculiar to economic transactions involving knowledge, and the services of free persons -- 
are likely to drive persisting wedges between the private and social rates of return to 
investing in human capital. These “wedges” signal the existence of mal-allocation. As was 
pointed out in Part I.3, they are likely to appear in either of two broad sets of 
circumstances: (1) the existence of non-pecuniary “externalities”, and the 
interdependence of individuals’ preferences over outcomes, results in some significant 
portions of the benefits and/or the costs of particular investments failing to accrue to the 
agents responsible for undertaking those projects; (2) there are persisting “market 
imperfections” (including incomplete and missing markets) that prevent relative prices 
from properly signalling relative private marginal costs and private marginal productivities 
– excepting those cases where the imperfections arise from complete market power that 
accompanies the “internalisation” of all relevant costs and benefits.  
The general implication of this is that the volume and composition of investments made in 
people tend to diverge from levels that would be socially optimal. A widely shared 
expectation that in the aggregate private investments undertaken solely for business 
profit, and to increase present or future private consumption satisfaction, will neglect the 
positive externalities, and therefore fall short of the social optimum, offers a broad 
rationale for the consensus favouring public policy measures that would encourage 
human capital formation activities. 
Where and how should government intervene? 
Strictly speaking, however, an economic justification for governmental (or charitable 
institution) interventions directed to raising human capital investment in particular 
categories is more demanding than that. The classic, theoretical criteria can be formulated 
this way: subsidies are called for only where it is found that the respective marginal social 
rates of return on such investments – whether directed to human capital investment 
among particular population groups, or for specific categories of training – exceed (i) the 
corresponding private marginal rates and (ii) the marginal social opportunity cost of the 
public tax revenues that would be absorbed by the indicated subsidy programmes.   
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The application of this test, as a practical matter, is not so easy. A comparatively 
straightforward and widely accepted methodology has been developed to obtain estimates 
of the private  marginal rates of return on investments in formal education, on-the-job 
training of various kinds, and even in health care. Such calculations typically make use of 
synthetic cohort estimates of age-earnings profiles derived from census and survey data 
for individuals classified by educational attainment, or health status; they indicate either 
the present values of the differential earnings streams (discounted at some opportunity 
cost interest rate on financial assets), or the internal rate of return on the stream of 
differential earnings. The latter measures are equivalent to the former only where 
reinvestment of the net earnings stream at an invariant rate of return is feasible, and this 
is not necessarily true in the case of educational investments, due to the effects of ageing 
upon an individual’s access to institutionalised educational opportunities.  
Comparisons among private net-present-value estimates for population groups that are 
distinguished by ethnic or racial markers, by geographic location, by type of educational 
institution and/or by training program, can be very useful, even when the corresponding 
social returns figures are not available. Differences in the private return to human capital 
may be illuminating in accounting for observable differences in socio-economic patterns of 
behaviour with respect to education and training. Furthermore, to the extent that there are 
pronounced inter-group differences among the private marginal rates, the latter signal the 
existence of market imperfections of one sort or another. The latter can operate as 
occupational entry barriers that are maintaining higher rates of return in some skilled 
occupations, or borrowing constraints that limit the access of low income groups to human 
capital investment opportunities. Cross-sectional comparisons of the private rates of 
return also may reveal the effects of discriminatory labour market treatment, whether in 
the form of differential wage rates, occupational segregation, or preferential hiring 
standards that ration jobs characterised by regularity of employment (rather than 
seasonality and exposure to frequent layoffs). The presence of differential subsidy 
programmes also may be discerned, if they encourage private human capital investments 
among some non-competing groups of workers, and so tend to drive down their internal 
rates of return.  
The foregoing discussion has concentrated on what there is to be learned from analysing 
information on the private rates of return. Although such calculations undoubtedly can be 
of use to inform the direction of government actions regarding human capital formation, 
their value is primarily diagnostic; without the counterpart information on the pattern of 
differences between private and social marginal rates of return, these indications cannot 
be regarded as “scientific” economic welfare criteria justifying the allocation of specific 
amounts of public resources for human capital formation purposes.  
Unfortunately, correspondingly detailed social rate of return estimates are hard to come 
by, except in some special circumstances where specialised occupational skills are 
required for an industry to be pursued, or for a specific technology to be adopted. It may 
then be feasible to estimate the incremental producer and consumer surpluses that would 
be generated in the society by providing the training necessary to meet those “critical 
human resource requirements”. Many historical instances might be cited, but a very recent 
one may suffice here: special interest has been shown by the US National Science Board 
supporting university curriculum innovations that would provide computer programming 
training to graduate students specialising in genetics; the signal for that initiative has been 
the surprising persistence of vacancies in positions for biology Ph.D.’s with experience in 
programming for the computational techniques employed in gene sequencing, 
notwithstanding the spectacular pay being offered to qualified recent graduates (Stephan 
and Black 1999, Romer 2000).   
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As to the question of how government ought to seek to alter the allocation of investment in 
human capital, the literature on the economics of public finance points almost exclusively 
to subsidies and taxes as the instruments of choice for effecting such corrections. A 
review of the generic implications of applying optimal tax and subsidy principles to the 
treatment of investments in intangible forms of human capital – specifically, education and 
training – therefore will occupy us in sub-section 2 (i), below. But, before turning to that 
task, a number of preliminary qualifying remarks are in order, to set the conclusions of that 
discussion against the background of pragmatic policy considerations. 
Theoretical prescriptions for taxes and subsidies typically stop far short of suggesting 
specifics for their implementation through tax codes and administrative procedures 
governing government subsidy programmes. Therefore, until such generic prescriptions 
are given a particular form that will be defined in terms of the categories and ranges of 
income subject to specified tax rates, and the legal conditions determining the eligibility of 
activities to receive stipulated levels of government subsidies, one can talk only in the 
loosest terms about the expected efficacy of such measures in any particular economic 
context.  
Just where, and on which particular capability-building activities such measures should be 
focused, however, are questions that only can be answered properly on the basis of more 
detailed analyses, in which the institutional setting also is fully specified. Thus, it would be 
reckless to start from a general a priori position regarding the directions or the severity of 
the various kinds of “market failures” that are thought to emerge in regard to human 
capital formation activities. 
True, there is a broad presupposition among economists of an overall systemic tendency 
toward under-investment in human capital, due to the incomplete private appropriation of 
their contribution to the (external) benefits of having a labour force (and a polity) that is 
more highly educated and possesses a greater degree and variety of skill. Yet this does 
not preclude the possibility that in some situations the behaviours of agents left to 
themselves in the private sector results in a level of educational investment that is sub-
optimal, not only when viewed from the social perspective but quite possibility also from 
the standpoint of the individuals themselves. Such is too frequently the situation of young 
labour market entrants, whose work habits and educational preparation reflect the 
limitations of previous interests and judgements on their parents’ part. 
At the same time, a condition of overall under-investment is quite compatible with there 
being socially excessive expenditures of private and public resources for formal schooling, 
i.e., levels of investment that drive the social marginal rate of return below the marginal 
private rate. Such a situation sometimes is alleged to be the case in regard to university-
level educational credentials that are sought (whether by students or their parents) 
primarily as “signals of quality” for prospective employers. The source of the putative 
inefficiency lies in the society’s lack of some alternative institutional mechanism that would 
perform the socially productive, signal-supplying function of educational credentials – with 
equal credibility but at lower unit cost.  
Corrective interventions by government therefore must be formulated on a case-specific 
basis, once the nature and seriousness of the existing misallocation has been established. 
Yet most corrective policy actions – whether they take the form of subsidies and taxes, or 
legal and administrative regulations, or the creation and management of special 
institutions by the public or private sector – will impose some costs of their own. That too 
must be taken into account in judging whether they should be recommended as “second  
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best” solutions, or only as the “n-th best” means of addressing the identified sources of 
“market failure”. 
A systems analysis of the sequence of educational choices points to the importance of 
targeting policy measures to address tendencies to under-investment during the earlier 
stages of the life-cycle. Schooling provides intangible capital that is a foundation of the 
capabilities for successfully undertaking later investments in education and training, 
including various kinds of on-the-job training. Market failures, or public institutional 
failures, that result in under-provision of “educational capital” at the primary level, 
therefore will raise the costs or reduce the effectiveness of subsequent investments in 
secondary schooling, tertiary vocational and university education, and in on-the-job 
training. 
Frustratingly, there are significant limitations to the degree of remedial leverage that 
government programmes can exert to effectively alter the family settings and 
neighbourhood environments of young children by targeting micro-level interventions – 
however critical those conditions appear to be for the subsequent development of their 
capabilities. Such problems are likely to have differential incidence within the population, 
and so may be responsible for permanent and increasing educational and socio-economic 
stratification among the members of the society. This implication is particularly relevant in 
diagnosing and addressing the sources of persisting segmentation of the population along 
racial and ethnic lines, a policy challenge which is considered more explicitly below, in 
section III.3.  
Adjusting the supply of various human capabilities found among the domestic workforce 
generally will be a comparatively slow and inevitably inexact process. Policies directed 
towards achieving specific goals of that kind when it must be achieved through subsidies 
for education, training and retraining, must take account of the long lags and uncertainties 
about future states of demands in the economy. Accordingly, they should be designed 
wherever feasible to allow for maximum flexibility and mid-course corrections. Yet, the 
latter implications derive much of their force from the “closed system” approach to human 
capital formation that dominates the macroeconomic analysis of the latter’s role in 
economic growth. A full-fledged open economy analysis, on the other hand, by taking into 
consideration that factors of production as well as their products can move across regional 
and national borders, is likely to steer the discussion of human capital subsidies and taxes 
towards rather different conclusions. 
The discussion of these matters is structured here in the following way. Sub-section 2(i) 
starts by reviewing the rationale for subsidies, and considers the case for direct subsidies 
even in the absence of externalities. It then examines in some detail both the actual and 
the desirable tax treatment of private investments in human capital. For purposes of 
exposition, the complications arising from international labour mobility are suppressed 
until sub-section 2(ii), where the effects of a variety of tax and subsidy measures affecting 
immigration and emigration are considered. The discussion of this section concludes, in 
2(iii), with a short note on the neglected subject of human capital investments that ought 
to be directed towards enhancing individuals’ capabilities and economic welfare in the 
retirement phase of the life-cycle.  
(i) Taxes, subsidies and investment in human capital 
Logically, the first set of questions to be considered under the heading of tax and subsidy 
policies for human capital formation concern the status quo: What is the level of national 
resources that currently are being devoted to human capital formation? Are those  
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resources being allocated in the most effective way, given the goals of economic growth 
and human welfare enhancement that the government seeks to attain? Focusing on 
intangible human capital formation, one should ask whether the existing mix of the various 
fiscal devices that the government has deployed for this purpose is yielding the best 
results attainable with the amount of public resources that are being invested. Such an 
assessment should be comprehensive, and therefore consider the resource costs entailed 
by the whole spectrum of measures – directly subsidised programs (whether implemented 
through the private or the public sectors), tax credits, and tax deductions allowed for 
training or educational expenditures. Having addressed those issues, one can then go on 
to pose a second set of questions: how much further it would be desirable to raise (or, for 
completeness, to lower) the overall rate of investment in intangible human capital? Is a 
“balanced” or equi-proportional increase of human capital investments indicated, or should 
the incremental mix be altered? 
In order to proceed with either of those inquiries it is of course necessary to have some 
idea about the way in which private investments in human capital formation are presently 
affected by the structure of educational subsidies, and also by the prevailing tax codes. 
The latter are likely to impinge in a direct way upon the inter-temporal resource allocation 
behaviour of individuals with regard to accumulating human capital through formal 
education beyond the mandatory school-leaving age, and through decisions to engage in 
on-the-job training (OJT) activities. Fiscal codes also may indirectly affect the supply of 
educational services; as, for example, through the tax deductions afforded to those 
making charitable bequests to educational institutions, and the treatment of the expenses 
employers incur for worker training.  
The following discussion is intended only to indicate the broad class of issues that need to 
be addressed, and to suggest the sort of empirical information that ought to have a 
bearing upon the design of specific government proposals in this area. We begin with a 
review of the basic logic of providing public subsidies for private investment in education 
and training, as it is presented in the modern economics literature. Following some brief 
comments on the rationale for direct, rather than preferential, tax treatment of those forms 
of investment expenditure, we turn to examine in some detail the analysis of the effects of 
the taxation of personal income. 
There remains, of course, the pragmatic issue of how government should allocate the 
subsidies it provides for human capital formation. Here fewer generic insights are to be 
found in the public finance literature, largely because practical choices among alternative 
forms of subsidisation cannot be made without reference to the specific structures of tax 
codes and the existing public and private agencies in the society concerned; nor without 
reference to inter-industry differences in the importance of different forms of investment in 
human capital, such as formal training outside the firm or OJT. On the latter question, 
however, notice already has been taken (in Part II.1) of a further practical difficulty – viz., 
that econometricians repeatedly have been frustrated by a lack of the kind of data that is 
needed to provide an empirical basis for deciding, in any given industrial setting, whether 
the emphasis should be placed upon job-specific training, rather than general human 
capital formation. 
A case for differential subsidisation of investments in human capital:  
A preliminary point needs to be made explicit. To the extent that investments in human 
capital yield positive externalities and so yield marginal social rates of return that exceed 
the corresponding marginal private rates of return, there is a case for public subsidisation. 
Much of the discussion in the preceding sections of this report (especially Part II)  
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addresses this question, implicitly and explicitly in the context of the social returns 
generated through processes of economic growth in which human capital plays a variety 
of roles. Whether a case can be made for differential tax treatment of investment in 
human vis-à-vis non-human capital, therefore is a question upon which the optimal tax 
literature per se is not helpful: the answers depend upon the direction and magnitude of 
possible externalities deriving from each kind of investment.  
Thus, the accelerated depreciation schedules and investment tax credits for outlays on 
producers’ durable equipment that are allowed by some countries (e.g., the US), are 
sometimes justified on the grounds that the rate of embodied technological progress is 
especially high for this category of physical capital, and the latest vintages of equipment 
have strong complementarities with specific investments by employers in worker training 
and organisational change, all of which contribute to total factor productivity growth. So 
long as the buyers of such equipment are competitors in the final product market, the spill-
overs through TFP increases will end up in the form of greater consumer surpluses. 
Similarly, and perhaps with stronger empirical justification, the most straightforward case 
for subsidisation of R&D investment rests upon a preponderance of evidence that public 
grants and contracts for research are net complements rather than net substitutes for 
private R&D (see David and Hall 2000; David, Hall, and Toole, 2000, for a review of the 
econometric evidence). This could justify either the granting of R&D tax credits, 
accelerated depreciation or, more usually, total deductibility (“full expensing”) of costs, 
where the policy intention was to raise private demand for this type of capital formation. 
Alternatively, as Romer (2000) recently has pointed out, the instrument selected for 
encouraging a larger volume of R&D investment might be the subsidisation of the training 
activities to create an enlarged supply of research personnel – a strategy that would have 
the merit of encouraging more private R&D investment by reducing its marginal costs. 
For present purposes, however, we may put aside consideration of externalities arising 
from interdependencies of the sort just recognised, and, further, ignore the existence of 
spill-overs from individuals’ respective investments in human capital. In the absence of all 
such “externalities”, expenditures on education and training can be treated as yielding 
purely private payoffs by raising individuals’ productivities and earnings; the issues 
involved in determining the proper tax-subsidy treatment of human capital investments are 
reduced to just those concerned with the degree to which private investment incentives 
may be distorted (to the detriment of individual well-being) in ways that can be remedied 
by direct subsidies, or corrected by alterations in the tax regime. 
Most of the discussion that occupies the economics literature devoted to this topic 
addresses the distortions that are perceived to arise from the workings of income tax 
systems. But before examining the nature and implications of that body of analysis, it is 
worth noting a distinctive rationale for direct subsidisation of educational investment, 
based upon the distortions caused by uninsurable private risk and its interaction with 
imperfections in the market for personal finance.  
The dominant stream of economic analysis concerning fiscal policies affecting education 
and training investments proceeds under the simplifying assumption that agents are risk 
neutral and all calculations affecting behaviour can be carried out in terms of expected 
values (“certainty-equivalents”). Some refinements in the analysis, however, do 
acknowledge the presence of differential uncertainty affecting the private returns to human 
capital investments. Eaton and Rosen (1980) were the first to argue that because 
individuals undertaking such expenditures had to assume idiosyncratic and uninsurable  
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risks of a sort not present in tangible capital investments, special subsidies were 
warranted to encourage private investment in education. 
Of course, in the face of moral hazard, subsidisation in the form of publicly funded grants 
to defray training costs are not unproblematic. This objection applies a fortiori to subsidies 
in the form of loss offsets symmetrical to the taxes that would be levied on the incremental 
returns from the human capital investment in question. But the Eaton-Rosen (1980) 
proposition would suggest, at the very least, that the extent and form of educational 
subsidies should take into account empirical data indicating the severity of uninsured 
individual risks, particularly those that for all intents and purposes can be viewed as 
uninsurable. As Judd (1998) points out, this rationale carries less force where private 
agents (say, firms and employees) possess more information about the idiosyncratic risks 
(of, for example, their joint investment in OJT) than does an outside party, such as a 
government agency.  
The same may be said where workers are able to write flexible contracts with risk-neutral 
employers. Such contracts in effect would induce the choice of a level of human capital 
investment that equated its marginal product with the return available on a risk-less asset, 
thereby implying no risk premium. Private contracting arrangements of that sort seem 
plausible in circumstances such as those of high-tech “incubator” organisations. The latter 
are modelled by Goddard (2000) as bundles of contracts designed to induce prospective 
start-up entrepreneurs to undertake the kinds and amounts of human capital investments 
that would maximise the expected rates of return on the backers’ equity. 
Yet the circumstances just cited are rather exceptional. It would seem to be a serious 
policy mistake to overlook the substantial transaction costs of arriving at transparent, 
flexible contracts that simultaneously address the problems of uncertainty, asymmetric 
information, tacit knowledge and moral hazard. Eaton and Rosen’s (1980) argument for 
“education subsidies” thus is hard to dismiss out of hand in the more general situation, 
where employers recruit and offer job-specific training to large numbers of workers under 
conditions of incomplete information, and where the idiosyncratic characteristics affecting 
the post-training productivities of a cohort of trainees, at best, will be revealed only after 
irreversible training investments have been sunk. Moreover, for individuals at the low end 
of the income and wealth distribution, the combination of high contracting costs, asset 
constraints (due to capital market imperfections), and uninsurable private risk is likely to 
pose such a strong deterrent to significant individual educational investment that direct 
subsidies remain the only practical and effective corrective.  
Taxation and intangible capital formation: 
Systems of taxation under which workers are treated (like machinery) as agents of 
production – the income tax being the prime exemplar, distort the allocation of resources 
in a direction that militates against human capital formation. The most general 
formulations of optimal tax theory, such as the classic papers of Diamond and Mirrlees 
(1971), argue that there should be no taxes levied on intermediate goods. Plainly, 
investments fall under the heading of intermediate goods, as they are an instrumentality 
for shifting resources from the present to the future. Human capital formation today is 
regarded as yielding enhanced capabilities from which derive an incremental stream of 
human productive services (and corresponding earnings) in the future. But the process of 
forming human capabilities through education and other kinds of training also may yield 
consumption satisfactions for the recipients.  
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The practical implications for policy design that can be derived from an application of 
optimal taxation principles, however, remains less than immediately clear. This is so 
because in practice human capital may be a mixture of labour supply, capital investment 
and a final good, and because it may be necessary to consider general equilibrium 
effects, as well as the first-order impacts upon the behaviour of individual agents (see, 
e.g., Boskin 1977, Davies and Whalley 1991, Trostel 1993, Dupor et al., 1996, Heckman, 
Lochner and Taber 1998, Judd 1998). 
To make any headway towards policy recommendations, therefore, it is best to begin by 
trying to reduce the tension that exists between the principle that human capital (being “an 
intermediate good”) should not be taxed, and the practical difficulty of attempting to tax 
income from labour services in a way that would not distort human capital investments. 
Judd (1998) suggests that this may be done by taxing workers’ incomes but immediately 
expensing all human capital expenditures: the proposal is to extend the (automatic) 
deductibility of foregone earnings costs to all direct education and training outlays. 
Furthermore, for the sake of consistency, it would seem to be appropriate for the central 
government to allow individuals to deduct from taxable income any mandatory community 
tax payments that were devoted to local public education and training activities. The latter 
detail that would preserve neutrality in the tax treatment of privately vs. publicly provided 
educational services.  
To be sure, were a significant portion of educational (and/or training) expenditures to 
represent “consumption” goods (or bads) it would be appropriate to tax these. But, the 
obvious practical difficulties in strictly implementing such a tax policy suggest that, 
instead, reasonably generous caps might be imposed on the deductibility of direct 
education and training related expenditures. Furthermore, a rigorous interpretation of the 
optimal tax proscription to leave capital of any form untaxed, would confine the taxation of 
investments in education and training capital to just that portion of direct expenditures that 
generated “educational consumption” satisfactions. The inter-temporal effects on 
individual economic welfare of educational investments made early in the life cycle – in 
raising marginal satisfactions derived subsequently from complementary consumption 
activities – is perfectly analogous to the effect of investing in financial or durable physical 
assets that yield a positive rate of return.  
Consideration of existing tax codes quickly reveals that, contrary to common opinion, 
some portion of human capital investments actually may be taxed more heavily than 
financial investment and tangible physical investments made by households (see, e.g., 
Judd 1998: Steuerle 1996). As a result of efforts since the 1980’s to increase the 
conventional personal savings rate in the US, UK and some other advanced economies, 
special tax provisions presently allow the sheltering of income in pension funds, individual 
retirement accounts, and other vehicles for savings. The use of these instruments for 
shifting income from the present into the future has thus been favoured, in comparison 
with others, including human capital formation, that may accomplish the same purpose. In 
addition, investments in corporate debt also avoid the corporate income tax, whereas 
equity investment is subject to taxation at the corporate as well as the household level; the 
interest expenses of financing owner occupied houses is deductible from taxable 
household income, whereas the service flow of the residential structure itself is not treated 
as part of taxable income.  
Consequently, the elimination of taxation of all investment in human capital has been 
recommended in some guise or another by economists and tax analysts, e.g., Boskin 
1977, Kaplow 1996. This is a partial tax reform proposal, and falls rather short of a 
“second-best” policy, for it would not be likely to result in a tax regime that was “neutral”  
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with respect to the formation of different types of capital. Physical capital goods purchased 
by businesses cannot be fully “expensed”, i.e., set off against earnings by firms that pay 
corporate income taxes; instead, most national and local tax codes allow depreciation 
charges on these durables to be deducted from gross earnings. One might view the 
persistence of differential tax treatment of different types of capital as a potential source of 
allocative inefficiency, and therefore favour far more sweeping reforms, such as the 
adoption of taxes on consumption expenditures alone.  
It should be understood that nothing in the economic arguments favouring a consumption 
tax regime (over regimes that implicitly tax investments) constitutes grounds for 
establishing fiscal neutrality with respect to capital formation. Under a consumption tax 
regime it would be entirely feasible to introduce differential subsidies for private 
investments, say, in order to counteract the effects of externalities and incomplete 
markets that otherwise would result in a socially sub-optimal national asset portfolio. 
Consumption tax rates could then be set so as to recover the revenues required to pay 
those subsidies, and the tax schedules (and exclusions from “consumption”) could be 
implemented with whatever degree of progressive-ness in the rates that was deemed 
desirable on welfare redistribution grounds. 
The consumption tax proposal to which public finance economists widely subscribe 
compounds two distinct departures from most existing tax regimes’ treatment of human 
capital. First, it removes the tax disadvantage of human capital investments due to the 
difference between the non-deductibility of the direct cost component of human capital 
investment, in contrast with the deductions allowed for depreciation of tangible non-human 
capital. Second, by eliminating the taxation of labour income, it does away with the effects 
of progressive marginal taxation on the amount of human capital invested privately by 
individuals (both foregone earnings and direct educational and training costs). Both 
features of the proposed reform are mimicked by the less sweeping proposal to shift to a 
“flat tax” on wage income, with full deductibility of human capital costs. To be sure, the 
abandonment of progressive taxation is from some viewpoints the really radical aspect of 
the “flat tax” scheme; that aspect of the reformers’ proposal is not a logical requirement of 
shifting to consumption expenditures as the basis for taxation, instead of continuing to tax 
labour incomes. 
It may be pointed out, further, that eliminating the inefficiencies in resource allocation 
created by differential “tax wedges” (gaps between pre-tax and after-tax rates of return 
that vary according to the type of asset) is not an obviously compelling goal for tax policies 
to pursue. There often will be a trade-off between improving static economic welfare 
efficiency and “dynamic efficiency”. Putting this in less abstract terms, a consistent 
growth-promoting logic may be read in the tax treatment of investment so as to favour 
both shorter-lived tangible assets (and intangible non-human assets such as patents and 
software), and comparatively long-lived, intangible human capital on the other hand. In the 
first case the tax bias tends to promote rapid turnover of the tangible capital stock, and so 
tends to enlarge the market for producer goods that embody technological innovations; in 
the second case the tax bias works to compensate for the greater systematic 
obsolescence risks to which owners of human capital are exposed by policies that 
promote more rapid rates of advance of fundamental knowledge and technological 
progress. 
Conventional income taxation is based upon current earnings, rather than accrual 
accounting which typically applies to physical capital. Under the latter system, the returns 
from the investment are included in current income; the costs of the asset are capitalised 
(not immediately expensed) and depreciated at a rate reflecting its “economic service life”,  
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i.e., the temporal change in the present value of the remaining stream of returns; current 
depreciation charges are set against current income. Were accrual income taxes to be 
applied to human capital, the effect would be less favourable to investment in education 
and training than the conventional income tax regime, as Kaplow’s (1996) analysis shows. 
The reason simply is that such investments tilt the time-profile of earnings upwards, and 
conventional income taxes do not impose additional taxes on the implicit interest 
component of higher later returns – whereas an accrual income system would do so. 
One therefore can see that, under the conventional income taxation, human capital 
investments are a favoured vehicle for young households to transfer income (and 
consumption) into the future. Those that opt instead to begin saving immediately to meet 
for their future needs, would choose earnings profiles that were higher at the outset but 
flatter; but they therefore must do their savings out of current after-tax income, and also 
pay taxes on the interest income from their financial assets. The foregoing tax regime 
comparisons, however, focus only upon the effects of differences in the method of income 
accounting, and their implications for human capital are quite separable from those that 
derive from the structure of marginal tax rates. It will be seen that the latter exert a 
counter-acting force upon educational investments as a vehicle for income shifting. 
Putting to one side for the moment the (redistributive) equity grounds for progressive 
regimes of taxation, it is a defect of rising marginal income tax rates that they militate 
against investment in human capital. This effect is due entirely to the temporal positioning 
of this particular mode of saving within the household’s life-cycle. The expensing of 
foregone earnings costs, as well as any deductions that are allowed for direct education 
and training costs, comes during the early phase of workers’ lives, when incomes and 
marginal tax rates are low in any case. But, these investments, especially when 
supplemented by taking advantage of OJT options, generate a rising stream of labour 
earnings that are exposed to higher marginal rates under progressive tax regimes. The 
option of sheltering pension contributions (with equal pre-taxes rates of return), by 
comparison, provides a more attractive vehicle for personal savings. This is so because 
the tax implications of deferring income are exactly the opposite of those which apply in 
the case of education and training investments: pension proceeds typically are realised 
during retirement when earned income levels and marginal rates of income taxation are 
expected to be lower.  
Is the impact upon human capital investment really a serious drawback of the progressive 
taxation of labour incomes? The answer surely will be sensitive to how steeply marginal 
tax rates rise over the upward-sloping portion of typical earnings profiles. Nevertheless, 
differences in economists casual responses to this question appear to turn on their 
intuitions as to whether individuals’ behaviours in this regard more closely resembles the 
degree of inelasticity typical of household labour supply (in response to variations in 
marginal tax rates on wage income); or whether individuals’ educational choices exhibit 
the higher degree of sensitivity that financial investors typically display in response to 
changes in the spread between pre-tax and post-tax yields. 
Good “natural” experimental data might permit the foregoing question to be resolved 
empirically, but, in its absence, recent studies have turned to simulation models. The latter 
combine theoretical specifications and parameters estimated from microeconomic data, in 
order to create quantitative models of household behaviour that can be used to evaluate 
effects of hypothetical alternations in the regime of taxation. Following Heckman (1976), 
the paradigmatic approach to the problem postulates that individuals make educational 
investment decisions within the framework of a model of inter-temporal expected utility 
maximisation, subject to the constraints of a human capital production function and private  
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borrowing in perfect (financial) capital markets. Dupor et al. (1996), for example, 
econometrically estimate the parameters of a life-cycle human capital investment model of 
US white males (based upon synthetic cohort data for various educational attainment 
groups in the 1970 Census), and use these to simulate the effects of various tax regimes. 
According to the results obtained by Dupor et al. (1996), shifting from the mildly 
progressive US 1970 tax regime to a flat tax rate would raise the foregone wages that 
were invested in human capital by 7.2 percent among high school dropouts, 5.2 percent 
among high school graduates and 2.8 percent among college graduates. But, these 
findings are sensitive to the choice of a baseline tax regime (modelled on the 1970 tax 
code) that was not particularly progressive: the proportionate rise in the marginal tax rate 
over the life-cycle of the typical worker was approximately 4 percentage points. Under a 
different tax rate schedule in which there are sharp discontinuities – such as is the case 
under the US 1990 tax code’s rate increase from the 15 percent to the 28 percent level – 
the effect upon workers who would be pushed across a “kink” in the rate schedule is found 
to be much more marked. Human capital investment (foregone earnings) is reduced by as 
much as 22 percent. Overall, the simulation results that Dupor et al. obtain by substituting 
a flat tax schedule for progressive rates suggest that a 10 percent rise of the marginal tax 
rate over the increasing portion of the individual earnings profile has the effect of reducing 
investment in human capital by 15 percent. In other words, the (arc-) elasticity of 
education and training investment with respect to the marginal tax rate is roughly – 1.5.  
Partial vs. general equilibrium and the policy relevance of microeconomics: 
Up to this point, the discussion of generic fiscal policy implications has been preoccupied 
with conclusions derived from partial equilibrium studies. It has not considered what 
effects would ensue from altering the tax treatment of earnings derived from human 
capital investments in the context of general equilibrium models of capital accumulation. 
Quite obviously it is important to take account of the general equilibrium repercussions of 
tax policy changes. Over the long run it is possible that the immediate positive impact 
upon the level of human capital investments of setting lower tax rates on labour income – 
vis-à-vis taxes levied on the returns to physical capital – may well be substantially 
mitigated, if not completely nullified by the induced change in the economy’s asset 
portfolio. (This proposition is brought out in the work of Auerbach and Kotlikoff 1987, 
Davies and Whaley 1991, Heckman, Lochner and Taber 1998, and Trostel 1993.) 
It is not difficult to see why that would be so. In the absence of countervailing skill-
deepening biases in technological change, the induced increase of the pace of 
accumulation of human capital (in relationship to the supply of raw labour-power through 
population growth) should operate to depress the marginal productivity of additional 
educational training. This is a point that was noted in considering the historical 
experiences of the developed economies (see Part II.3, above). Furthermore, to the extent 
that the contemplated tax reforms induce agents to substitute human capital for physical 
capital investments, the long-run effect on the level of physical capital per worker in the 
economy would depress the marginal productivity of labour and drag down before-tax 
rates of return to human capital. The after-tax interest rate in the economy’s steady-state 
equilibrium, therefore, may not be affected by removing taxes on human capital 
investment (Trostel 1993). 
Dynamic general equilibrium considerations of this kind are particularly relevant when 
analysing fiscal policies in a closed economy setting. But, the case of large economies, in 
which the supply of savings and the age- and educational attainment distribution of the 
population are determined largely by endogenous forces in the domestic economy, must  
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be contrasted with the situation of a small open economy. There the conclusions of the 
foregoing partial equilibrium analyses are more applicable, because when international 
financial flows and labour migration are unobstructed they can operate in the long-run to 
peg the before-tax rates of return on human capital and physical capital investments. 
The implications of these “small, open economy” conditions for the use of taxes and 
subsidies as means of promoting human capital formation are not entirely straightforward, 
however. Whereas unrestricted international factor movements tend to give these fiscal 
instruments stronger long-run leverage over national capital formation, the very same 
conditions make it necessary to allow for the possibilities that national investments in 
human capital will not be tantamount to changes in available stocks of human resources 
and productivity growth in the domestic economy. This significant complication is one that 
must now be addressed (immediately below, in sub-section III.2.ii) by examining the direct 
and indirect impact that migration policies, including the tax treatment accorded to 
immigrants and emigrants, can have in shaping an open economy’s human capital 
endowment.  
(ii)  Migration policies and their relationship to human capital formation 
An extensive economic literature is devoted to the subject of international migration and 
its effects upon income in the sending countries (see, e.g., Bhagwati and Wilson 1989, 
World Bank 1995). The portions of it that are generally thought to be most immediately 
germane to policies affecting a region’s human capital endowments usually are focused 
upon the effects of so-called “brain drains”: the emigration of the more able, and more 
highly educated and skilled members of the population provides a form of windfall capital 
transfer to immigration regions. The latter can enjoy the benefits deriving from the 
newcomers’ knowledge and skills without having borne the associated costs of their 
education and training. Even had the latter investments not been subsidised in any way by 
their native country, so that the migrants and their families might be supposed to have 
borne the full educational investment costs and recouped the private returns, whatever 
positive externalities their presence in the labour force and the polity created would 
redound in the first instance to the advantage of the receiving nation. 
A country that already devotes considerable resources to domestic investment in human 
capital therefore must live under the spectre of a “brain drain” that will carry off cadres of 
highly educated personnel to other regions, where they are offered more attractive 
environments in which their talents and training can be employed. This was first identified 
as a worrisome economic issue in post-WWII Britain, where well qualified scientists, 
engineers and doctors were seen to be leaving home in search of more promising 
professional situations in America. More recently, renewed concerns about “brain drains” 
have focused upon the supposed damage that the phenomenon may do in developing 
countries, where already existing deficits in the human capital endowment are thought to 
be a major contributory factor in low productivity levels and poverty (see Bhagwati and 
Wilson 1989). Thus, the World Development Report (World Bank, 1995, p. 64) asks: “Can 
something be done to stop the exodus of trained workers from poorer countries?”  
Countermeasures against “brain drains”?: 
Such concerns are quite reasonable in some economic development contexts, especially 
those where there are critical scarcities of educated personnel required to maintain the 
minimal functions of a modern government, and to facilitate economic and political 
interactions with other, more economically advanced societies.   
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But, where there is substantial supply-side capability for expanding the numbers who can 
be trained, and the problem is one of insufficient private demand for investment in human 
capital, efforts to curtail out-migration of the highly trained may have counter-productive 
consequences. The effect may be to further weaken private incentives to invest in 
education. Conversely, there are conditions under which investment in human capital 
might be raised by allowing those whose expected earnings potentials would thereby be 
increased to chose to work abroad in order to realise such gains. This effect could affect 
the investment behaviour of a much larger portion of the population than would actually 
emigrate, and consequently could augment the impact of public subsidies for the types of 
education and training that would provide the skill qualifications required for overseas 
employment (see Stark and Wang 2000). 
The selectivity of emigration decisions, which often has been held to draw off the more 
innately able and enterprising members of the society in economically less developed 
regions, tends to be amplified by selective immigration policies in the higher income 
regions: such restrictions typically favour the admission of applicants who have obtained 
higher educational credentials, and thereby are likely also to select individuals from the 
upper tail of the (academic) ability distribution in the origin population. The negative 
externalities (which may be cultural and political in character as well as economic) that are 
entailed by their removal from their native land, may well be more palpable than the 
positive externalities they bring to their new society. 
One basis for this conjecture is that immigration societies typically are already more 
heterogeneous, than the individual societies from which they draw new members, and the 
selectivity of migration simply amplifies that difference by further homogenising the 
population who remain at home. Indeed, the greater diversity of peoples, and the wider 
variance in the array of economic opportunities created by the variegated array of human 
skills and tastes, is one feature of regions of in-migration (such as large metropolitan 
agglomerations) that renders them more attractive destination markets for newcomers 
who can invest further in job search when they arrive. The job-searcher is concerned with 
the value of the best among the employment opportunities that he or she will encounter, 
and, in any given sample of job openings, the expected extreme value tends to be larger 
where the relative dispersion of the underlying distribution of job offers is greater. (For 
models of migration cum local job search, see David 1974.)  
Selective immigration policies for raising the human capital endowment:  
Policy measures that are directed towards affecting the international movement of people 
potentially offer a far more controllable and faster mode of response to labour market 
demands that remain unmet by the gradually evolving domestic supply of suitably 
qualified personnel. There is a wide range of instruments that can be applied selectively in 
this connection: 
•  discretionary controls over visas and the issuance of employment permits, subsidies 
for passage and settlement costs, 
•  tax concessions for immigrants who are burdened by the repayment of educational 
loans, 
•  subsidised provision of schooling and social services to accommodate special needs 
of families of new immigrants, 
•  licensing requirements for professionals having obtained qualifications and certification 
in foreign countries,  
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•  requirements for “naturalisation” of the foreign born and for indefinite leave to remain 
in the country, and so forth. 
Obtaining reliable indicators of the likely effects of introducing differential treatments of 
this kind, both in terms of their influence on the characteristics of the arriving immigrants 
and the anticipated duration of their attachment to the country's workforce, generally will 
not be a simple matter – especially not without some experimentation. But, the costs of 
designing experimental immigration schemes, and of administering a system that features 
a multitude of different rules and entitlements, may be very substantial. 
Moreover, there are numerous vexing distributional issues raised by selective immigration 
policies. The arrival of a substantial number of skilled immigrants relative to the pre-
existing domestic supply would be most likely to prove beneficial in the short run for those 
who own complementary human and non-human assets. On the other hand, their 
competition in labour markets tends to lower the rates of remuneration received by the 
owners of assets for which they represent replacements, or very close substitutes. The 
immediate impacts on relative wage and salary rates are likely to be felt most strongly by 
domestic workers situated at the opposite extremes of the skill-spectrum.  
There is an offsetting income effect that also should be considered. Encouraging a 
substantial inflow of immigrants who have special, high-skill qualifications – such as those 
needed in computer programming for financial, banking and insurance industries, or for 
computational chemistry, and biogenetics research – would tend to lower the costs and 
raise the profitability of the domestic organisations that made intensive use of workers of 
that kind. If this attracted investment to expand capacity, the impact of expanding 
employment demand could be sufficient to counteract the downward relative price effect 
on the remuneration of new, domestically trained workers. There would be, in addition, a 
potential benefit for the industry’s customers, as well as for the vendors and owners of 
complementary physical capital equipment. Consequently, the impact of an inflow of 
trained workers from abroad upon the incipiently rising wage premia for workers with 
programmers’ skills will not necessarily result in a weakening of the long-run incentives for 
the domestic population to invest in such training.  
The considerations leading to that conclusion are likely to have greater force where there 
are threshold-effects, or minimum scale and critical density effects in the industries that 
make intensive use of workers with specific human capital qualifications. Inducing the 
immigration of qualified foreign workers in numbers sufficient to attain those critical levels, 
constitutes one path to initiating a cumulative process of growth in such industries. Were it 
to be made clear -- by explicitly stated “sunset” provisions – that the programmes and 
subsidies being offered to induce an inflow of suitable workers from abroad would not 
continue indefinitely, then the longer-term prospects of domestically trained workers to 
find future employment in the expanding industry would be more likely to elicit a 
subsequent accommodating expansion in the supply of domestically trained workers. 
What should be clear from the foregoing is that programs promoting selective immigration 
and tax policies promoting human capital formation in the domestic population should not 
be regarded automatically as substitutes, especially not when their effects are considered 
over a suitably extended time horizon. Nevertheless, where-ever the government of the 
day cannot credibly make policy commitments that are effectively binding upon future 
administrations (such as sunset provisions), the short-run substitution effects can be 
expected to be dominant. The two classes of policy measures consequently will be 
perceived correctly to be in conflict, and the instrumental value of both would be 
diminished, if not wholly vitiated. This point simply echoes the emphasis which the  
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preceding discussion of reforms in the taxation of human capital investments laid upon the 
government’s need to establish the credibility of its policy commitments in this area.  
(iii)  Human capital policies and retirement 
It is appropriate to close this section with a comment on a neglected topic: the role of 
human capital in retirement. In large part because straightforward methods of measuring 
the private (let alone the social) economic returns on human capital investments that yield 
payoffs when the individuals in question has ceased to engage in market employment, the 
economics literature has had little to say on the subject, as was stressed in section II.1. 
Nonetheless, peoples’ intangible capital needs do alter when they enter retirement. 
Voluntary retirement is occurring at earlier ages in the advanced, higher income 
economies, and the circumstances of formal retirement there entail both enlarged 
opportunities for non-market productive activities, and an increasing number of personal 
transactions with public and private bureaucracies, and greater sophistication concerning 
aspects of healthcare and medical technology.  
In view of the demographic trends towards the ageing of the population, and the growing 
importance of the time and resources that individuals devote to recreational pursuits and 
leisure-related consumption, the economics of “education for retirement” is a subject that 
would seem to merit more serious attention from the public sector. Although it is obvious 
that the social returns from such investments could not be expected in the form of 
increasing direct measured productivity on the part of the recipients, there may be 
significant economic “payoffs” that will be reflected in the improved cost-effectiveness of 
many of the private and public service organisations whose performance is affected by the 
characteristics of the elderly clientele with which they must interact. Enhancing the 
“capabilities” of those people is likely to yield significant gains in their well-being as well as 
reductions in the economic burden they place upon the working population. The geriatric 
literature is replete with testimony to the beneficial effects for the health and mental acuity 
of the elderly of continuing to utilise previously acquired skills, and of acquiring new ones. 
The Coordination Challenge: Aligning Human Capital and other 
Investments 
A general point on which modern growth theory and empirical observations quite clearly 
agree is that it is a tricky, delicate matter to establish a smoothly virtuous dynamic of 
positive feed-backs that will drive steady growth at the macroeconomic level. Looking 
below the long-term trends one finds periods of slowed and accelerated productivity 
advance, as well as episodes of under-utilisation of productive potentials and others that 
are marked by recurring inflationary pressure. 
Putting to one side questions of short-run demand management, the reason given by 
most recent contributors to growth theory to explain why maintaining a high growth rate 
path is such a challenge for a market economy is that the sources of social increasing 
returns to investment derive from “spill-over effects” of one kind or another. In an economy 
of any complexity, especially in one where there is decentralised decision-making and 
competition in many sectors, crucial positive spill-over effects created by technical 
complementarities and coordination of exchange transactions take place at the 
microeconomic level. Consequently, they must be underpinned largely by the 
development of mutually aligned expectations regarding the positive pecuniary 
externalities that will result from investments in a variety of durable productive assets. This 
will be the case especially where the “investment projects” that are required to achieve  
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complementarity between the characteristics of newly developing technologies and 
matching worker capabilities usually involve rather long periods of gestation. 
This leads, on one hand, to what some economic thinkers regard as the uncomfortably 
pessimistic conclusion that we should not expect a perfect, free market economy to arrive 
spontaneously at a sustainable set of such expectations. On the other hand, the “good 
news” – or, perhaps one should say, the less discouraging news – is that the important 
initiating and guiding function that exists to be filled in such situations is one that lies well 
within the scope of national government agencies that are already established in most 
countries, save for the poorest and smallest. Working in partnership with the private 
sector, public agencies may promote growth by facilitating better dynamic co-ordination. 
This involves increasing the flow of reliable information to shape mutually reinforcing 
expectations that, in turn will affect private investment decisions. Of course, financing for 
the necessary human capital components cannot effectively be left to either the 
households or the business sectors, for all of the reasons that already have been 
reviewed here.  
What will be required to shape expectations in this context is the publicising of the state’s 
credible commitments to undertake long-term programmes that offer subsidies for basic 
education and training investments, and provide assistance with the financing of 
continuing education and re-training. Furthermore, from the narrow resource allocation 
viewpoint it is obviously important that subsidies in this area should have a two-part 
structure: in addition to promoting general education in the population, they should aim to 
elicit further human capital formation which are aligned specifically with indicated broad 
trajectories of technological development, business reorganisation, and structural 
reorientation related to international trade specialisation. The latter, of course, ought to be 
identified on the grounds of being those holding the greatest promise for the economy’s 
future. 
Policies to Promote Catch-Up and Convergence through Human 
Capital Formation? 
NZ’s relative standing in the international ranking of countries by GDP per capita has 
slipped considerably over the course of the last quarter of the 20
th century. Without 
entering into the question of whether that is a serious problem in itself, or is symptomatic 
of conditions in the NZ economy that need to be addressed, one may ask what the 
findings of the macroeconomic growth literature offer by way of a general answer to this 
question: Is there a role for public policy to take, in generally encouraging a higher human 
capital formation rate as the means of enabling NZ’s economy to catch up with the 
productivity leaders?  
The first point to be made in this regard is that the empirical evidence from international 
comparisons suggests that it is the level, rather than the rate of growth of the average 
human capital endowments in a country that affects its productivity growth rate. Raising 
that level would therefore tend to accelerate the growth rate, and it appear that (other 
things being the same) such effects are stronger when the initial human capital-intensity is 
low than when it is already high. For an economy that starts from the latter, favourable 
position, the prospects of a big relative growth payoff from reaching a still higher general 
level of human capital-intensity do not appear particularly promising.  
Furthermore, at least in the near term the potentials for a country to catch up with the 
reigning international productivity leader(s) are not unqualified. Instead they are bounded 
by conditions that limit economic integration through trade and capital movements, as well  
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as cultural and institutional dissimilarities – including differences in political and legal 
institutions. Such heterogeneities appear to impede the easy and effective international 
transfer of technological and commercial capabilities. Rather than permitting those 
processes to occur in the manner of an undirected diffusion, those conditions, and others 
work to channel effective knowledge transfers much as they direct flows of labour and 
capital, guiding these along particular paths that have been formed through the past 
history of specific bilateral and multi-lateral international contacts. Cross-country economic 
convergence, in the form of the reduced relative dispersion of productivity and per capita 
real income levels, has thus been found to occur within “clusters” of countries both 
historically and in more recent times.  
The policy implications for a country that is already a member of a “convergence club” 
situated at the upper end of the international distribution of productivity and per capita real 
income level, would seem be to that it should eschew pursuing an across-the-board 
approach to reaching higher average educational attainment levels. Instead, government-
initiatives in the area of human capital formation should focus upon the opportunities and 
needs for selectively augmenting the capabilities of the work-age population. Enhancing 
capabilities for knowledge transfers and closer commercial integration with other “club 
members” whose endowments are complementary, and whose geographical locations are 
conductive to regular commodity trade and the circulation of expert personnel, is a 
strategy that would reinforce the already existing mechanisms that enable comparative 
laggard’s within the club to gain ground on its leading members.  
If subsidising higher and higher general education attainments in the population at large 
does not appear to be the indicated policy for an already comparatively well off, and highly 
educated population to accelerate the domestic economy’s productivity growth and catch 
up with the leaders, it may nonetheless be a strategy worth continuing as a means of 
protection against the possibility of falling farther behind. The broad rank ordering of 
economies according to their standing in the international distribution of labour productivity 
(and per capita output) levels exhibits considerable inertia over the span of several 
decades. A country’s maintenance of a high average level of educational attainment that 
is widely shared throughout its population appears to serve as a potent stabilising force 
against serious and prolonged decline in its relative per capita GDP standing. 
Nevertheless, nothing is guaranteed: the persistence of seemingly small differences in 
productivity growth rates can take a toll, and over the longer-term such differentials have 
resulted in some marked historical realignments in the rank ordering of nations by average 
levels of economic welfare. 
III.3  Human Capital Policy Implications for the New 
Zealand Economy  
The situation of the New Zealand economy is one that presents something of an anomaly 
in the context of modern generalisations about economic development and growth. The 
country has enjoyed moderately high levels of productivity and GDP per capita, in both 
absolute and comparative international terms. In many respects the economy’s historical 
development paralleled the early 19
th century experience of the US, Canada and Australia 
– the other predominantly English-speaking regions of European overseas settlement in 
that epoch. Like those regions, too, its early comparative prosperity, and ability to sustain 
a high standard of living in the face of rapid population growth, rested for a long time on 
the exploitation of the country’s primary resource base.   
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Settler society in 19
th century New Zealand was characterised by what for the times was 
an uncommonly high material standard of living, but also by an egalitarian income 
distribution, and democratic internal political traditions. Those unusual circumstances 
seem to have had much to do with the fact that the European part of the population and 
their descendants attained and sustained remarkably high rates of school enrolments and 
literacy from a very early point in the country’s history. By 1870 the NZ primary school 
enrolment rate, relative to the number of children ages 5-14, approached 70 percent – a 
level very close to that of the US, Switzerland and Prussia, the then world leaders. By 
1910 the country’s primary school enrolment rate had edged above the corresponding US 
rate and stood near the 90 percent mark (see Lindert 2000). 
Yet, New Zealand’s long-term growth path during the 20
th century has seen its level of 
labour productivity overtaken and surpassed by that of many of the high average income 
member states of the OECD; today the country stands around 24-25 places down in the 
international rank ordering based levels of per capita GDP. Having lost the favoured 
agricultural export niche that Britain’s market formerly provided, prior to its entering the EU 
and submitting to the Common Agricultural Policy, New Zealand is undergoing a slow 
process of transformation from a predominantly primary producer into an economy with an 
expanding service sector – without having passed through a stage of significant 
industrialisation. 
The country’s population still features a high average level of educational attainments by 
international standards, but the distribution of those attainments is rather skewed: at the 
low end there is an ethnic minority population (the Maori and Pacific Island peoples) 
among whom there are many without any educational qualifications at all, whereas among 
the educated elite there are many who have attained advanced postgraduate degrees. 
Although its economy remains dominated by primary production and related processing 
industries, these are highly sophisticated in their use of modern technologies for dairying 
and animal husbandry, etc., but the lack of a significant manufacturing base has left the 
country with a cadre of highly qualified scientific and technical workers that is quite small 
in absolute number (in the range of 3000–4000), comparatively more heavily stocked with 
agronomists and specialists in veterinary medicine than with engineers. 
New Zealand’s Situation: What Correspondence with Economic 
Growth Literature?  
It must be said straightaway that little of the macroeconomic growth theory literature (upon 
which the discussion in section II.2 is based) has an immediate bearing upon the 
circumstances of an economy such as the one just described. Virtually all the models of 
endogenous growth have been developed for economies that are closed to trade and 
therefore, presumably, have a sufficiently extensive and varied resource endowment to 
provide for their own consumption requirements. By implication it could be said that those 
growth models therefore apply more directly to the situation of large economies, there 
being two distinct senses of “large” that are worth remarking upon briefly in this context.  
The first of these concerns the relative importance of domestic sources of the growth of 
productive inputs – savings, population growth and human capital formation – in 
comparison with the magnitude of the supplies of those factors that are available to be 
drawn into the economy within a short time-span. A comparatively small region, such as 
New Zealand, typically faces highly elastic international factor supply conditions; and so 
long as regulations blocking the movements of labour and capital have not been imposed, 
international flows of those mobile resources can rapidly alter the country’s factor 
endowments, thereby permitting it to quickly change growth paths.   
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The policy implications for the NZ economy are immediately transparent, and this has 
already been recognised in section III.2, where a number of issues were examined for 
their bearing on the possibilities of affecting immigration rates selectively, and thereby 
adjusting a (small) country’s human capital portfolio. It may be added here that some 
further significance attaches to the international mobility of certain occupational groups 
within the NZ population. Extensive experience in travelling and living abroad (for study 
and professional purposes) is typical among the more highly educated stratum of NZ 
society, and it is ubiquitous among the country’s professional, business management and 
scientific and technical personnel. In regard to this aspect of “personal contacts and 
maintained foreign connections” which continued to be so important a complement to 
overseas telecommunications access, the NZ economy is very much open to global flows 
of both codified and tacit knowledge.  
There is, however, something of a linguistic and cultural “bias” in those connections: they 
are particularly strong in regard to exchanges with the US, Great Britain and the English-
speaking Commonwealth. That is largely a heritage from the past, when New Zealand 
was an “immigration economy”. Subsequent restrictive immigration policies, however, 
have left it less ethnically heterogeneous than other, larger commonwealth countries such 
as neighbouring Australia and remote Canada – the presence of the sizeable indigenous 
Maori population notwithstanding. But the other aspect of that historical legacy is that New 
Zealand’s citizens and residents offer a comparatively thin base of personal and kinship 
connections (“social capital”) to support the development of extensive commercial and 
financial transactions with the populous business communities of South-east and North-
east Asia, including the overseas Chinese. Whether this constitutes a disadvantage, in 
view of the effort to develop new bases of comparative advantage, and how the situation 
could best be redressed were it deemed to be an impediment to accessing Asian markets, 
are matters that may warrant further discussion.  
The second sense of an economy’s “smallness or largeness” has to do with the 
assumptions made by most of the endogenous growth literature concerning the nature 
and sources of technological change, and the access that agents in one country may have 
to scientific and technological knowledge that is generated elsewhere. What the growth 
models depict in this regard is the technological situation of a “global” economy, one that 
is closed in regard to knowledge flows and so must invest in R&D activities in order to 
generate a basis for continuing innovation. Such is not the situation in which New Zealand 
finds itself, although, as will be seen, this does not imply that the human capital policies of 
a small, open economy can simply ignore the need to invest in infrastructure and direct 
generation of new knowledge.  
Designing Taxes and Subsidies for Intangible Human Capital in a 
Small Open Economy 
A significant ex ante limitation has been placed upon the scope of the fiscal policy 
initiatives to be discussed here, inasmuch as they deal exclusively with intangible human 
formation through education and training investments. Consequently, nothing will be said 
regarding possible complementary and competing government actions immediately 
affecting investment in health care, occupational and consumer safety, or in economically 
motivated geographical mobility within NZ. Care should be taken that the effects of the 
design of programmes, and the tax treatment of those related human capital investments 
is not such as would tend to vitiate the force of the policies suggested here.  
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(i)  Full deductibility of education and training costs: a new reform proposal 
Several modifications of the income-tax system could augment New Zealand’s human 
capital resources, without requiring the potentially more disruptive and administratively 
more costly replacement of income taxation with a consumption tax regime. Our 
discussion of optimal and second-best tax policies, in the preceding section, II.2 (i), 
carries two major implications. One is that the principal goal of a partial fiscal reform 
should be the elimination of the differential tax treatment of human capital investments vis-
à-vis other forms of investment by households. A secondary, reinforcing objective is to 
mitigate the disincentive effects of progressive taxation of the interest component of the 
wage-income streams deriving from private investments in intangible human capital. 
The first of these objectives would be met by making all certified direct costs of education 
and training deductible from taxable wage income; whereas, the second objective can be 
reached (without altering the progressivity of existing tax schedules), by the device of 
shifting to a later point in the life-cycle the date at which such deductions from taxable 
income can be exercised by private individuals on whose behalf the direct educational 
expenditures were made. Under quite plausible assumptions about the time distribution of 
education-associated earnings differentials, it is feasible for the state – by acting as a 
financial intermediary in the market for human capital investments – eventually to recoup 
enough in extra tax revenues to do more than make up for allowing the individual to claim 
the deduction on their direct costs of education.  
To fix ideas here we may consider the simplest case, in which direct costs of educational 
investment are being met out of individual households’ current income flows, as would be 
true either when the young adult undergoing training had independent means, or received 
inter-vivos income transfers for the purpose from family members. Under the proposed 
scheme, neither the recipient nor the household that had borne these current direct costs 
would be allowed immediately to enjoy such tax savings as would be generated by 
claiming them as deductions from taxable income. Instead, the nominal value of the tax 
savings would be recorded in the current year’s tax return filed by the student, and would 
be credited to a new, non-transferrable government guaranteed account established in the 
name of that individual (identified by a taxpayer number). The novel asset thus created is 
an untaxed, interest-bearing educational (expense) deduction account – the UIBEDA (or, 
phonetically, “we-bedda”). 
Comprehensiveness is desirable in defining “direct costs” for these purposes. Thus, this 
category should be taken to include expenditures for tuition and educational fees, for 
textbooks, equipment and supplies purchased in connection with enrolment in formal 
training programmes and additional expenses for living away from one’s place of 
residence whilst engaged in education and training. If local tax authorities subsidise 
educational and vocational training programmes and use local excise and property taxes 
for that purpose, and all such taxes are not already treated as deductible under the 
national tax code, the fraction of local tax rates attributable to the subsidies can be 
announced by local authorities, and used by households to calculate an allowable 
deduction.  
The maximum life of these UIBEDAs would be set uniformly, with consideration given to 
the possibility that post-university professional education, and post-graduate training that 
would generate subsequent direct cost should similarly be “credited” in the account. The 
actual life of an account, however, would be a matter of the account-holder’s discretion, in 
that after some initial fixed waiting period from the date at which it was established, the 
account either could be liquidated, or that action could be further deferred.   
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Ideally, UIBEDAs should resemble a tax-free long-term bond in at least one respect: they 
grow at a fixed rate of interest (set at, say, the Treasury’s long-term borrowing rate in the 
year that the credit was established) through automatic reinvestment of yields, up to a 
maximum attainable surrender value. But, unlike bonds, they would not be transferable, 
they would not throw off any “coupon” yields prior to being “cashed in”, and they would 
have a variable surrender value even if held as long as was possible. 
The aggregate nominal value of an UIBEDA, that is, of the portfolio consisting of a bundle 
variously dated “certified deposits” (direct cost expenditures) each of which would be 
growing exponentially at their respective government bond rates, could be “cashed in” for 
the sole purpose of claiming deductions from the account-holder’s domestic NZ wage 
earnings. Once the UIBEDA had been thus broached, the stream of annual tax deductions 
would then resemble a term annuity, in having to be taken – whether in equal amounts (or 
according to some other pre-specified formula – over a fixed number of consecutive 
years. But unlike annuities, their monetary value would be the resulting tax-savings, and 
therefore would depend upon the account holder’s current earnings, given the stipulated 
tax rate schedule(s) that would apply to the UIBEDA account. 
The purpose of the foregoing provisions should be transparent enough. The benefits they 
offer in terms of tax-savings are intended to induce the account holder to make use of 
such capabilities as they gain through human capital investment, by working in NZ at the 
higher-income occupations that their education qualifies them to enter. The restrictions 
that have been imposed upon the way in which these benefits can be realised are meant 
to prevent tax-payers in high income brackets from benefiting by claiming a deduction for 
education-related expenditures in the name of other individuals, especially those who do 
not intend, or are unlikely ever to utilise that “investment” by working in New Zealand at 
subsequent dates.  
A further problematic issue they address is that an individual account holder might be 
myopically opportunistic, and so seek to “cash in” the deduction immediately upon 
completing her studies, after which she would permanently exit the NZ labour force. The 
minimum waiting period should serve to diminish the attractiveness of the scheme to such 
individuals.  
In addition, it would be desirable to provide the Treasury with greater predictability in the 
reduction of taxable incomes due to the liquidation of UIBEDAs and their conversion into 
an annuity-like stream of deductions in consecutive tax-years.  
The effective after-tax yield on UIBEDAs would thus be determined by three sets of 
conditions: the Treasury’s long-term borrowing rate, the degree of progressiveness in the 
income tax schedule, and the steepness of the individual’s earnings profile during the 
period following their education and training investments. The first two of these being 
under the government’s control, it is important that the rates in effect at the time the 
particular individual’s account was established remain fixed throughout its life, whether or 
not they actually changed. Keeping track of the implicit fiscal obligations of the Treasury in 
respect to the credits in these accounts will not pose any real burden for modern financial 
information systems.  
For such a programme to be effective it would be essential that statutory provisions be 
made to prevent subsequent changes from altering the government’s obligations to the 
account holders, whether by executive or legislative action. The terms of individual 
UIBEDA accounts, apart from the necessarily variable current government nominal 
borrowing rate that establishes the yield on deduction credits, should thus remain fixed  
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throughout the life of the UIBEDA account. Of course, establishing a reasonable measure 
of “credible commitment” would not require binding future governments from altering tax 
rates, or changing the expenditure eligibility provisions which were applied in the cases of 
individuals newly entering the system. Conceptually, what is appropriate is to render these 
assets as secure from the risk of default as government guaranteed bonds. 
Domestic inflation is a form of “constructive default” on the part of the state, but, in view of 
the fact that the great bulk of the UIBEDAs will represent future deduction claims by tax-
paying residents, it would be sufficient to fix the real yield on deductions credited to these 
accounts and index the accounts’ value to the domestic consumer price index. There 
would be no need to provide separate protection against the risk of depreciation in the 
country’s currency vis-à-vis other currencies. 
For administrative simplicity, and to give the programme greatest initial impact, it would be 
desirable for “sunset provisions” to be specified at the inception of the UIBEDA scheme, 
and for the major features of the programme to remain fixed for a stipulated period, say 10 
years. By thus creating a fixed temporal window during which individuals would be 
assured of being able to enter this programme, families would be encouraged to take 
advantage of it in their long-term planning. The intention underlying this feature is to 
create a future “opportunity” that would affect decisions not only about investment in the 
further education of secondary school-leavers and university graduates, but one whose 
existence also would exert an influence on families’ attitudes towards preparatory 
schooling at the secondary level.  
From the foregoing it should be apparent that the novel instruments (UIBEDAs) created 
under such a reform would work to offset the taxation of the interest component in the 
returns on investment in human capital, But, in addition, because their value is increased 
by utilising that asset in employment at higher earnings rates within the NZ economy, they 
add to agents’ incentives to use their skills at home. UIBEDAs therefore have the 
expected effect of raising future tax revenues derived from whatever public subsidies had 
been given to the individuals during their education in New Zealand. 
Moreover, it also may be seen that once the administrative apparatus for such a scheme 
is in place, the way would be prepared to replace heavy government subsidisation of the 
direct (tuition) costs of university instruction by a programme of government guaranteed 
student loans. In general the incidence of direct government subsidies for education 
provided by public institutions is regressive in its effects upon the taxpaying population, for 
higher income households tend to be in a better position than are the poor when it comes 
to taking advantage of the benefits it conveys. Loan financing creates the opportunity to 
remove this regressive feature of the provision of higher education through publicly 
supported educational institutions, and replace it by a policy that was redistributive in 
favour of the economically disadvantages. 
By extending the scheme contemplated here, it would be entirely feasible, as well as 
desirable on social and economic grounds, to make zero- or low-interest loans available to 
finance the direct human capital investment costs of low-income individuals. This could be 
readily done, by allowing a mixture of deferred deductions and deferred tax credits for the 
amortisation of those loans. Following “financial needs-blind” university admissions, as in 
the case of other educational borrowing options, the subsidies provided to individuals 
should be made available on a means-tested basis. They ought to be large enough to 
finance the larger, indirect costs of the investment, namely, the foregone earnings of 
individuals from low-income households whose need for the labour market earnings of  
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their young members would otherwise discourage the latter from pursuing post-high 
school, or post-university training. 
In order to make clear what would be entailed in altering the tax regime in this way, and, 
particularly, the nature of the empirical and institutional details that would have to be 
considered in designing a scheme of reforms that was implementable in practice, it would 
be necessary, in effect, to set out in considerably greater detail the features of a “reform” 
programme of the sort that is contemplated. A recently prepared memorandum by David 
(2001) does that, but to pursue those details would go beyond the bounds of this report, 
and further expand an already lengthy discussion of this proposal. 
(ii)  Fiscal measures affecting selective immigration flows 
The foregoing proposals to encourage private investment in further education and training 
by permitting full deductibility of eligible direct and indirect expenditures lend themselves 
readily to implementation in an open economy context. Arguments already have been 
advanced, above in section III.2(ii), against the imposition of restrictions on the freedom of 
recipients of educational subsidies to emigrate and take up employments abroad. It 
should be noticed that the structure of the UIBEDA scheme not only accommodates that 
policy position, but would allow such individuals to establish accounts whose future value 
constitutes an inducement for them to return to work in New Zealand after gaining further 
training and work experience abroad.  
Thus, the UIBEDA may be seen as a means of encouraging the voluntary repatriation of 
New Zealanders who have acquired knowledge, skills and overseas connections that are 
likely to be of considerable value in domestic employment. The structure of the benefits 
provided in the form of income deductions, further, makes this option particularly attractive 
to individuals in the age range between 35 and 45, for whom relocation costs otherwise 
might prove a disincentive that New Zealand firms would have to overcome in order to 
recruit them. Although it is likely that such individuals would have made further, indirect 
investments in human capital whilst working outside the country, there are no compelling 
reasons to make such expenditures eligible for further deduction credits in their UIBEDA 
accounts. Closing that option not only has the virtue of eliminating a source of 
considerable administrative costs, but creates a marginal incentive to take up employment 
at home after graduation from university, and thereby benefit from the additional 
deductibility of investments in further education and on-the-job training. 
The provisions of the UIBEDA scheme also lend themselves quite naturally to use as an 
instrument for encouraging selective immigration of people who received education and 
training investments in other parts of the world. The mechanism of selection available to 
the government in this case is the determination of the list of eligible institutions, and the 
date of receipt of specified degrees and competence certifications will be accepted as 
qualifying them to set up a UIBEDA account when they first enter employment in New 
Zealand. Evidence would also have to be submitted to establish the direct expenditures 
incurred overseas in connection with obtaining those credentials. For administrative 
simplicity, however, no deduction credits would be allowed for indirect investments in the 
form of foregone earnings.  
Some foreign governments, or business sponsors of university education and other 
specialised vocational instruction impose debt obligations upon the recipients, and their 
family members, and require that they repay those before they are at liberty to take 
employment abroad; in other cases debts are incurred for overseas training, and these 
must be repaid in a lump sum if the individual does not return to take up employment in  
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his or her country of origin. Where foreign nations have made provision for the 
extinguishing of such educational debts as a condition for permission to emigrate, or 
remain abroad in employment, it would be appropriate for New Zealand to supplement the 
UIBEDA scheme by allowing the debtors to obtain deduction credits for the formal re-
financing of their educational debt obligations. 
In effect, immigrants with “approved” educational credentials could be made eligible (upon 
entering NZ employment) to receive educational loans in the amount of their pre-existing 
indebtedness on the same terms as are available to residents, provided those monies are 
used to extinguish their previously incurred debts. Upon doing so, the full amount of such 
outlays could be made the basis on which UIBEDA credits would be accumulated. A more 
cautious approach also might be adopted, to increase the probability that the re-financing 
loans would be repaid: UIBEDA credits would be granted only upon production of 
evidence of actual loan repayments. In principle it would be possible to implement such a 
scheme using private lenders for the re-financing activity, with some government 
guarantees to keep interest rates at the same level as those being offered to NZ students. 
Depending upon the scale of the programme, the costs of administering the re-finance 
arrangements for emigrants might be reduced were the state itself to take the financial 
intermediation role, and establish UIBEDA credits automatically as a step in the 
repayment process. 
The intention of the foregoing proposals is to place another (fiscal) tool in the hands of the 
government which can be utilised to encourage a rapid inflow of migrants that can not only 
raise the average human capital endowment of the working age population, but do so in a 
controlled and selectively targeted manner. Immigration, as has been pointed out 
previously, offers the most direct and flexible means of transforming labour market 
conditions to facilitate particular lines of economic expansion and alter perceptions among 
the domestic population of future career opportunities that would warrant their investing in 
human capital formation. Although a wide array of other instruments has been identified 
(in section II.2(ii)) as permitting selectivity in this regard, many of them entail granting 
differential access or subsidies to social services and therefore are more likely to elicit 
resentments from members of the citizenry to whom such benefits are not available. 
Moreover, coordinating the administration of such programs might require establishing a 
special, integrated agency dealing with housing, language instruction and family services 
to be handled with the special needs of various categories of immigrants. Therefore, it 
appears to be far more efficient and transparent an arrangement to confine the selective 
instruments to the fiscal sphere, as has been proposed here, and provide social services 
that meet the needs of immigrants on the same criteria that apply to the rest of the 
population.   
(iii)  Tax credits and subsidies for cooperative business investments in job-
specific training  
In order to guide a country’s public policies affecting the extent and forms of investment in 
human capital beyond general, formal educational training, it would be desirable first to 
have ascertained empirically whether or not job-specific capital accumulation – through 
learning-by-doing and formal on-the-job training programmes (OJT) – was important in the 
occupations and industrial sectors that are of particular interest. The existence of 
experience-based “learning” that might not be entirely appropriated by the employing firm 
has a bearing also on several issues of “industrial” policy.  
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Granting subsidies for the adoption of new technologies whose use entails special 
workforce skills, for example, can be rationalised on the argument that firms that are early 
adopters may be providing benefits for subsequent competitors, who would draw upon an 
already-formed pool of skilled workers. Such a line of reasoning could apply not only 
where training in the use of truly novel technologies was involved, but, equally to policies 
of granting “import patents” (a form of monopoly franchise) to establish a known industrial 
production process, or research technique, in a new location. 
The classic “infant industries” argument for tariff protection thus can be recast in a form 
that makes the existence of on-the-job learning externalities critical for its justification. 
Where learning spill-overs do not require the multiplication of production facilities as 
training sites, direct subsidies generally would dominate infant industry protection by 
means of tariffs levied on imports (see, e.g., David 1970). Similarly, the promotion of 
import substitution through awards of patent monopolies is a second-best policy that is 
more readily justified where learning by “pioneer” or “pilot” firms in the market gives rise to 
strong and widespread knowledge spill-overs (see David and Olsen 1992).   
Unfortunately, as was previously noted in Part II, sect.1(3), the unambiguous empirical 
identification of micro-level learning effects in data collected for other purposes has 
proved difficult, except in some rather special circumstances that leave doubts as to the 
validity of generalising from those findings. Consequently, systematic sample survey data 
from interviews conducted at the business establishment level are likely to remain the 
most practical, widely applicable solution to the challenge of informing the design of public 
policies concerning OJT investment. From such sources it may be possible, at least, to 
learn more for particular industries and sectors about the extent of the gaps that exist 
between average practice and what might be viewed as “best practice” training policies. 
The latter can be gauged by inter-firm comparisons as to the scale, per worker costs, and 
the nature and modes of training; and before-and-after comparisons the distributions of 
workers’ performance, and rates of job among the trainees. 
It is indeed a pity that greater empirical attention has not been given to examining intra-
industry variability of businesses’ training practices and their comparative merits and 
costs, because it seems clear that in contrast with the longer-term effects of lifting the 
general quality of the workforce through schooling investments directed to the young, 
public subsidisation of OJT human capital formation undertaken jointly by employers and 
workers offers the prospect of much quicker payoffs. The latter may well bring positive 
externalities, by affecting not only the trainee’s productivity performance within their firm, 
but by easing skilled labour supply constraints upon the diffusion of new production 
methods, and inducing greater investment in the physical plant and equipment that 
embodies new technologies. 
At the same time, it must be recognised that OJT investments are in general less 
amenable to standardised modes of training, far more heterogeneous in the content of 
what is to be learned, and less amenable to external monitoring, than are physical capital 
formation projects. Of course, it is in the interest of employers, as a rule, to make such 
investments in the most effective form possible if they internalise the benefits – whether 
they are spending their own money or funds provided by public agencies. Thus, a good 
case can be made for avoiding government micro-managing, or even certification of the 
forms of training that will be subsidised. 
On the other side of the argument, survey data as well as casual observation indicate the 
existence of wide and unjustified inter-firm and inter-establishment variations in training 
practices, and thereby provide empirical ground for inferring that there is significant under- 
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investment in information about best practice training methods, and that private incentives 
to share knowledge about the details of successful training methods remain inadequate. 
Hence, proactive provisions for information exchanges, at very least, ought to receive 
support from public funds or be made a condition of receipt of public subsidies offered 
under the terms of other public programmes directed to small and medium size 
businesses. 
One way in which this latter objective would be achieved is by allowing employers to form 
cooperative training associations, whose activities would receive matching public funding 
according to a pre-determined formula for this form of fixed investment in building 
information infrastructures. In effect, such organisations would be “clubs” engaged in the 
voluntary production of a public goods of two kinds: knowledge about effective methods of 
training and retraining employees, and the actual augmented supply of workers suitably 
trained to take up employment in firms other than those where they were trained. 
Direct subsidisation of private investments through tax credits for incremental training 
expenditures, would not be inappropriate here, inasmuch as the efforts of these 
associations yielded public goods whose benefits could be shared by “non-club” firms 
(and their workers). The analytical argument for this is completely analogous to that which 
has been developed in the case of tax credits for private R&D outlays. The pertinent 
empirical question, therefore, is whether the marginal social rate of return on such 
subsidies matches that yielded by other public uses of tax revenue. More concretely, it 
would be relevant to ask whether the impact of such tax credits in inducing additional 
training investments by firms would turn out to match the level of effectiveness that recent 
econometric studies at the microeconomic level have found for the case of R&D (see Hall 
and van Reenen, 2000).  
The rules of the proposed cooperative training associations would establish a two-part 
structure for the contributions of member firms: the fixed part being uniform, and the 
variable portion rising with the absolute growth in the total employment roster of the firm. 
The effect of the latter, beyond assessing costs in a manner related to the benefits (which 
would tend to enable successful enterprises to expand production and employment), 
would be to create an added incentive – beyond that of the tax credits – for each firm to 
upgrade the skill level of its existing employed workforce.  
Firms’ contributions to these organisations’ outlays should be treated as fully expensed, in 
keeping with general principles of taxing consumption rather than investments. 
Furthermore, the work of the training association could be reinforced by automatically 
allowing full deductibility of the foregone earnings costs incurred by the trainees enrolled 
in these “approved” training institutions. That, of course, would be more immediately 
feasible were the scheme to be implemented in conjunction with a tax incentive 
programme aiming to encourage prospective workers to undertake further investment in 
acquiring specific skills, along the lines of the UIBEDA programme that has been 
proposed in the preceding sub-section.  
Romer (1993), in calling for the formation of “self-organised industry investment boards” 
that would sponsor both R&D and specialised training programmes, has put forward a 
proposal that is similar to this one in spirit, if not in its details. A problematic feature that is 
common to both proposals, however, is the need for the internal decision structure of such 
organisations, as well as their actual patterns of investments, to be closely monitored by 
the authorities responsible for the enforcement of competition policy. Lacking that 
precautionary measure, it would be quite possible for these organisations to become 
vehicles for employers’ cartels, restraining the participants’ abilities and readiness to  
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compete through the introduction of new technologies and products requiring specialised 
worker training, as well as through the recruitment of workers with better qualifications.  
Another, closely related worry is that the larger firms within these “boards” and 
“associations”, by virtue of the greater initial dependence of the club’s activities upon their 
financial contributions and managerial expertise, would in all likelihood exert greater 
political leverage upon their internal political proceedings. There thus is a definite risk of 
the “capture” of these associations by their dominant members, and the direction of the 
organisations’ collective activities towards projects whose direct or indirect effects 
reinforced the industry position of these incumbents against the challenges posed by 
rapidly growing entrants. This particular risk would need to be contained by some 
combination of supervised internal rules and external monitoring. There are precedents for 
the effectiveness of the latter instruments: in the organisational regulations adopted upon 
voluntary standards development bodies by the American National Institute of Standards 
(ANSI); and in the recourse that individual firms have under U.S. anti-trust law to private 
damage suits when standards-writing bodies are found to have acted in an anti-
competitive manner (see, e.g., David and Shurmer 1996, and references therein). 
Knowledge Infrastructure Policies for a Small Open Economy 
In a large economy, the government enjoys greater scope to focus national science and 
technology policy inwards, placing greater emphasis on the indigenous creation of new 
knowledge and capturing the rents on such investments through the protection of 
intellectual property rights. Correspondingly, rather less attention may be devoted to 
identifying and absorbing such knowledge from abroad. Of course, an efficient system 
providing access to relevant scientific and technological data, and reducing the costs 
associated with their domestic distribution remain important. Not only do such facilities as 
on-line access to databases – of patent filings, scientific working papers and archival 
publications, and the like – help firms to monitor developments that could enable overseas 
and domestic competitors to attack their market positions. In a growing number of 
industrial sectors, ready access to such information also is essential in translating new 
discoveries and inventions into new commercial opportunities. As David and Foray (1995, 
p. 91) recently argued in an OECD report, “knowledge distribution is the crucial issue in 
the relationship between the stock of knowledge and the flow of innovation” [emphasis 
added]. 
What this view implies for a small, open economy is that economic growth policies 
affecting the national institutional knowledge infrastructure should be directed primarily 
towards the goal of providing potential innovators with greater access to the relevant 
global knowledge bases. The proximate goal is to increase the rate of assimilation of the 
large additions to reliable knowledge that are accumulating in the world at large, and 
which are likely to prove relevant to enhancing the capabilities of the country’s population. 
Among the obvious material benefits from this, one would expect some of this information 
to be applicable in generating technological innovations at home, and adapting for local 
implementation innovations that were being commercialised elsewhere. But no less 
important, from either the perspectives of individual human well-being or global economic 
welfare, are the positive consequences of educationally preparing members of society to 
pursue the realisation of their talents and aspirations in endeavours that might well carry 
them into the wider world. 
Thus, in countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands and New Zealand, domestic science 
and engineering capacity cannot be expected to push the frontier of knowledge sufficiently 
fast to keep up with the much greater research efforts and opportunities for field  
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experimentation in the world’s larger countries. The aim of innovation infrastructure policy 
in such circumstances, therefore, should be to effectively “plug in” as much of the 
economy as is possible to the rest of the world, especially in the domains of information 
and technological know-how. There is an important exception to this prescription: 
substantial domestic investments in the generation of knowledge may be called for to 
support those local industries that have no major foreign counterparts, or where prior 
experience has established that little in the way of relevant scientific and engineering 
advances will be forthcoming from external R&D efforts.  
To promote the general goal of improving the distribution and utilisation of knowledge 
requires specific policies that seek to overcome the obstacles arising from a variety of 
conditions. Thus:  
•  government subsidies may be required to finance the access costs to building up 
“information structures”; 
•   in order to tap into the large body of uncodified and possibly tacit knowledge, it may 
be necessary to send people for training overseas; 
•  otherwise, as has been suggested already, immigration by foreign workers who have 
the appropriate skills must be encouraged; 
•  intellectual property rights (e.g. copyright, patent, and trade-secrecy laws) must be 
seen as “a vehicle of cooperation and investment coordination to expand productive 
capacities”, rather than as a stream of monopolistic profits that restrict knowledge 
distribution; 
•  special “bridging” institutions – such as multi-disciplinary technology development 
centres, business incubators, and “science parks” that promote university-industry, or 
public institute-industry research collaborations may be required to surmount other, 
institutional impediments to knowledge access.  
The extensive recent literature that has been devoted to each of the foregoing topics 
notwithstanding, it remains far from clear that there exists an optimal set of public 
schemes (“best practice policies”) to induce and assist agents to access external 
knowledge resources as a strategy for enhancing productivity. The frequency with which 
mixed or negative results emerge in case studies of widely different technology transfer 
programmes, points to the existence of numerous pitfalls in designing such policies. Even 
though it is tedious (as well as disheartening) to catalogue and seek to generalise about 
the multitude of “things that don’t work”, such experiences can provide useful cautions for 
policy-makers, and therefore ought not to be ignored. 
A pair of recent case studies, selected more or less at random, can serve to illustrate this 
point, and to inject a note of caution regarding the current enthusiasm in many policy 
circles for engaging the resources scientists and engineers engaged in the public sector 
(whether in universities or government institutes and laboratories) in “transferring” 
technological knowledge to commercial firms. Harmon, et al. (1997) examine the 
experiences of efforts to transfer technologies developed at the University of Minnesota to 
firms. They present evidence for approaching technology transfer as a collaborative 
activity that is less effectively carried on outside an established network of formal and 
informal relationships; success entails "network building and relationship marketing 
efforts”. 
This view contrasts with the approach to technology transfers as “arms length”, buy-sell 
transactions between university research units and firms. The latter conceptualisation has 
encouraged concentration on the provision of “on-line” information about technology  
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offerings, with the goal of enabling potential developers and users to conduct more 
technically informative searches at lower cost. The latter undoubtedly is important, but it is 
observed that as a rule university-industry collaborative research entities are ill-situated to 
engage in effective “relationship marketing” activities of the sort that emerge between 
successful vendors of new technologies and their clients. 
One source of this disability is the conflicts with other missions of the university that 
circumscribe the ability of universities to make legal commitments to industrial “partners” 
which, as a practical matter could be fulfilled only if administrators possessed the power to 
direct faculty researchers to develop the close and continuing connections with their 
industrial counterparts. Yet, from studies such as the one just cited, it appears that such 
connections are likely to be required with each of the organisations to which technological 
capabilities are to be “transferred”, especially in fields where the technical knowledge is 
complex and undergoing rapid modification (see, e.g., David 1997: esp., pp. 22-24). Were 
university administrators not dissuaded from entering them by the inherent conflicts of 
institutional interests, it also is the case that passive provision of information about 
“technology offerings” constitutes an activity that absorbs far less administrative resources 
in monitoring and reporting the operations of “technology management/transfer” offices.  
In another recent study, Bessant (1999) evaluates a UK programme called “Supernet”, 
which aimed at improving the access of SMEs to research centres. His findings 
emphasise the need for better understanding of the nature and distribution of SME 
demands for technological support. This was particularly important because the 
programme’s performance evaluation judged it to be a failure when requests for 
technological information failed to match the designers’ expectations as to the number of 
SMEs that would be helped by the project, as well as the type of information they 
required. This sort of information is essential in designing effective schemes, because (in 
the absence of pre-selection) the population of potential clients is extremely 
heterogeneous. Some SMEs have no need for technology support at all, whereas others 
will “already know what they need and why”, so that some subsidisation of costs and sign-
posting may be sufficient. Yet, there also are likely to be firms in need of sustained, 
interactive consultancy relationships in order for them to understand and articulate a 
technological strategy that has reasonable chances of success. 
A general point that emerges in this case study is that the transfer-promoting organisation 
must be designed so that it has strong incentives to invest resources in improving its own 
knowledge – about the distribution of “customer” needs. Unfortunately, this is not an 
orientation that automatically characterises agents and agencies that see themselves as, 
and work to promote the perception in others that they are repositories and disseminators 
of knowledge. What might follow from that observation is an organisational design policy 
that structured the budgets of “technology transfer programmes” in terms of an array of 
differentiated services that it provided, with correspondingly differentiated costs and 
activity levels for each category. This would create incentives for undertaking initial 
“market research”, and for periodically updating survey information on the population of 
potential clients as a basis for subsequent budget adjustments. 
Detailed characterisation of the relevant technological knowledge bases for existing and 
prospective lines of production would be needed to structure more specific policy 
implications regarding the form of “knowledge infrastructure” investments that would be 
most appropriate in the case of any particular economy. Thus, given the resource 
endowments and industrial structure of New Zealand’s economy, concentrating on close, 
participatory monitoring of global advances in certain branches of the life sciences, 
including biotechnology, plant and animal genome sequencing, cloning techniques,  
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clinical areas of veterinary medicine, and related disciplines, would appear more 
economically relevant (at least at first consideration) than would, say, comparable 
attention being given to developments in robotic engineering, high temperature 
superconductivity, and quantum computing. The implication is clear that such 
considerations ought to enter into the targeting of domestic knowledge infrastructure 
support, and cooperative agreements with other countries for the use of advanced training 
facilities, exchanges of graduate and post-graduate students and research personnel. 
Equally clearly, in fields where the objective is to create a capability for discovery and 
innovation, passive acquisition of information from external sources is not a pragmatic 
option. The consensus of the theoretical and empirical economics literature is that only 
exceptionally can the absorption of knowledge that is useful for such applied purposes be 
accomplished solely on the basis of codified material available in published sources (see 
Cowan, David and Foray 2000). For a variety of reasons, much relevant complementary 
knowledge pertaining to recent research advances remains uncodified, and therefore 
costly to transfer; often it must be acquired through personal exchanges among 
individuals and teams qualified as participants in highly specialised international research 
communities. These are not costs that can be readily avoided. 
In place of the traditional view of non-rival, public knowledge diffusing automatically and 
instantaneously, it is now recognised that significant portions of industrially relevant data 
are characterised by a considerable degree of “stickiness”. As a result, informational spill-
overs remain localised within large multi-establishment corporations, consortia and other 
inter-organisational research networks, and geographically “clustered” agglomerations of 
small and medium size enterprises (see, e.g., David, Foray and Steinmueller 1999). 
Although it may be feasible for New Zealand to make itself the site of one or two such 
nodal “clusters” for research-oriented firms in the Southeast Asian region, the country’s 
physical remoteness suggests emphasising an alternative strategy. This would combine 
the provision of greatly enhanced digital communications capacity through high-speed 
electronic network connections, and public support for extensive overseas exchanges of 
research personnel. In a sense, then, the indicated direction of knowledge infrastructure 
investments represents a continuation, modernisation and elaboration of the educational 
policies of subsidising overseas studies and scholarly exchange, in which New Zealand 
historically has engaged.  
Human Capital Policy and the Economically Disadvantaged Minorities 
New Zealand’s long history of near universal mass education starting at the primary level, 
and then moving rapidly on to secondary schooling in the first quarter of the 20
th century, 
as did the US, formed a base for the subsequent high average level of educational 
attainment in the majority of the population. But, this history was not shared with the 
indigenous population of Maori.  
Recent data on the educational, health and employment characteristics of the different 
ethnic groups in New Zealand document the well-recognised pattern of economic 
disadvantage that exists among Maori and Pacific peoples, vis-à-vis the majority of the 
population. The patterns of educational difference among the ethnic groups are striking 
and are worth describing in some detail. 
According to data published by the NZ Ministry of Research, Science and Technology 
(1998) among the population of European descent, 21.5 percent have a tertiary education, 
whereas the same is true for only 8.3 percent of Maori and 5.5 percent of Pacific peoples. 
The third non-European ethnic minority is the Asian people, who comprise only a small  
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proportion of the total population and are atypical in having the highest fraction of their 
number educated at the tertiary level. This same pattern is repeated in the respective 
ethnic population proportions reported as having no educational qualifications at all: 24.7 
percent among the European group, whereas among Maori and Pacific peoples the 
proportions are twice as high – at 50.3 and 52.6 percent, respectively.  
One may infer that the pattern exhibited by the ethnic differentials in the population’s 
educational attainments at the university level is not likely to alter appreciably, at least not 
if current schooling rates remain unaltered. The tertiary school entry rate among Maori 
high school graduates is down to the 22 percent level, less than one-half of the 
corresponding figure among non-Maori, but a still more marked relative differential 
appears between the two populations in regard to the type of tertiary education institutions 
they attend: only 8 percent of Maoris enter a university rather than attending a 
polytechnic, whereas about 25 percent of non-Maori do so. As a proportion of the 
numbers entering tertiary education directly from secondary school, university entrants 
account for well more than one-half (0.55) of non-Maori students coming directly out of 
secondary schools; whereas the corresponding proportion among Maori students is only 
0.36. (See, Ministry of Maori Development 2000, for this and the following statistical 
material.) 
The same government statistical source reveals that these ethnic disparities are already 
evident at the very beginning of the educational process: even in early childhood, the pre-
school enrolment rate (for 3- to 4-year-olds) is 98.4 percent among non-Maori, and only 
65.2 percent among Maori – a difference of over 30 percent points. The gap becomes 
smaller at the next, primary education stage, but the secondary school retention rates still 
show Maori being 20 percentage points below the 89 percent average retention rate that 
prevails among the rest of the population; a gap of the same proportions (23 percentage 
points) persists between the rates at which the two groups enter formal tertiary education 
directly from secondary school. 
Parallel differences appear among the groups in regard to their tangible human capital 
situations, as may be seen from the various health indicators in a recent document 
published by the NZ Ministry of Maori Development (2000): Maori life expectancies are 
lower, while average infant mortality rates are higher, as are coronary heart disease and 
lung cancer death rates compared with those among non-Maori. Not surprisingly, 
opportunities for on-the-job training which would lead to higher earnings, are 
correspondingly different among the two sub-populations. Maori have consistently lower 
age-specific labour force participation rates than the rest of the population, lower median 
hourly earnings from wages and salaries in most occupations, and they are concentrated 
at the low end of the distribution of personal and household weekly incomes’ distributions 
(see Ministry of Maori Development, 2000).  
Efforts clearly have been under way to address this situation. The gap between Maori and 
non-Maori in the shares of the working age population that lack any schooling 
qualifications has narrowed more or less continuously from c. 27 percentage points in 
1986 to the 20 percentage point level in 1998 (Chapple 2000: p. 12). At present the 
proportion of Maori who participate in the Training Opportunities Programme is almost 
four times larger than the corresponding proportion of non-Maori. A hopeful prospect may 
be formed from such indicators, and when the situation is viewed from a truly historical 
perspective there are grounds for optimism about the eventual outcome of the 
transformations that have been underway in NZ society to eradicate persisting socio-
economic disparities between Maori and non-Maori.  
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Indeed, the trends in a variety of demographic and socio-economic indicators since the 
1920s point not only to secular gains in average absolute levels of material wellbeing 
among Maori, but to gains relative to the levels characterising the non-Maori majority. The 
process of rapid urbanisation following WWII brought improvements associated with 
access to better schooling, better housing, better health service, and better jobs than had 
been available to Maori in rural areas. As Chapple (2000: p. 2) points out: “[t]he post-
1970s Maori population is in absolute terms larger, per capita materially wealthier, and 
has a higher life expectancy than at any other time in New Zealand’s history”.  
Yet, significant disparities remain, as has been noted, and a more detailed examination of 
the recent data reveals that the slowing down of New Zealand’s economic growth, and the 
rising unemployment rates during the latter 1980s significantly arrested the country’s 
progress towards socio-economic convergence. There undoubtedly was some recovery in 
this regard during the 1990s, but throughout the second half of that decade the disparity 
between the non-Maori and Maori average employment rates remained in the region of 11 
percentage points, well above the levels seen in the years preceding the late 1980s. Data 
on median incomes, also presented by Chapple (2000: pp. 11-12), reveals the 
proportionate income gap between non-Maori and Maori females to have remained 
essentially unchanged since the mid-1960s, while the corresponding gap in the case of 
males still is substantially bigger than it had been in the pre-1986 era. 
Thus, the expected narrowing of the relative gap in employment rates as the overall 
macroeconomic picture continues to improve, seems likely at best to restore the relative 
inter-group income gap for males to its historical range between 10 and 20 percentage 
points, but not to initiate a new era of relative income convergence.  
The thrust of the thesis that Chapple (2000) advances is that Maori members of NZ 
society today are not disadvantaged due to any lack of inherent abilities, nor because they 
form a distinct ethnic minority that has suffered active social and economic discrimination 
at the hands of the majority. Rather, as a group Maori are comparatively poor, and it is 
suggested that they suffer the self-perpetuating disabilities associated with poverty. If that 
view is accepted, the economic literature on “poverty traps” (which in its general logic 
resembles discussion of the “low-level equilibrium trap” phenomena studied by 
development economists) suggests that this condition will not cure itself spontaneously. 
Dynamic models containing multiple equilibria in human capital formation rates (e.g., 
Redding 1996 and Acemoglu 1996) suggest how an easily identified ethnic or racial 
segment of the population could become chronically disadvantaged. Suppose that there is 
a group of people that has high educational qualifications and hence has access to jobs 
with high wages and productivity, while another group is initially disadvantaged with low 
levels of education, and therefore remains in low wage and productivity jobs, with little 
prospect of advancement. Then society as a whole, and employers in particular, will infer 
that the group (say an ethnic minority, but one can easily think of a division by gender or 
race) is a “low productivity” group and will tend to discriminate against them on a 
statistical, rather than a personal basis. 
Clearly, it is the initial human capital of each group combined with a “segmented” labour 
market that causes the productivity differences, but the signal extracted by firms will result 
in differential treatment. This sort of stereotyping can result in the initially disadvantaged 
group remaining in less advantageous occupations, which also reduce its members’ 
incentives to acquire higher educational qualifications.  
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The appropriateness of such a diagnostic approach, however, might well be challenged by 
those who also agree with Simon Chapple’s (2000: p. 10) contention that “[p]opular 
rhetoric to the contrary, Maori do not share a common experience of socio-economic 
disadvantage. The Maori ethnic group is not a group whose boundaries are well defined 
by socio-economic failure. Socio-economic differences amongst Maori as a group 
overwhelm socio-economic differences between Maori and other groups”. The force of 
this proposition would seem to be directed against targeting interventions to assist Maori 
qua Maori, rather than Maori qua “Poor”.  
Yet, the major piece of quantitative support adduced by Chapple (2000: pp. 8-10) is the 
observation that the 1997-98 distributions of real hourly earning for Maori and non-Maori 
workers are not at all disjointed; indeed their domains overlap completely, even though 
the Maori distribution exhibits greater weight in the lower tail. Although this evidence 
would seem sufficient to establish the absence of any significant degree of wage 
discrimination, it does not demonstrate that occupational segmentation is not a factor 
disadvantaging those identified with the Maori minority. 
The income distributions for Maori and non-Maori show substantially greater separation 
than the hourly earnings distributions, implying that employment rates vary between the 
groups in the same direction as do the wage rates. Thus, to equalize the two distributions 
of earnings requires moving only 13.4 percent of Maori to higher real wage rates, whereas 
equalisation of the two income distributions would require moving 28 percent of Maori to 
higher income levels. It remains a matter for further research to determine whether the 
high-wage rate end of the Maori hourly earnings distribution corresponds to seasonal and 
erratic employments, and dangerous occupations wherein Maori workers are 
disproportionately represented. 
If the structural, “culture of poverty” diagnosis of the relative socio-economic status of 
Maori in New Zealand is accepted, this would suggest that successful remedial measures 
would entail making substantial transfers of resources through integrated public 
programmes. Such an approach would permit the provision of community health care 
services to raise levels of tangible human capital and reduce the losses of employment 
experience and income due to sickness and medical disabilities. Further, in order to 
enable students to remain enrolled in school, thereby raising the primary and secondary 
completion rates, it might be appropriate to provide family income support conditional on 
continuing educational enrolment. 
Establishing programmes leading to successive degrees of vocational certification at the 
secondary school level, and immediately beyond, would create positive incentives, 
complementing conditional grants of family income support that also aimed at reducing 
the wastage of high drop-out rates. To complement that strategy, it would be appropriate, 
in turn, to expand opportunities for entering tertiary educational institutions and 
programmes after a period of labour market experience. Corresponding direct subsidies, 
to replace foregone earnings, would most likely be required for such measures to become 
effective. Such investments could boost the productivity of disadvantaged minority 
workers in the types of jobs they currently hold, and also improve access to job- and 
occupational-ladders leading to steeper earnings profiles. 
Via that route one might hope to eradicate remaining ingrained perceptions on the part of 
employers that the inferior qualifications of the general run of Maori workers justifies their 
under-representation among steady, higher paying and low risk occupations. Some further 
policy pointers may be extracted from the discussion in the macroeconomic growth 
literature of the role played by expectations in coordinating other investment activities that  
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would be complementary with those involving human capital. Small business loan 
programmes, eligibility for which is tied to the acquisition of specific business skills and 
vocational qualifications, fits neatly enough into that larger strategy. But public 
dissemination of information about the range of investments that are being undertaken in 
this fashion is also a way in which the expectations and actions of economic agents in the 
predominantly Maori urban communities can become better co-ordinated with, and 
reinforced by, activities taking place elsewhere in the economy.  
An integrated programme of support designed to substantially raise average levels of 
human capital (the tangible as well as the intangible components) throughout these 
relatively disadvantaged minority groups can be envisaged. But its resource costs and 
coordination requirements imply that such an approach would represent a major political, 
as well as an economic commitment. Expanding the coverage of such an approach, so 
that it addressed the needs of economically and educationally disadvantaged families and 
youths throughout the NZ population, might raise its political attractiveness on grounds of 
equity alone. Nevertheless, the added administrative complexities of determining 
eligibilities for such targeted subsidies, and the potential drawbacks of establishing 
general programmes of entitlements to resource transfers, should not be underestimated.  
The new macroeconomic theories of endogenous growth, and the econometric 
investigations which they have inspired, agree in finding that an important force making for 
international convergence to common levels of human capital and income is the cross-
border flow of technical information and business knowledge. By contrast, the opposite 
result is to be expected in the case of economies that are closed in terms of knowledge 
transfers, and information-bearing transactions more generally. These comparatively 
isolated systems will converge to different long-run levels of productivity and per capita 
real income that are determined by their respective initial endowments of physical and 
human capital. 
An analysis of this kind, on its face, does not seem immediately applicable to the situation 
within New Zealand; Maori and non-Maori are not segregated population groups, 
functioning in different economic spaces. On the other hand, just how densely, or sparsely 
connected the two sub-populations are by social communication networks is a different 
question. The answer to it may turn out to be important in gauging the likelihood that 
information diffusion would promote a tendency towards socio-economic convergence.  
Thus, analysis of the role of human capital in open economy models of endogenous 
growth may yet hold some useful insights about ways of mitigating the forces that promote 
economic stratification along ethnic community lines within the economy of New Zealand.  
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